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FOREWORD 
Strait of Istanbul has a critic importance for being the only way for Black Sea 
coasted countries to make sea transportation and maritime trading to worldwide. The 
fairway divides a metropolitan in to two side from the middle city which has a 
population more than 13 million. Istanbul Strait is a specific fairway which has a 
narrow width between similar navigation areas, has difficulties for navigation due to 
sharp turns, shallowness and its own special currents. Especially, Port of Haydarpaşa 
Zone which  located in the southern entrance of the strait is one of the most risky 
wateway due to traffic density and external conditions in the world. 
In this study, marine accidents in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone and the nature of 
accidents are investigated by the information of historical accidents and by 
consulting regional experts. The most risky situations has been studied to determine 
in the occurrence of accidents. 
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A DECISION SUPPORT MODEL TO IMPROVE NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY 
IN PORT AREAS WITH AN APPLICATIONTO THE PORT OF 
HAYDARPAŞA ZONE 
SUMMARY 
Safety of  maritime transportation is one of the most cited topics of sciencetific 
research in the last decade. The main reason of the increasing trend on maritime 
transportation studies is the limitations of the low capacity waterways and port areas 
with increasing marine traffic. In case of port capacity problem, the utilization of the 
hinterland and port facilities is key issue in the existing literature. Hinterland 
extension is one of possible alternatives to increase the capacity of ports.However, 
waterways and particularly narrow channels have geographical boundaries which 
usually cannot be extended. Increasing traffic density in these narrow channels create 
a high risk of marine accidents and the hazards as the result of  these accident.  Since 
the population of the world and their consumption is rapidly increasing, the maritime 
transportation scales up to reaching capacities.  
Strait of Istanbul is one of the most intensive  waterway  in the world and its critical 
position is frequently discussed since it is located in the heart of a metropolitan.  
Several studies investigated the accident risk in Istanbul Strait. The main impacts of 
a marine accident in the strait are the loss of life, the loss of aqua life, the marine 
pollution and unexpected financial costs. The recorded accidents caused such kind of 
unfortunate results and both academic and official societies are particularly interested 
in this problem. 
This study is conducted on a root analysis of accidents based on historical incidents 
and a questionnaire survey to find out the risky conditions for navigational safety in a 
specific port area. Port of Haydarpaşa Zone is selected for the application of the 
model which is used in this study. The analysis techniques as preliminary hazard 
analysis (PHA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are used for the evaluation of the 
accidents occurred during the period 1991-2010 in the research area. On the basis of 
the results from the Fault Tree Analysis parameters, a questionnaire survey has been 
prepared to be applied to the experts so as to make a clear comparison between these 
two models. Fuzzy-AHP  method is used  to find out the nature of accidents by 
consulting regional experts in this application.According to the expert opinions, and 
fault tree analysis results  strategies are investigated by analyzing the causal factors 
of the accidents for the prevention measures.   
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LİMAN BÖLGELERİNDEKİ SEYİR GÜVENLİĞİNİ GELİŞTİRMEK İÇİN 
OLUŞTURULAN BİR KARAR DESTEK MODELİNİN HAYDARPAŞA 
LİMAN BÖLGESİ UYGULAMASI 
ÖZET 
Dünya nüfusunun ve buna paralel insanların tüketim ihtiyaçlarının artması lojistik 
sektörünü gün geçtikçe daha da önemli bir konuma taşımaktadır. Kıtalar ve ülkeler 
arası taşımacılıkta en fazla tercih edilen yol,taşınan yükün miktarının diğer taşıma 
kanallarına göre daha fazla olması nedeniyle  denizyolu olmaktadır. Deniz 
taşımacılığında talebin artması neticesinde, bu talebe karşılık olarak taşımayı 
gerçekleştiren gemi sayısında da artış görülmüştür. Son yıllarda, artan gemi sayısı 
beraberinde kazaların artışına neden olmakta ve denizcilikle ilgili bilimsel 
çalışmaların deniz güvenliği konularına eğilmesine neden olmaktadır. Dar su yolları, 
boğazlar, kanallar ve  liman bölgelerinin kapasitelerinin yetersizliği  artan gemi 
trafiği ile   seyir güvenliği açısından riskli bölgeler olması, deniz taşımacılığı 
konusunda yapılan bilimsel araştırmaların artmasına neden olmuştur. Genelde 
yapılan bu  araştırmalardan, özellikle liman bölgesinde ki risklere karşı bu bölgelerin 
daha faydalı kullanımı ve liman sahasının genişletilmesi ile ilgili sonuçlar 
çıkarılmıştır. Fakat dar su yolları, boğaz ve kanallar doğal yapılar oldukları için, bu 
bölgelerde genişletme çalışmaları yapılması zor olmaktadır. Bu dar deniz yollarında 
seyir yapan gemi trafiğinin artması da, daha tehlikeli ve riskli durumlar 
oluşturabilmektedir. Özellikle, boğaz gibi dar suyollarındaki gemi trafiğine bir de 
meteorolojik, oşinografik ve hidrografik şartların da eklenmesiyle durum daha da 
tehlikeli bir hal almaktadır.  
Büyük bir metropolisin tam kalbi konumunda olan İstanbul Boğaz’ı gemiler 
açısından dünyada ki en riskli kanallardan biri olarak bilinmektedir. Özellikle, 
İstanbul Boğazın’ın, Karadenize komşu olan ülkelerin açık denizlerle olan tek 
bağlantısı olduğu düşünülürse bu bölgenin hem İstanbul hemde Karadeniz’e komşu 
ülkeler açısından ne kadar önemli bir konumda olduğu görülmüş olur. İstanbul 
Boğaz’ın da deniz trafiğini, kuzey-güney veya güney-kuzey  geçiş yapan gemiler, 
Haydarpaşa Limanı’na yanaşan veya limandan ayrılan gemiler, boğazın bir 
yakasından diğer yakasına yolcu taşıyan yerel gemiler/vasıtalar oluşturmaktadır. 
İstanbul Boğaz’ın da, boğazı boyuna geçen gemiler ile bir yakadan diğer yakaya 
geçen gemiler kazaların oluşumu açısından büyük riskler taşımaktadırlar. Geçmişte, 
İstanbul Boğazı’nda yerel ve transit trafiğin oluşturduğu kaza riskleri ile ilgili 
birtakım bilimsel çalışmalar yapılmıştır. Geçmişte yaşanan Independenta ve Nassia 
kazaları hala zihinlerden silinmemiştir. İstanbul Boğaz’ın da oluşan kazalar; ölüm, 
yaralanma, deniz kirliliği , hava kirliliği, maddi kayıp, gemi kaybı gibi sonuçlar 
doğurmuştur. 13 milyondan fazla bir nüfusa sahip büyük bir metropolisi ikiye ayıran 
bu suyolunda oluşabilecek ciddi bir kaza bölgede yaşayan halk açısından da büyük 
riskler oluşturabilmektedir. 
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İstanbul Boğazı’nın güney giriş bölgesi gerek gemi trafiği açısından gerekse doğal 
yapısı açısından en riskli bölge konumundadır. Yerel trafiğin % 85 oranında 
gerçekleştiği bölgede, deniz kazalarının görülme sıklığı boğazın diğer bölgelerine 
göre daha fazladır. Ayrıca bu bölgede, Türkiye’nin en önemli limanlarından biri olan 
Haydarpaşa Limanı bulunmaktadır. Haydarpaşa Limanı’na yanaşan gemiler, liman 
rıhtımları, liman bölgesinde bulunan dalgakıran bu bölgenin daha da karmaşık bir hal 
almasına neden olmaktadır. Liman bitiminde başlayan yerel trafik rıhtımları ve yerel 
trafiğin liman bölgesinden akması risklerin artmasına sebep olmaktadır. 
Bu tez çalışmasında, Haydarpaşa Liman bölgesinde meydana gelen kazalara neden 
olan faktörler araştırılmıştır. Bu bölgede 1991-2010 tarihleri arasında yaşanmış 
kazalarla ilgili çeşitli kaynaklardan alınan verilere dayanarak bir kaza veri tablosu 
oluşturulmuştur. Oluşturulan  bu veri tablosunda bu bölgede meydana gelen kazalarla 
ilgili detaylar verilerek kök analizi yapılmıştır. Yöntem olarak birincil tehlike analizi 
ve hata ağacı analizi tercih edilmiştir. Birincil Tehlike Analizi ile, bu bölgede oluşan 
kazalarla ilgili risk haritası çıkartılmış ve önerilerde bulunulmuştur. Biçimsel 
Güvenlik Değerlerndirmesinin bir aşaması olanBirincil Tehlike Analizi bölgede 
meydana gelmiş kazaların, risk açısından hangi tehlikeli durumlara işaret ettiğini 
göstermektedir. Bu bölgede en fazla çatışma, karaya oturma ve çatışma sınıfı 
kazaların olduğu saptanmıştır. Bu doğrultuda İstanbul Boğazı güney bölgesinde seyir 
yapan gemilerin bir birleri ile çatışma risklerinin yüksek olduğu söylenebilir. Böyle 
bir çatışma durumunda veya çatışma olmasa sadece çatışma tehlikesi olsa yolcular 
arasında oluşabilecek panik den dolayı yaşanması muhtemel boğulma, ezilme vb. 
durumlarının ne kadar ciddi olduğu açıktır.Meydana gelen kaza çeşitlerinin 
yoğunluklarının belirlenmesine takiben bu kazalara neden olan gemi üzerinde 
meydana gelen teknik hatalar, insan faktöründen doğan hatalar, gemi kontrolünde 
yapılan hatalar  ve bu hatalarla beraber kaza oluşumunda gemiye  etkiyen dış 
faktörler belirlenmiştir. Kaza oluşumunu neden olan gemi kontrolü ve teknik hatalar 
ile birlikte geminin güvenli seyir yapmasını etkileyen  dış faktörlerin de veri 
tablosuna dayalı olarak 20 yıl içerinde oluşma frekansları hesaplanmıştır. Bu 
hesaplamaların ışığında  tepe olayların (kazaların), bir yıl içerisinde bölgedeki 
gerçekleşme olasılıkları belirlenmiştir. Hata ağacı analizi ile,oluşan kazalara neden 
olan faktörlerin değerlendirmeleri neticesinde kullanılan matematiksel modellerle,her 
kaza tipine en çok etki eden nedensel hata faktörleri belirlenmiştir.  
 
Çalışmanın ikinci aşamasında bir Bulanık Mantık-Analitik Hiyerarşi Model 
kullanılmıştır. Bu modelin altyapısını oluşturmak için bölgenin hata ağacı analizi 
modeline uyumlu olacak şekilde, bu bölgede seyir yapmış olan uzman görüşlerini 
değerlendirebilmek için bir anket uygulaması yapılmıştır. Anket uygulamasında 
kullanılan kriterler, alt-kriterler ve alternatifler hata ağacı modelindeki nedensel 
faktörlere bağlı olarak seçilip anket hazırlanmıştır. Ankete katılan uzmanlar genel 
olarak bölgede seyir yapmış veya halen seyir yapan ve bölgeyi çok iyi tanıyan  VTS 
operatörleri, akademisyen denizciler, İdo kaptanları, şehirhatları kaptanları ve 
kılavuz kaptanlar arasından belirlenmiştir. Uygulanan anket sonuçları önce bulanık 
mantık modeliyle  analiz edilmiştir. Analiz yapılırken anketin tutarlılığı test edilip, 
test sonuçlarına bağlı olarak anketin tekrar düzenlenmesine gerek 
duyulmamıştır.Uzmanlara uygulanan anket çalışması sonuçları ve bulanık mantık 
modelinin analizi sonucunda bölgede kaza oluşumuna etki eden faktörlerin  
ağırlıkları belirlenmiştir.   Belirlenen ağırlıklar analitik hiyerarşi modeliyle analiz 
edilmiş ve kazaya neden olan alternatifler faktörlerin  genel ağırlıkları  belirlenmiştir. 
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Genel ağırlıklar, kazaya  en çok etkisi olandan en az etkisi olana doğru 
sıralandırılmıştır.  
Çalışmanın son aşamasında, bu bölgedeki kazaların oluşumuna etki etmiş veya eden 
faktörleri belirlemek amacıyla uygulanmış olan iki modelin karşılaştırılması 
yapılıpsonuçlar analiz edilmiştir. Karşılaştırmalar sonucunda iki yöntemden elde 
edilen sonuçların birbirleriyle olan tutarlılığı görülmüştür. 
Sonuç olarak, İstanbul Boğazı güney girişinde bulunan Haydarpaşa Liman 
Bölgesi’nde ki kaza risklerinin ayrıntılı bir şekilde değerlendirilmesi yapılmıştır. 
Kazaya neden olan riskler kullanılan iki metodla da belirlenmiştir. Hata ağacı analizi 
metodu, bölgede meydana gelmiş kazalara neden olan faktörlerin belirlenmesi 
açısından uygulanmıştır. Bulanık mantık- analitik hiyerarşi modeli ise bu bölgede 
meydana gelen veya oluşması muhtemel kazalara neden olan faktörlerin belirlenmesi 
açısından uygulanmıştır. Araştırma bölgesi için bulunan sonuçlar ile ilgili 
değerlendirmeler yapılıp ileriye yönelik önerilerde bulunulmuştur. Bulguların 
sonucunda insan faktöründen , gemi kontrolü ile alakalı hatalardan kaynaklanan 
sorunların müdahale edilebilir sorunlar olduğu görülmüş. Teknik hata ve araştırma 
bölgesinin kendine has meterolojik, oşinografik ve hidrografik koşullarına müdahale 
etmenin daha zor olduğu görülmüştür. Bu bölgede kazaların oluşmasına etken 
faktörlerden trafik yoğunluğu ve bölgede bulunan denizüstü (dalgakıran, liman 
rıhtımları, demir sahası, fener, şamandıra, diğer gemiler) ve denizaltı yapıların 
(Marmaray çalışma sahası, sığlıklar) kazaların oluşma riskini büyük ölçüde etkilediği 
görülmüştür. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose of Research 
Risks associated with the vessels, as essential element of maritime transport, has a 
major impact in marine operations. There have been several types of accidents like 
collision, grounding, contact, man overboard, machinery failure, fire, explosion, and 
drifting during the operation life. This study investigates the risk level of all 
accidents occurred in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone based on the last 20 years 
historical data and  a questionnaire survey application to the captains who have sailed 
in this region.  
The risk analysis of the Haydarpaşa Port Zone includes the most common events, 
causal factors of the accidents, probability of the accidents and putting the barriers 
for preventing these unwanted incidents in this area. Evaluation of the risk 
parameters would be useful and necessary to prevent the fatalities, injuries, sea and 
air pollution, loss of ship and cargo, damage to the infrastructures, loss of time and 
money.  It will also be evaluated in the analysis; 
 The most common type of accidents 
 The most important reasons that led to the accidents 
 How often encountering with the accidents? 
 The causal factors of accidents 
 Determination of accidents by degrees 
 Human factors role in the occurrence of accidents 
 External factors role in the occurrence of  accidents 
 Conditions onboard role in accidents 
 Technical Failures role in accidents intended to introduce.
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1.2 Importance of the Research 
There have been made a limited number of academic studies related to the maritime 
sector in Turkey. Most of the scientific studies and the majority of master's and 
doctoral theses were related with certain types of vessels carrying dangerous cargo 
and tanker oriented studies in the Strait of Istanbul.  In international literature, 
researchers have been usually focusing on accident types, accident causal risks, and 
the method applied to specific risk assessment studies of the process occurs. This 
study is conducted on a root analysis of accidents based on historical incidents and a 
questionnaire survey to find out the risky conditions for navigational safety in the 
Haydarpaşa Port Area. 
It is evaluated the accident reports in last 20 years with the characteristics of the 
Strait, weather conditions due to the months, traffic volume, infrastructures in the 
port area, conditions onboard related to the accidents, external conditions affecting 
the occurrence of the accidents, human factors, questionnaire with the expert captains 
who  sailed in this waterway. Also, the causes of accidents have been investigated by 
these reports and questionnaire survey for identification of risks in this waterway.  
Traffic density in Istanbul Strait is rising each passing day. While 4,500 ships on 
average passed through in the year 1936 when Montreux Treaty was signed, 
nowadays, the number of passage has reached 55 thousand ships in a year. Especially 
in the Istanbul Strait, daily 2,100 scheduled or unscheduled local traffic ships run 
from one side to the other of the Istanbul Strait which adds up to more than 700 
thousand passages a year [1]. 
With the technological developments in the field of ship building and with arrival of 
Caspian petrol in the international market, there has been a significant increase in the 
dimensions and number of ships passing through Turkish Straits, on tonnages and the 
variety and abundance of the dangerous cargo. While the rate of the ships carrying 
dangerous cargo was 10% before the year 2000, by the end of 2003 it rose up to 19% 
and has remained at around 18% since then. Serious increases have been observed in 
the transportation of dangerous cargo through the  strait in recent years. The quantity 
of petrol and petrol products carried through the Istanbul Strait was 65 million tons a 
year. This situation is reached dangerously to 82 million tons in 1999,
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91 million tons in 2000, and 101 million tons in 2001. By the end of 2009, it reached 
up to 144.5 million tons. Still, on a daily basis an average of 150 ships pass through 
the Istanbul Strait and 132 ships pass through the Dardanelles Strait [2]. 
In addition, the intensive tanker traffic has reached a daily average of 25 tankers, and 
it is expected to reach up to 30 big tankers [3]. According to the “Maritime Traffic 
Regulations for the Turkish Straits”, large vessels are described as having a length 
overall (LOA) of 200 meters or more, and these vessels have difficulty to keep their 
course in the Traffic Separation Schemes [4]. The first maritime traffic regulations 
adopted by IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) for the Turkish Straits came 
into force on 1st of July, 1994. Certain precautions were implemented for safety 
passage in the Turkish Strait, such as establishment of TSS, only day time passage 
for ships 200 meters in length. In 1998, these regulations were revised after 4 years 
of practice and experience. IMO adopted the 1998 Guidelines in MSC 71 and 
circulated IMO Rules and Recommendations as "Rules and Regulations on 
Navigation through the Strait of Istanbul, the Strait of Dardanelles and the Marmara 
Sea" [5]. 
The rules for navigating and passing through the Istanbul Strait are inspected by 
Directorate General of Coastal Safety, Ministry of Transport according to 1998 
Guidelines (DGCS). As designated by the Guidelines-Article 14, “within the Straits 
the vessels may not overtake vessels except in necessary cases” and “no overtaking 
may take place between the Vanikoy and Kanlica points”. Ships longer than 200 
meters are not allowed to enter the Strait in opposite directions and for ships longer 
than 300 meters; all other traffic in the Strait is suspended to ensure safe passage.  
In the last 10 years, nearly 350 marine accidents have occurred in Turkey, especially 
in the Istanbul Strait. Incidents are classified according to the nature of their 
occurrences as follows: 57% of accidents are collisions, 22% of accidents are 
grounding, 16% of accidents are stranding, and the rest are due to fire and other 
causes [6]. 
The research area chosen as Port of Haydarpaşa Zone spans between the Coast of 
Moda to the Coast of Üsküdar, which is located in the South entrance of the Strait of 
Istanbul. Recently marine traffic density has increased and consequently the 
navigation risks are greater than before in the Istanbul Strait. The local traffic density 
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rises in correlation with the rising city population. 95% of the scheduled and 
unscheduled local traffic vessels transport passengers in the South entrance of the 
Istanbul Strait. In addition, a big part of the population in Istanbul, which has 
exceeded more than 12 million people, lives in this district region. 
1.3 Description of the Marine Traffic and Environment in the Research Area 
1.3.1 General introduction of the straits and dangers 
Northwestern Turkey is separated by a complex fairway that connects the Black Sea 
to the Marmara Sea and the Aegean Sea. The channel passing between the Black Sea 
and the Sea of Marmara is named as the Strait of Istanbul, more commonly called the 
Bosphorus. The Sea of Marmara is connected to the Aegean Sea by a channel called 
as Strait of Dardanelles, as shown in Figure 1.1 [7]. 
 
Figure 1.1 : Strait of Turkey and Sea of Marmara. 
The Turkish Straits, comprising the Strait of Dardanelles, the Strait of Istanbul and 
the Sea of Marmara, are unique in many respects. The very narrow and winding 
shape of the strait is more a kin to that of a river. It is an established fact that the 
Turkish Straits are one of the most hazardous, crowded, difficult and potentially 
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dangerous waterways in the world for marines. All the dangers and obstacles 
characteristic of narrow waterways are present and acute in this critical sea lane [7]. 
Of  the 164 miles comprising the Turkish Straits, 17 miles of this is the Istanbul               
Strait,  110 miles is the Marmara Sea, and 37 miles is the Dardanelles Strait   [9].                
There are difficult elements in the Istanbul Strait include current which can reach a 
speed of up to 6-7 miles per hour, wind, bars and small islands that require forced 
maneuvers and hinder safe navigation [3]. 
The fairway we call as Bosphorus Strait, has a critical importance due to having a 
geopolitical importance for being the only way for Black Sea coasted countries to 
make maritime trading to worldwide, dividing a metropolitan city which has a 
population more than 12 million into two side from the middle, having a narrowest 
width between similar navigation areas, having difficulties for navigation due to 
sharp turns, shallowness, and its own special currents [8].  
About 54 thousand a year, about four thousand a month and 140 a day ships passed 
the Strait of Boshporus. It is the second busiest and most dangerous waterway after 
the Strait of Malacca. The traffic density of Boshporus Strait is three times more than 
Suez Canal, four times more than Panama Canal and two times more than Kiel Canal 
since it is open to the international maritime traffic [8]. 
 
Figure 1.2: Strait of Istanbul [7]. 
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Kandilli and Yenikoy turns, where significant course alterations have to be made, the 
rear and forward sights are totally blocked prior to and during the course alteration as 
shown in Figure 1.2. The ships approaching from the opposite direction cannot be 
seen round these bends [7].  
There is also very heavy ferry traffic in the Strait of Istanbul, which crosses between 
European and Asian sides of the city. There are two suspension-bridges spanning the 
Bosphorus which connects Europe to Asia. Bosphorus suspension bridges 3 miles 
within the Strait connect Europe to Asia. It is 1074 m long between the legs and has 
a vertical clearance of 64 m over a width of 400 m decreasing to 58 m at each end 
[7]. 
Transit and local traffic constitutes a serious risk, especially in the southern region of 
the throat. Due to the nature of complex and difficult traffic all the time, there is a 
risk of marine, coastal, environmental pollution, or even an accident resulting in 
human death in the Strait of Istanbul. In spite of the arrangements for national and 
international legislation, traffic density increased in the region.    
Majority of the marine accidents which have occurred in the strait resulted in a lot of 
fatalities, vessel losses, and environmental pollution.  Istanbul Strait intense local 
marine traffic and the number of ships carrying dangerous cargo and hazardous cargo 
increase the occurrence in the amount of a biological corridor of the Bosphorus 
cruise, life, good and pose a threat to environmental safety. 
A big accident, which may occur in the Strait of Istanbul, could create dire results of 
such a closure to traffic of the Bosphorus particularly the Black Sea countries, 
including benefiting from Istanbul  Strait adversely affect all countries. In addition, 
an accident resulting from dense tanker traffic, the damage to historical structures 
and the natural environment of Turkish Straits could be similar to the damage of a 
potential earthquake in Istanbul [9]. There were several important accidents occurred 
in the Strait of Istanbul. The accidents and effects represented in the following: 
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 1979 Independenta – Evriali:  M/T Independenta (Romanian) and M/V 
Evriyali (Greek) collided in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone. 43 sailors lost their 
lives. The explosion caused heavy damage and windows of thousands of 
houses in Kadikoy were broken.  96.400 tons of petrol spilled into the sea, 
burned for days and resulted in environmental pollution. The Strait of 
Istanbul closed to the traffic for one week. Local traffic was restricted.  Moda 
was closed to the vehicle traffic.  Fire continued about two months as shown 
in Figure 1.3 [10]. 
 
Figure 1.3: The scene from Independenta accident [11]. 
 1994 Nassia – Shipbroker : In March 1994, a collision between M/T Nassia 
(South Cyprus) and M/V Shipbroker (South Cyprus) on the north entrance of 
the Strait. Accident resulted in air, sea and environmental pollution due to 
13,500 out of 98,600 tons of petrol spilling in to the sea. 27 sailors lost their 
lives, fire continued one week as shown in Figure 1.4,  sea traffic stopped for 
a week , hundreds of ships accumulated at the entrance of the Istanbul Strait, 
and city transportation and life were highly affected [12].  
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Figure 1.4: The scene from  Nassia accident [10]. 
 1999 Volgoneft : The vessel broke into two parts because of the bad weather 
conditions on the south entrance of the strait ( Florya Fairway ). The accident 
resulted with spill of 1.578 ton  fuel oil and sea pollution of 7 km coastline as 
depicted in Figure 1.5 [10]. 
 
Figure 1.5: The scene from the  Coast of Florya after the  Volgoneft  accident [10]. 
 2002 Gotia :  The vessel contacted to the Quay of  Emirgan. The accident 
resulted with 22 ton oil spill and a serious damage on the Quay of Emirgan 
Point of ramming is shown in Figure 1.6 [10]. 
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Figure 1.6: The scene from the  Gotia Ship and  point of ramming [10]. 
Reported accidents show that South entrance of the strait is the most risky area. 
Local traffic crossing the strait, transit traffic passing the strait, fishing boats, 
berthing/ departing vessels to the Port of Haydarpaşa can be counted as the risk 
factors in this area. The number of occurred accidents increases on the Port of 
Haydarpaşa Zone and on the South entrance of the Strait as shown in Figure 1.7.  
 
Figure 1.7 : Distribution of the accident areas occurred on the Strait of Istanbul [13]. 
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1.3.2 Information about the research area 
Port of Haydarpasa, also known as the Port of Haidar Pasha  is a general cargo 
seaport, ro-ro and container terminal, situated in Haydarpasa, Istanbul at the southern 
entrance to the Bosphorus. The port is operated by the Turkish State Railways 
(TCDD) and serves a hinterland which includes the country's most industrialized 
areas [8]. 
Haydarpaşa Port and Fairway, in the province of Istanbul represented by Bosphorus, 
in one of the most important metropolis. Haydarpasa is in the impact area covering 
Black Sea countries and the waterway of Rhein-Main-Danube Canal, Haydarpaşa 
gaining substantial importance in this aspect [14].  
The Port of Haydarpaşa has all kinds of transportation such as sea, railway and land 
routes, and render service 24 hours with having 2675 meters length of berths in a 
year 2213 unit ships receipt capacity.  It is the biggest container port in the Marmara 
Region
 
and with an annual cargo volume exceeding six million metric tons (MT) also 
with 360.000 container handling capacity is Turkey's third biggest port after Mersin 
and Izmir [14].  
Port construction was commenced by the Anatolian Railway on April 20, 1899. The 
Company operated the port until the newly established Turkish Republic purchased it 
on May 24, 1924. On May 31, 1927, the port's administration was handed over to the 
Turkish State Railways, which is controlled by the Ministry of Public Works and 
Settlement. On February 5, 1953, an extension project for the Port of Haydarpaşa 
was undertaken. The first part of the extension was completed in 1954 and the 
remainder in 1967 [8]. The last view of the port is shown in Figure 1.8. 
 
Figure 1.8 : The view from  Port of Haydarpaşa [15]. 
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Haydarpaşa Port Zone has the highest accidental risk based on the historical 
accidents on the Boshporus Strait. This zone is selected as the research area of this 
study for analyzing the factors which affect the navigation safety of this port zone. 
The zone chosen as Port of Haydarpaşa area spans between the Coast of Moda to the 
Coast of Üsküdar which is located in the South entrance of the Strait of Istanbul. The 
complexity of the traffic situation and infrastructures on the port area make it 
difficult to navigate in this fairway. Top view of research area is shown in Figure 1.9. 
 
Figure 1.9 :Scene of Haydarpaşa Port Zone (research area) [16]. 
Research area’s marine environment is associated with a number of key 
characteristic as follows: 
 High traffic volumes because of the vessels passing north-south, south-north 
between Black Sea to Mediterranean Sea and Mediterranean Sea to Black Sea 
and crossing local vessels. 
 Wide variation in vessel size and types. 
 High portions of speed sea buses, local ferries, fishing boats and local 
passenger boats. 
 Close proximity of marine facilities within a small geographic area. 
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 Multiple water approaches to the port. 
 Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) 
 Underwater tube work area of Marmaray European side to Asian side and the 
buoys. 
 Close mooring area for the vessels which wait for passing the strait under 
Bosphorus regulations. 
 Quays, Port and a wide traffic network with the railway and highway. 
 Strong current activity, surface current and sub current in different routes. 
 Changing  seasonable weather conditions which affect the traffic ( mist, 
strong winds, rain….i.e.) . 
1.3.3 Natural structure of the research area 
Strait of Istanbul is a strong and steamy fairway that lies by twisting. Due to its basic 
physical characteristic, it is one of the narrowest waterways in the world. When 
measured by the center line, its average length is 17 miles and its cost line is 19 miles 
on the Anatolian Side and 30 miles in European side because of its twisting structure. 
The widest parts are in the North, 3,600 meters between the Anatolian Lighthouse 
and Turkeli Lighthouse and 3,220 meters between the Ahirkapi Lighthouse and 
Inciburnu Lighthouse in the South [17]. 
The secure passing in the research area is 30-60 meters. For this reason depth is not 
an important factor in terms of navigation. Shallow waters at Harem Fairway, Kız 
Kulesi, the capes of Salacak, breakwater of Haydarpaşa, Quays of Haydarpaşa, 
underwater work area of Marmaray are the factors affecting navigation negatively.In 
addition, Kız Kulesi and underwater work area complicate navigation and require 
much attention [1,6].  
1.3.4 Current and wind 
In the Strait of Istanbul and research area, there are four types of currents caused by 
water level and density differences between the Black Sea and the Marmara Sea, 
namely, the surface and undertow currents. Between the Black Sea and the Marmara 
Sea, there is a 25 cm waters level difference, the Black Sea being higher [18]. While 
the surface current flows from the Black Sea to the Marmara side, the undertow 
13 
 
flows towards to the Black Sea from the Marmara Sea due to salinity difference. In 
normal conditions, the speed of the current flowing from the Black Sea to the 
Marmara Sea changes between 0.4 knots and 4.8 knots at varying points in the 
research area. However, the change of meteorological conditions, notably the 
direction and severity of wind affect the current significantly [13]. If the wind blows 
stronger than the North wind and the Borealis, the surface current in the Istanbul 
Strait might rise to 7~8 knots, rising 2~3 times in the parts where it is normally 3~4 
miles. The undertow is generally 25~60 meters deep and flows in the opposite 
direction. The speed of these currents changes between 1.0 and 3.0 knots. With the 
strong storms of southwest wind, the surface current turns to the opposite creating 
the Orkos current. When the Orkos occurs, water levels rise up between the surface 
current and undertow at the mouth of the strait. As the depth of the surface current 
decreases, depth of the undertow rises and the deep water begins to affect the deep 
draught ships [18]. Also, there are gulfs, or in other words, mirrors, in the research 
area which occur when the waters flow into the bays or capes and are  deflected by 
the shore and move in the opposite direction. These currents cause dangerous 
situations for ships altering course where sharp turns have to be made. The current 
chart of the Istanbul Strait is shown on the Figure 1.10 [19]. 
 
Figure 1.10 : Current chart of  Istanbul Strait. 
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One of the major factors affecting safety of  navigation in the research area is the 
current which affects the entire strait. The speed of the current near Beylerbeyi 
Palace reaches up to 4~5 knots, and after touching Uskudar shores, flows to 
Sarayburnu. The speed of the main current in this zone is approximately 3~4 knots 
from Vanikoy to Kiz Kulesi. In the South of Kiz Kulesi, it decreases to 2~3 knots as 
it crashes into Sarayburnu cape. Its speed is therefore reduced and some of the waters 
bend towards Tophane and Golden Horn forming mirrors [20]. 
Direction and strength of current is closely related to the changes of weather 
conditions. With the South and south west winds, the width of the gulf current 
tightens to little more than 1 cable. When the winds of the south are too strong, the 
main current in the Strait makes its way to the North, thereby affecting the entire 
strait [6]. 
The countercurrent in the north bay of Uskudar flows north-east in a narrow line. 
This current is moved by south west winds in to the middle part of the Strait [6]. 
1.3.5 Visibility 
One of the significant factor affecting marine accidents in the research area is the low 
visibility caused by mist, snow and rain. The occurrence rate of accidents is high 
when the visibility decreases down to 0.5 miles. The heaviest rain fall is in December 
with an average 106 mm of rain fall which affects navigation safety. Visibility may 
decrease to 20~30 meters in the strait due to mist. However, the best visibility in the 
strait is during nightfall in December and January and at noon in other months. 
March is the worst month for visibility with an average of 4.8 days in which 
visibility is less than 1,000 meters. Low visibility of 6~10 meters due to mist is 
common in early morning [1, 6]. 
1.3.6 Marine traffic in the research area 
Four directional traffics is formed consisting of transit traffic that passes through the 
strait with stop-over or without stop-over in North-South or South-North bound in 
the Southern entrance of the Strait of Istanbul. The local traffic crosses the strait in 
the directions of East-West or West-East bound [9].  
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1.3.6.1 Transit vessels vs. stop-over vessels (other traffic) 
The number of transit and stop-over vessels that pass through the Strait of Istanbul 
changes year to year. Figure 1.11 presents the comparison of the changing passes 
during the period 1997-2009. 
 
Figure 1.11 : Statistics of transit and stop-over vessels [9]. 
As it is shown in Figure 1.11, the number of transit vessels is significantly increased 
in the recent years. Most of the vessels which have foreign flags do not stop-over and 
the vessels which have Turkish flags generally stop-over. [2].  
The large transit or stop over vessels bound for the Aegean Sea or Black Sea, 
substandard vessels and vessels carrying dangerous cargo are the main factors for 
increasing traffic risks. The elements that threaten these vessels include local traffic 
with oceanographic and topographic structure. Encounter situations of local traffic 
vessels with substandard vessels forms the most dangerous situations. It is a common 
situation for vessels crossing the strait to come closer and/or    pass   closer to the 
transit passing vessels. 
Traffic has increased since the Black Sea countries declared their independence and 
have formed their own fleets. River vessels from East European countries which sail 
to the Black Sea by using the Tuna-Ren seaway also contribute to and affect the 
traffic density. For the safety of Istanbul, the tendencies to use the Turkish Straits for 
transporting Caspian oil to western markets have to be limited. At present, the traffic 
of the Turkish Straits is over the safety limit in terms of navigation, life, property and 
environment [6]. 
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1.3.6.2 Density of local traffic 
An important factor adversely affecting safety of navigation in the Strait of Istanbul 
is formed by the vessels which are crossing the strait named  local traffic.  Local 
traffic crossing the strait is generated as;  City Lines Transportation, Sea Buses, 
Special Passenger Motors Line, Fishing Boats, Excursion and Sports Boats, ,  and 
Military Boats. In the Table 1.1, scheduled local traffic lines in the Istanbul Strait are 
sorted according to departure and arrival ports, voyage duration and quantity. 
Table 1.1 : Scheduled local traffic lines in the Strait of Istanbul [9]. 
 
After investigation of the local traffic lines in the Istanbul Strait , it is revealed that, 
except for the Beykoz-Yenikoy line, almost 95% of local marine traffic in the strait, 
run and/ or navigates in the determined research area [6] . 
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 City lines transportation 
The City Lines Ferries belong to TDI Şehir Hatları İşletmesi which are crossing from 
European side to Asian side or Asian side to European side. City Lines have a fleet 
of 61 passenger and car ferries, a total 54 piers, 17 of which are in the research area. 
More than 800 voyages of City Lines take place in the research area on a daily basis 
[21]. 67% of the sea transportation in Istanbul is conducted by City Lines [22]. 
 Istanbul sea buses corporation (IDO) 
Another company which transports passengers in the Istanbul Strait is the Istanbul 
Sea Buses Corporation (IDO). This line blends with the ships that make international 
cruises within the Karakoy-Eminonu-Kadikoy area. Daily, 125 local voyages are 
made by IDO vessels [9]. Sea buses are the fastest ships in the Straits with speed of 
25-30 knots. Ships run between 06:00 and 21:00, and traffic density is highest during 
the day time [1]. 9 % of the sea transportation in Istanbul conducted by IDO [22]. 
 Local passenger boats 
There are two separated cooperatives and private owners of the local passenger boats 
which cross the strait as another alternative for passengers. These cooperatives 
named as; Dentur Avrasya and Turyol. These cooperatives operate the registered 
vessels to the different points in the strait. A total of 60 boats run on the Uskudar-
Eminonu-Karakoy, Kadıkoy-Haydarpasa-Eminonu, and the Eminonu-Adalar and 
Karakoy-Adalar lines in the summer time. 39 vessels of 4 different types are 
registered to Dentur Avrasya [23] and 62 vessels of 5 different types are registered to 
Turyol [24].  
The time tables of local marine traffic lines, which include city lines ferries, sea 
buses and local passenger boats, have been analyzed and present the fluctuations of 
local traffic density, as shown in the Figure 1.12 [6]. The fluctuations in traffic 
density can be observed hourly in the daytime, the busiest time frame being 07:00-
09:00 am in the morning and 17:00-19:00 pm in the evening. A 100% business 
annotation rate was given to these time frames in each of the peak periods. As it is 
depicted in Figure 1.12, traffic volume decrease nearly ½ during noon time, 1/3 in 
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the afternoon and 1/4 during night hours when compared with peak hours. There are 
no registered voyages from midnight until 6 o'clock in the morning [6]. 
 
Figure 1.12 : Local traffic time table and frequency [9]. 
1.3.7 Marine traffic management and regulations 
1.3.7.1 Vessel traffic services (VTS) 
VTS is designed to improve the safety and efficiency of navigation, safety of life at 
sea and the protection of the marine environment. VTS has developed from a shore-
based radar system with the aim of enhancing navigation in bad visibility conditions 
to a modern system using multiple devices. It is acknowledged by IMO that vessel 
traffic services have been provided in various areas and have made a valuable 
contribution to safety of navigation, improved efficiency of traffic flow and the 
protection of the marine environment [25]. 
VTS is governed by SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 12 together with the Guidelines 
for Vessel Traffic Services [IMO Resolution A.857(20)] adopted by the International 
Maritime Organization on 27 November 1997.  
There are certain procedures for vessels to follow such as area procedures, sector 
areas, arrival and departure reports, approach procedures, pilotage procedures and 
many more in areas that are covered with VTS. Each of the above procedures are 
named with respect to the area that they serve [26]. The service should have the 
capability to interact with the traffic and to respond to traffic situations developing in 
the VTS area [9].
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VTS allows identification and monitoring of vessels, strategic planning of vessel 
movements and provision of navigational information and assistance. It can also 
assist in prevention of pollution and co-ordination of pollution response [9]. 
The VTS guidelines require that the VTS authority should be provided with 
sufficient staff, appropriately qualified, suitably trained, capable of performing the 
tasks required and competent taking into consideration the type and level of services 
to be provided in conformity with the current IMO guidelines on the subject [26]. 
According to the IMO Resolution number 857, VTS provides 3 kinds of services: 
 Information services (INS) 
 The information service is provided by broadcasting information at fixed 
times and intervals or when deemed necessary by the VTS or at the request of 
a vessel. The service may include for example fairway conditions; external 
conditions; hazards; or any other factors that may influence the vessel's transit 
[26]. 
 Traffic organization service (TOS) 
   The traffic organization service concerns the operational management of 
traffic and the forward planning of vessel movements to prevent congestion 
and dangerous situations, and is particularly relevant in times of high traffic 
volume or when the movement of special transports may affect the flow of 
other traffic. The service may also include establishing and operating a 
system of traffic clearances or VTS sailing plans or both in relation to priority 
of movements, allocation of space, mandatory reporting of movements in the 
VTS area, routes to be followed, speed limits to be observed or other 
appropriate measures which are considered necessary by the VTS authority 
[26]. 
 Navigational assistance service (NAS) 
The navigational assistance service is especially important in difficult 
navigational or meteorological circumstances or in case of defects or 
deficiencies. This service is normally rendered at the request of a vessel or by 
the VTS when deemed necessary [26]. 
Increasing dangerous cargo transportation, rising vessel length, high traffic volume, 
complex infrastructure, incapacitation the crew on board, violation of the complex 
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traffic rules, external conditions and increasing the number of accidents in the Straits 
of Turkey have lead to the compulsory establishment of VTS. 
VTS operates in the entire area of the Turkish Straits VTS (TSVTS). The total length 
of the TSVTS area is 243 nm. TSVTS has been operating since December 30, 2003. 
Authorized organization for traffic control is VTS Authority under the Directorate 
General of Coastal Safety on behalf of the Under secretariat for Maritime Affairs 
(Competent Authority) (UMA-web and DGCS web). The TSVTS Authority have 
taken into account the IMO Resolution A-857 (20): Guidelines for VTS, STCW-95 
Resolution 10, SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 12, IMO MSC Circular 952, IALA 
Recommendations and Guidelines (IALA VTS Manual and IALA V-103/1/2/3/4), 
and EU Directive 2002/59 for planning and operating of VTS [9]. 
Marine traffic in the TSVTS area is monitored by using Radar, ENC, AIS, CCTV 
and VHF equipment such as VHF R/T, DSC and DF. The TSVTS also receives 
information from various sources on anticipated ship movements, hazards 
influencing the navigation, aids to navigation and any other information of interests 
to the TSVTS participants. The risks of close passing, near misses, contact, collision 
and grounding are perceived by the system and the necessary cautions are made and 
all these activities are kept under record. The sole target of radar scanners which 
could turn 360°, are vessels and with the so called process of “sector closing”, 
electron transmission towards shore is not allowed [9]. 
The length of Istanbul VTS is 55 nm which is divided into four sectors, namely 
Sector Turkeli, Sector Kavak, Sector Kandilli and Sector Kadikoy. Research area is 
accepted between Sector Kadiköy and Sector Kandilli and the Breakwater of 
Haydarpaşa is the border between two sectors as shown in Figure 1.13.   Each sector 
is controlled by a different VTS operator and different VHF channels are allocated 
for each. While the sectors were determined, the field where an operator can monitor 
effectively and the number of ships that will be placed in this area and the density of 
communication with these ships are taken into consideration [12, 19]. 
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Figure 1.13 : Sectors related to Istanbul VTS [27]. 
1.4 Statistical Analysis of the Accidents Occurred in the Haydarpaşa Port Zone  
1.4.1 Description of the historical accident database in the research area 
Database of the accidents occurred in the research area was created from the accident 
reports from Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs, the Marine 
accidents Investigation Committee under the General Directorate of Maritime 
Transportation,  Search and Rescue Coordination Center, accident/incident statistics 
on the official webpage of Under Secretariat of Maritime Affairs, historical 
newspapers on internet archive, Office of Navigation-Hydrography and 
Oceanography historical data  and  Offical internet page of Turkish State 
Meteorological Service historical data. Appendix A represents the database of all the 
accidents occurred in the research area. Description of statements on the data table 
given  in the following; 
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1.4.1.1 Year, month, and hour 
These statements indicate the year, month and hour of the accident occurred in the 
research area. 
1.4.1.2 Waterway 
This statement indicates the region of the accident in the research area.  The zone 
chosen as Port of Haydarpaşa area spans between the Coast of Moda to the Coast of 
Üsküdar which is located in the South entrance of the Strait of Istanbul.  This area 
has been separated  into 4 parts in the analysis as shown in Figure 1.14. 
 
Figure 1.14 Port of Haydarpaşa Zone (Research Area) [16]. 
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 Harem Fairway: This waterway is expressed as the area between the Port of 
Haydarpaşa and the Coast of Üsküdar. 
 Kadıköy Fairway: This waterway is expressed as the area between the Quay 
of Kadıköy and the Coast of Moda. 
 Port of Haydarpaşa: This area covers all the quays of other (container, bulk 
and dry cargo) vessels, local (local ferry, local passenger boat, railed ferry 
and ro-ro ) vessels and breakwater of Haydarpaşa.  
 Quay of Kadıköy: This area covers the quays of local (passenger boat, local 
ferry) vessels. 
1.4.1.3 Name, type and gross tonnage of the ship 
The names of the ships are not mentioned due to confidentiality. This statement 
indicates the type and gross tonnages of the vessels which had accidents in the 
research area. Gross tonnage is a unitless index related to a ship's overall internal 
volume [28]. 
1.4.1.4 Type of accident 
This statement indicates the accident types occurred in the research area. The 
following principal hazard categories are used in the data table: 
 Collision: Collisions are defined as events where the vessel accidentally hit 
or is hit by other vessels. This may lead to sinking, grounding or to a fire on 
the vessel, but these are counted as collisions if this was the cause. 
 Grounding: Groundings are defined as cases where a vessel comes into 
contact with the sea bed or shore, including underwater wrecks.  
 Contact: Contacts are defined as cases where a vessel impacts to an object or 
a ship. The definition of the contact is made due to the accident reports in this 
research.  This includes impacts on berths, bridges, offshore platforms and 
other vessels. 
 Fire: The fire/explosion category which this appendix addresses is defined as 
cases where fires and/or explosions occur for reasons other than collision, 
contact or grounding. Releases of dangerous good are also covered, including 
toxic and flammable materials. 
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 Drifting: Drifting is defined as incident where adrift occurred by machinery 
failure (blackout), strong current, strong wind …e.t.c. 
 Capsizing: Capsizing is defined as cases where a vessel is turned on its side 
or overturned. 
 Man Overboard: Man overboard is defined as a situation in which a person 
has fallen off a vessel into the water. 
 Rope Stuck: Rope stuck is defined as a situation in which a vessel stuck to a 
rope of another vessel or to an anchor. 
1.4.1.5. External conditions 
External conditions are defined as the influence of external forces such as poor 
weather, waves, current, reduced visual conditions, etc. external factors relating 
to weather and sea are often contributing factors to accidents occurred in the 
research area. External conditions maybe marginal conditions (visibility, 
illumination), physical impact (wind, wave, current) and restricted searoom      
(traffic density, infrastructure).  
 Visibility: Accidents statistics in the research area have revealed that a 
significant proportion of accidents occur in poor visibility. Visibility may 
be defined in various ways, but in this research two classes were applied; 
clear and mist as specified in Table 1.2.  
Table 1.2 : Visibility range 
Clear Mist/Fog 
Greater than 4 km Less than 4 km 
The data about visibility has been taken from Turkish State Meteorological Service 
historical data. 
 Illumination: Accidents statistics in the research area have revealed that 
a significant proportion of accidents occur at night. Illumination naturally 
was applied into two classes; night (darkness) and daylight. 
 Wind: Factor like wind may have a significant effect on the behavior of 
the vessel due to drag. Wind was applied into three categories; moderate, 
strong and violent as specified in the Table 1.3.  
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Table 1.3 : Wind range. 
Moderate Strong Violent 
0-7.7 m/sec 7.7- 13.8 m/sec 13.8-36.5 m/sec 
The data about wind has been taken from Turkish State Meteorological Service 
historical data. 
 Wave:  Wave height is evaluated as a factor in the occurrence of the 
accidents in the research area. However, the causal factor wave does  not 
have a significant place in the occurrence of the accidents in the research 
area. 
 Traffic Volume: The number of accidents in an area is proportional to the 
traffic volume [29]. There are two types of traffic in the research area; the 
traffic in the same and longitudinal direction and crossing traffic in each 
direction. This situation makes the Strait of Istanbul one of the most 
dangerous fairways.  Transit traffic, local traffic, fishing boats and yachts 
create the high volume traffic in the research area. Additionally, arriving and 
departing vessels in the Port of Haydarpaşa zone increase the risk of 
accidents. Traffic volume is applied into two categories; high volume and 
moderate due to the local traffic density and working hours in the research 
area. 
 Infrastructure: Navigation in this narrow fairway with high volume traffic 
increases the risk of accidents. Quays, shallow seabeds, underwater work area 
(buoys, platforms), buoys, breakwater, mooring area are evaluated as the 
infrastructures which affect the occurrence of the accidents in this narrow 
fairway. 
1.4.1.6 Technical failure 
This category is evaluated as degradation or failure of machinery, propulsion and 
steering systems.  
 Machinery Failure: Blackout of the main engine, electricity failure, 
auxiliary machinery breakdowns which affect the main engine power 
systems are specified as machinery failures. 
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 Propulsion Failure: Failure on the remote control of the propulsion 
systems, impacts on the propulsion unit of the vessel cause losing the 
propulsion power of the vessel in this narrow fairway with strong 
current and high volume traffic. 
 Steering Failure: Failure on the remote control of the steering unit, 
locked steer, switching to hand steering too late, reduced steering 
ability are specified as steering failures. 
1.4.1.7 Unsafe acts of ship  
Immediate causes are defined as those circumstances that immediately precede the 
accident.  They could also be labeled as unsafe acts or practices and unsafe 
conditions [29]. 
 Lack of Control: This category is evaluated into two sub-categories; lack of 
control during navigation operation and maneuvering operation. For instance, 
if the steer is locked while passing the Strait of Istanbul , naturally the captain 
will lose the control of the vessel. This is a sample scenario for lack of control 
while navigating. If there is a propulsion failure while berthing operation, 
again the captain will normally lose the control of the vessel during 
maneuvering operation. This is a sample scenario for lack of control while 
maneuvering. 
 Handling Failure (Maneuvering): This category is evaluated as the failures 
done by the master or pilot during in the maneuvering operation of the vessel. 
For example, if the incompetent master starts maneuvering with high speed in 
order to avoid an accident in the high volume traffic with the strong current, 
normally the risk of an incident will increase. This event is evaluated as 
handling failure.  
 Lack of Radar Observation: Not following radar, especially in maneuvering 
operation, increases the risk of an accident. Fishing boats, mist conditions, 
high volume traffic reduce the visual observation with naked eyes. 
 Fixed Positioning: Incorrect fixing of vessel’s position generally resulted in 
an incident in this narrow fairway. A later position fix can be added but 
heading might not be corrected in this category. 
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 High Speed: There is a strong current in the Strait of Istanbul. The 
Regulation of COLREG limited the speed of the vessels while passing the 
strait with 10 knot. Increasing the speed of the vessel in high volume traffic is 
a risky act for the navigation safety of the vessel. 
 Lack of Visual Observation: Accidents occurred in the research area have 
revealed that a relatively proportion of the accidents occur in poor visibility. 
Navigation dependence on radar and other electronic aids without the support 
of direct visual observation of fairway and traffic can be assumed as a big 
factor for the accident occurrence in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone. 
 Planning Failure: Less than adequate resources, failure in understanding 
traffic, failure in observation equipment and failure observation of fixed 
markers are the causal factors for planning failure while navigating in the 
research area. 
 Human Error: Most of the accidents were based on human errors in the 
research area like all over the world. Human factor is important by the very 
fact that ships are still operated by humans. Human errors are evaluated as 
preconditions before unsafe acts of the accidents in this study. Direct effects 
of the human errors in the occurrence of the accidents are determined in this 
category. For example operation failure of the machinery crew while 
maneuvering.  
1.4.1.8 Preconditions 
Conditions onboard or external conditions before the unsafe acts of the ships are 
evaluated in this category. One of the first studies of human error in ship operations 
focused on the following factors; inattention, ambiguous pilot-master relationship, 
inefficient bridge design, poor operational procedures, poor physical fitness, poor 
eyesight, excessive fatigue, excessive alcohol use, excessive personnel turnover, high 
level of calculated risk, inadequate lights and markers, misuse of radar, uncertain use 
of sound signals and inadequate rules of the road.  
Five categories of preconditions (human factors) from the investigated accidents in 
the research area have been determined on the following: 
 Complacency: This category is evaluated as unawareness of actual 
dangers or deficiencies. Failures and deviations are usually related to 
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routine activities and situations rather than abnormal situations can be 
evaluated in this category too.  Excessive self-confidence of the captain, 
psychological causes (personal issues) fatigue prepares as the causal factor of 
complacency situation onboard operations. For example; if the captain does 
not need to follow the radar while departing from the Quay of Haydarpaşa 
Port, this action may cause an accident. In other words, the complacency of 
the captain may cause impact of the vessel with fishing boat in the 
maneuvering area.  
 Distraction: This category is evaluated as losing concentration because 
of noise, fatigue, glare, and flicker in shipboard operations.  
 Drunkenness: Excessive alcohol use is evaluated as a human factor in 
the occurrence of accidents. Example as; If master under influence of 
alcohol does not comply the directions of VTS in the research area, this 
may cause an accident. 
 Incompetency: This category is evaluated as inadequate and unsuitable 
captain for sailing in the Strait of Istanbul. Current, wind, the 
infrastructures and traffic make it hard to navigate in this narrow fairway. 
Experience, qualification and capacitating of the bridge team are a 
significant factor for safety of navigation in this complex waterway. 
 Negligence: Human errors due to low morale, operation in conflict with 
intended procedures or in a less than adequate way, wrong timing, and 
violation of the traffic rules also fall in this category. 
1.4.1.9 Hazardous materials 
Vessels carrying hazardous cargo involved in the accident as a risk factor for the 
research area have been shown in this category. 
1.4.1.10 Vessel damage 
The consequences of an accident are dependent on the damage to the ship [4]. 
Damage or loss of vessel and cargo are the factors for economic and material losses 
of the vessel. Vessel damage was applied into three categories; minor damage, 
serious damage and loss of the vessel. 
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 Minor Damage: The size of the damage is not as big as to take towage 
service or the vessel can sail with a small repair in the shipyard.  
 Serious Damage: Vessel should take towage and rescue service for safety 
operation and cannot sail without a particular repair in the shipyard. 
 Loss: Loss of a vessel because of collision, contact, grounding, fire, capsizing 
in the research area. Not able to operate or rescue the vessel after the incident. 
1.4.1.11 Human fatalities or injuries 
Human were investigated in two categories; human injury and fatality. 
1.4.1.12. Infrastructure damage 
Infrastructure damage includes the damage on the shore, seabed, breakwater, quay, 
other berthed or moored vessels, buoys and platforms on the Port of Haydarpaşa 
Zone. Infrastructure damage was applied into three categories; minor damage, 
serious damage and loss. Example as; loss of the buoy on the underwater work area. 
1.4.2 Statistical analysis of the accidents during the period 1991-2010 
1.4.2.1 Distribution of accidents yearly, monthly, and hourly 
 
Figure 1.15 : Annual distribution of accidents in the research area. 
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The average frequency of incidents involving all types of vessels in the Port of 
Haydarpaşa Zone is estimated 6.45 per year. As it is presented in Figure 1.15, in 
years 2004, 2005 and 2008, the number of accidents reached averagely 11. Starting 
of Marmaray Project work and growing traffic density in the research area can be 
considered as the major factor for this increase. 
Figure 1.16 : Monthly distribution of accidents in the research area. 
As it is presented in figure 1.16, 21 of the accidents from 129 occurred in November. 
It means 16% of the accidents occurred in November. Change of climate, 
prolongation of the night period, strong southwest wind in this month affect the 
increase of the accidents.  
 
Figure 1.17 : Hourly Distribution of accidents in the research area. 
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As it is shown in Figure 1.17, the period of 16:00- 20:00 is the most risky hours for 
accident occurrence in the research area. 33 accidents occurred in this time period. 
As the result of the analysis, local traffic volume increases in this time period. 
Especially, accident frequency increases because of darkness in the winter. 
1.4.2.2. Distribution of accidents due to restricted searoom 
Figure 1.18 : Distribution of  accidents by region. 
As it has been shown on Figure 1.18, the majority of the incidents occurred on the 
Fairway of Harem with 56 accidents. There is high volume traffic on the Fairway of 
Harem because of transit passing vessels and crossing local vessels. Channel width 
and strong currents increase the risk of accidents in that narrow fairway with the 
complicated traffic. Accidents occurred in the Port of Haydarpaşa create significant 
amount of accidents after Fairway of Harem with 47 accidents. Local traffic arrivals 
and departures to the Quay of Haydarpaşa, berthed vessels, arrivals and departures to 
the Port of Haydarpaşa, Breakwater of Haydarpaşa have a big amount of effects for 
the accidents occurred in the research area. 
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1.4.2.3 Distribution of accidents by type 
 
Figure 1.19 : Distribution of accidents by type. 
The majority of the accident types in the research area are collisions with 60 
accidents. Experience with accidents/incidents involving all type of vessels in the 
Port of Haydarpaşa during the period 1991-2010 may be classified as follows:  
Table 1.4 : Distributions of accidents. 
Collisions 60 46.5% 
Groundings 24 18.6% 
Contacts 18 13.9% 
Fire 11 8.5% 
Adriftings 8 6.2% 
Capsizings 4 3.1% 
Man Overboards 3 2.3% 
Rope Stuck 1 0.7% 
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1.4.2.4 Distribution of accidents by causal factors 
Figure 1.20 : Distribution of unsafe acts on vessels. 
35 vessels had accident because of lack of control onboard conditions. Classification 
of lack of control factor is analyzed in the Data Table 1.3. into two situations   as 
lack of control in maneuvering conditions and lack of control in the navigation 
conditions. Strong current, strong wind and preconditions on board directly affected 
the control of the vessel in this narrow fairway. Handling failure in the maneuvering 
operation is another significant factor with 22% of the unsafe acts in the occurrence 
of accidents. 
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Figure 1.21 : Distribution of preconditions onboard in the occurrence of accidents.    
Preconditions onboard are the indirect factors in the occurrence of accidents and 
create a direct effect on unsafe acts for operations of the vessels. Incompetent 
captains sailing on the Strait of Istanbul are the major risk factor in the occurrence of 
the accidents. Especially, vessels passing the strait transit and arriving/ departing/ 
mooring vessels in the research area create a high risk with incompetent captains or 
crew. Complacency is analyzed as secondary factor with 16 preconditions of the 
accidents. Most of the complacency case as precondition onboard   is analyzed in the 
accidents of local traffic.  
1.4.2.5 Distribution of hazards in the accidents 
 
Figure 1.22 : Distribution number of fatalities/injuries in the research area. 
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There were 9 accidents with fatalities and 16 accidents with injuries occurred in the 
research area. 
Figure 1.23 : Distribution of damages on vessels in the accidents. 
14 vessels were lost, 40 vessels had serious damage and 92 vessels had minor 
damage as shown in Figure 1.24. 
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2.    OVERVIEW OF RISK ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES USING FOR 
MARITIME SECTOR 
2.1 Literature Survey 
Or and Kahraman (2002) analyze causal factors contributing to accidents in the Strait 
of Istanbul by using the Bayesian method and simulation modeling. The conditional 
maritime accident probabilities in the l strait are obtained by applying the Bayesian 
method. The simulation model takes into account the characteristics and the critical 
traffic rules and behavior of the strait, and uses the conditional accident probabilities 
determined via the Bayesian method. Simulation results indicate significant increases 
in number of accidents in maritime conditions involving higher transit traffic rates, 
denser local traffic conditions, higher percentage of longer ships and/or adverse 
weather conditions [31].  
Tokuşlu, A. investigates the marine traffic, factors affecting the navigation, causal 
factors of the historical accidents, beside sea pollution as a result of an accident in 
the Strait of Istanbul. The procedures and the reports are also mentioned when a sea 
pollution occurred in his research [32].  
Acar, B. has analyzed all the accidents which occurred in the territorial waters of 
Turkey by using several risk analysis techniques and statistical evaluation. Finally, 
Acar, B. used Delphi Technique with questionnaire survey applicated to the experts 
[33].  
Atasoy, C.  determines the local traffic intensity and some risks-related parameters in 
the Istanbul Strait. The risks were defined based on environmental stress factors via 
Environmental Stress (ES) model [1]. 
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Akyüz, G. examines the safety risk analysis for passenger ports and took an example 
of Port of Kuşadası. Qualitative risk analysis techniques were  used in the research 
such as; data gathering about the research area, hazard identification (HAZID), risk 
analysis by implementing brainstorming  [34]. 
Kum, S.  determines the risk profile of maritime accidents in the Istanbul Strait, and 
then develops a methodology to minimize human error. He exposes the potential 
threats and defines the risk profile based on the geographical and physical 
specifications of the Istanbul Strait [35]. 
Nur, J. investigates environmental, economical and strategic characteristics of the 
Istanbul Strait. The marine traffic, marine casualties and circumstances of innocent 
passage are evaluated based on present safety precautions in her PhD thesis. In 
addition, she generates a casualty chart for the Istanbul Strait by using the statistical 
analyse method. In conclusion, two different results are revealed: (i) the relationship 
between the number of marine casualties and the passage of ships without pilot, and 
(ii) influence of meteorological factors on ship accidents such as current, wind, mist 
and the tonnage of ships in the Istanbul Strait [13]. 
Aydogdu, V. investigates the risk level of marine traffic and risks in the southern 
entrance of Istanbul Strait in order to improve marine traffic safety.  Local marine 
traffic parameters such as local traffic volume, traffic flow and probability of 
collision  have been determined by utilizing various statistics. Afterwards, a 
questionnaire survey applied to the experts with real time simulation studies and 
marine traffic fast time simulation studies for conducting to investigate several 
marine traffic parameters. In  the end, Local Traffic Separation Schemes (LTSS) are 
proposed to promote navigation safety in the Istanbul Strait in his PhD thesis [9]. 
Talley, W. K. et al., investigate determinants of the property damage and injury 
severities of cruise ship accidents. Data of individual cruise ship accidents for the 
period 1991–2001 which were investigated by the US Coast Guard were used to 
estimate cruise ship accident property damage and injury severity equations by them 
[36]. 
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Darbra, R. M. and  Casal, J. investigate  the historical analysis of accidents in 
seaports. They analyzed 471 accidents in period 1941-2002. They analyzed the 
various causes of the accidents such as the type of substance involved and the results 
for fatalities and injuries [37]. 
Yip, L.Y. investigates port traffic risk issues by discussing historical accidents in 
Hong Kong Port. He analyzed the accidents which occurred in the period 2001-2005 
with a negative binomial regression model for analyzing the record of dataset.  
Consequently, he found that port traffic risks are of certain pattern and collision 
accidents are the most popular incidents when port traffic is heavy [38]. 
Trbojevic, V.M. and Carr, B.J. investigate the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) and 
Safety Management System (SMS) which emerge to improve safety in ports and 
shipping industry. They developed a step wise methodology for safety improvements 
of ports.  In the first step, the hazard identification and the qualitative risk assessment 
is carried out to establish hazard barriers which are or should be in place to prevent 
hazards from being released; the controls for managing these hazards are then 
developed and integrated into the SMS. In the second and optional step, the areas of 
high risk are investigated in detail and the approach for risk quantification discussed. 
Event tree analysis, bow-tie analysis and risk matrix techniques are used for the 
evaluation [39]. 
2.2 Overview of Risk Analysis Techniques 
Hazard and risk concepts, constitute the basis of understanding the modern 
management of accident prevention. Especially with the aim of preventing marine 
accidents, there is a great need on the definition of a common understanding of these 
concepts. 
Risk depends on the deficiencies of business or problematic processes, personnel, 
systems and the influence of external factors, and their losses due to accidents. The 
main objective of risk assessment in researches for solutions is to prevent accidents 
from happening. A systematic analysis, by providing an understanding of the risk, 
will support the reduction of hazards. Therefore, risk assessment, hazard 
identification, risk analysis taking into account the possibility of 
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these hazards and the stages of formulation and implementation of measures is 
important for a business. 
2.2.1 Risk analysis 
The terminology for risk analysis studies is [40]: 
 Risk analysis - the estimation of risk from the basic activity “as is”. 
 Risk assessment - a review as to acceptability of risk based on the 
comparison with risk standards or criteria, and the trial of various risk 
reduction measures. 
 Risk management - the process of selecting appropriate risk reduction 
measures and implementing them in the on-going management of the activity. 
The following four criteria are taken into common for risk assessment methods and 
the classification this study. 
i. Aim 
ii. How the relationship was established between events and results (effects), 
iii. Location in the life cycle, 
iv. Format of the results is presented. 
 Qualitative risk analysis - Qualitative risk analysis is used to locate possible 
hazards and to identify proper precautions that will reduce the frequencies or 
consequences of such hazards. Generally these techniques aim to generate a 
list of potential failures of the system under consideration. All the identified 
hazards within the system under study can be evaluated using this method to 
produce a risk ranking based on the highest priority down to the lowest 
priority [41]. 
 Quantitative risk analysis - Quantitative risk analysis utilizes what is known 
and assumed about the failure characteristics of each individual component to 
build a mathematical model that is associated with some or all the  
information  as [42]; failure rates, repair rates, mission time, system logic, 
maintenance schedules, human error. 
Similar to the qualitative analysis, the occurrence probability of each system 
failure event and the magnitude of possible consequences are to be obtained. 
However, these parameters are to be quantified. 
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Table 2.1 : Purposes of the risk assessment methods [43]. 
Aim Examples of the Possible Outputs 
Qualitative Analysis 
Listing  the potential negative effects or the dangers of a 
system  or process 
Quantitative Analysis 
The numerical data which estimates the  frequency of 
occurrence of critical failures or adverse events 
Both Qualitative and Quantitative 
Analysis 
A type of graphical representation looks like a tree separately 
defining the possibility of an event with branches, roots and 
leaves. 
2.2.1.1 Hazard identification (HAZID) 
Description of a hazard is as a situation with a potential for causing harm to human 
safety, the environment or business. It may be a physical situation (e.g. a tanker is a 
hazard because it may collide with the production installation), an activity (e.g. cargo 
pump operations are a hazard because the load might release) or a material (e.g. fuel 
oil is a hazard because it might catch fire). In practice, the term “hazard” is often 
used for the combination of a physical situation with particular circumstances that 
might lead to harm, e.g. a tanker collision, spilled oil or  fuel.  The essence of a 
hazard is that it has the potential to cause harm, regardless of how likely or unlikely 
such an occurrence might be. 
Identification of hazards is the first step in a QRA (Qualitative Risk Analysis) and 
FSA (Formal Safety Assessment). This is often called Hazard Identification or 
HAZID. The purpose of hazard identification is to [46]; 
 Identify all the hazards associated with the planned operations or activities 
 Create an overview of the risk picture, for planning the further analysis work 
 Provide an overview of the different types of accidents that may occur, in 
order to document the range of events, which give rise to risk 
 Provide assurance, as far as possible, that no significant hazard is 
overlooked. 
We should ask "What can go wrong?" for the Hazard Identification. There is an 
example in Table 2.2 for hazards and possible consequences. 
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Table 2.2 : Schematic view of hazards and possible accidents. 
Hazard Accident 
Operations in restricted waterways 
Grounding 
Collision 
Bad Weather 
Loss of crew overboard 
Damage to vessel 
Handling Toxic Substances 
Spill 
Personnel exposure 
Improper waste handling 
Hot work started without authorization 
Fire, explosion 
Injury to personnel 
Vessel damage 
 
In this part, an introduction to some typical risk analysis techniques is given. The 
objective is to establish a set of tools and techniques that we need to utilize in the 
process of carrying out a risk analysis and assessment. In order to understand the 
application, importance and role of these techniques in the context of risk analysis, it 
is of crucial importance to the first gain an understanding of the basic concepts of 
risk analysis, as well as the underlying components of risk [29]. 
2.2.1.2 Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) 
A hazard and operability study is an inductive technique of identifying hazards that 
might affect safety and operability based on the use of guidewords and extended 
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Assessment (FMECA). HAZOP is more 
extensive hazard identification method, searching more systematically for system 
deviations that may have harmful consequences. 
The HAZOP team is made up of individuals with varying backgrounds and expertise. 
The expertise is brought together during HAZOP sessions and through a collective 
brainstorming effort that stimulates creativity and new ideas, a thorough review of 
the process under consideration is made. They use a standard list of guidewords to 
prompt them to identify deviations from design intent. For each credible deviation, 
they consider possible causes and consequences, and whether 
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additional safeguards should be recommended. They record their conclusions in a 
standard format during the sessions [43]. 
2.2.1.3 Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) was introduced in 1966 after the Department of 
Defense of the United States of America requested safety studies to be performed at 
all stages of product development. The Department of Defense issued the guidelines 
that came into force in 1969 [33]. 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis is an analytical technique used to identify hazards 
which, if not sufficiently prevented from occurring, will give rise to a hazardous 
event. "Brainstorming" techniques are used during which the design or operation of 
the system is discussed on the basis of the experience of the people involved in the 
brainstorming activity. PHA typically involves [42]: 
- Determining hazards that might exist and possible effects  
- Determining a clear set of guidelines and objectives to be used during a 
design  
- Creating plans to deal with critical hazards  
- Assigning responsibility for hazard control (management and technical)  
- Allocating time and resources to deal with hazards. 
The PHA may seem like a very general and non-specific exercise and that is exactly 
what it is. To facilitate matters for the analyst, it is therefore important to systemize 
the deviations. There are several ways to do this systemization and the analyst should 
adapt a system suitable for the system and/or situation he or she is to analyze. There 
is a Preliminary Hazard Analysis Case for the oil tanker under consideration in 
Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 : PHA cases for  an oil tanker under consideration [29]. 
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Table 2.3 : Form applied in PHA [29]. 
 
Hazardous 
element 
 
Trigging 
event 1 
 
Hazardous 
condition 
 
Trigging 
event 2 
 
Potential 
accident 
 
Effect 
 
Corrective 
measures 
Kinetic 
Energy 
Loss of 
Navigational 
Control 
Tanker sail on 
random course 
Another ship 
is on tanker’s 
course 
Collision, Rupture 
of cargo tanks 
Fatalities, 
Environmental 
damage, Hull 
damage 
Improving 
Navigational 
Standards 
 
Cargo Oil 
Rupture of 
cargo tanks 
Cargo oil leaks 
into the sea 
Spill exposes 
animal life 
Spill makes 
consequences for 
the environment 
Environmental 
damage, Hull 
damage 
Increase the 
rupture resistance 
of tanks 
Cargo oil 
vapour 
Leakage in 
pump room 
Explosive gas 
mixture 
Ignition of 
gas 
Explosion 
Fatalities, 
Environmental 
damage, Material 
damage 
Install pumps in 
the individual 
tanks 
 
Advantages of PHA method include [42]: 
- The potential for major hazards at a very early stage of project development 
is identified 
- Basis for design decisions is provided 
- It helps to ensure plant to plant and plant to environment compatibility 
- It facilitates a full hazard analysis later. 
2.2.1.4 Hazard checklist analysis 
Checklist analysis is a systematic evaluation against pre-established criteria in the 
form of one or more checklists. A hazard checklist is a written list of questions 
intended to prompt consideration of a full range of safety issues. They are used to 
check a design and confirm that good practice is incorporated [44]. 
A systematic approach built on the historical knowledge is included in checklist 
questions. Checklist analysis used for high-level or detailed analysis includes root 
cause analysis. It is applicable to any activity or system, including equipment issues 
and human factors issues. The analysis performed generally by an individual trained 
to understand the checklist questions. Sometimes performed by a small group are not 
necessarily risk analysis experts. It is mostly based on interviews, documentation 
reviews, and field inspections. Checklist analysis generates qualitative lists of 
conformance and non conformance determinations, with recommendations for 
correcting non-conformances. The quality of evaluation is determined primarily by 
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the experience of people creating the checklists and the training of the checklist users 
[45].  
2.2.1.5 Structural what-if technique analysis (SWIFT) 
What-if analysis technique is a brainstorming approach for identifying hazards and 
their consequences. Hazards are identified, existing safeguards noted, and qualitative 
severity and likelihood ratings are assigned to aid risks in risk management for 
decision making. Questions that begin with "what-if" are formulated by engineering 
personnel experienced in the process or operation preferably in advance. 
This technique is a systematic, but loosely structured, assessment relying on a team 
of experts brainstorming to generate a comprehensive review and to ensure that 
appropriate safeguards are in place. What-if analysis is typically performed by one or 
more teams with diverse backgrounds and experience that participate in group review 
meetings of documentation and field inspections. It is applicable to any activity or 
system and use as a high-level or detailed risk assessment technique. It is also 
generates qualitative descriptions of potential problems, in the form of questions and 
responses, as well as lists of recommendations for preventing problems. The quality 
of the evaluation depends on the quality of the documentation, the training of the 
review team leader and the experience of the review teams [45]. 
2.2.1.6 Functional hazard assessment (FHA) 
Functional Hazard Analysis is a kind of design and a functional point of view is to 
analyze. The purpose of this method is the system which may cause hazard 
identification and function of these hazards is to recognize degrees of criticality. 
Knowledge is needed in order to obtain meaningful results with this method. Outputs 
for the definition of the effects for each function, for an error probability and for 
every one stage should be in the form of providing information about the type of 
analysis [44]. 
2.2.1.7 Change analysis 
This analysis technique looks systematically for possible risk impacts and 
appropriate risk management strategies in situations where change is occurring. This 
includes situations in which system configurations are altered, operating practices or 
policies are changed, new or different activities will be performed, etc. [45]. 
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This technique explores all of the differences from normal operations and conditions 
that may introduce significant risks or may have contributed to an actual accident. 
2.2.1.8 Risk matrix 
This technique is used during risk assessment to define the various levels of risk as 
the product of the consequence of the accident probability categories and 
consequence severity categories. This is a simple mechanism to increase visibility of 
risks and assist management decision making. 
Analyzing the risks with this technique provides a traceable framework for explicit 
consideration of the frequency and consequences of hazards. This may be used to 
rank them in order of significance, screen out insignificant ones or evaluate the need 
for risk reduction of each hazard [40]. 
Risk matrices are used for purpose of evaluation of cause-consequence relationship. 
It is possible to take necessary and urgent precautions before the danger can be 
determined as soon as possible. And also, it is possible to make ranking and 
measurement of the effects on the event of occurrence. A risk matrix uses a matrix 
dividing the dimensions of frequency (also known as likelihood or probability) and 
consequence (or severity) into typically 3 to 6 categories.  
Risks scores are written in Table 2.4 were obtained by multiplying the probability 
and the degree of consequence. 
                                                                (2.1)        
 
R = Total risk  
i   = Number of scenarios which may lead to the consequence  
j   = Number of phases within each accidental outcome. Fatalities (e.g. immediate, 
escape, evacuation and rescue) Environment (e.g. immediate, rescue tow)  
Cij = Consequence measure for the relevant scenario and phase e.g. n fatalities, tons 
of spills... 
Pij =    Probability of the relevant consequence   cij for the given scenario and phase.  
By this formula it is possible to obtain the risk scores for an example in Port of 
Haydarpaşa; 
 
 
i j
ijij cpR
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Table 2.4 : Consequence severity of the accidents in research area. 
 
 
 
Table 2.5 : Sample reliability probability risk matrix for accidents in Haydarpaşa 
Port Zone. 
  Reliability Probability (P)  
  Fire Contact Collision Grounding 
Unsafe 
Acts 
Effect 
Safety of  
Navigation 
High Traffic Volume 1 3 4 3 
External Conditions  2 3 3 4 
Technical Failure 3 4 3 4 
Human Error 4 3 3 3 
L.T.A. Pilotage/Tug 
Service 
2 2 2 1 
L.T.A. VTS/Port 
Authority 
1 1 2 1 
2.2.1.9 Event and causal factors analysis (ECFA) 
Event and causal factors analysis or charting is a graphical or written description for 
the time consecutions of events associated with an accident. The descriptions of the 
charts are [45]: 
Condition: A distinct state that facilitates the occurrence of an event. A condition 
may be onboard status, weather, external factors, technical failures or anything that 
affects an event. 
Event: A point of time defined by a specific action occurring (e.g. maneuvering of 
the vessel). 
Accident: Any action, state, or condition in which a system is not meeting one or 
more its design intents. That includes incidents, accidents and near misses (e.g. 
collision). The event is the focus of the analysis.  
Likelihood Ranking 
High 4 
Moderate 3 
Low 2 
Very Low 1 
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Primary event line: The key sequence of occurrences that led to the accident. This 
line always contains the accident, but it does not necessarily end with an accident 
event. The primary event line can contain both events and conditions.  
Primary events and conditions: The events and conditions that make up the 
primary event line. 
Secondary event line: The sequences of occurrences that lead to primary events or 
primary conditions. Causal factors are almost always found in secondary event lines 
and most event and causal factor charts have more than one secondary event line. 
Secondary event lines can contain both events and conditions. 
Secondary events and conditions: The events and conditions that make up a 
secondary event line. 
 
Figure 2.2 : Event and causal factor charting [46]. 
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Figure 2.3 : Analysis of an accident occured in the research area with ECFA. 
2.2.1.10 Safe operations (SAFOP) 
Safe operations technique is analysis method for analyzing work processes and 
procedures in order to identify and evaluate risk factors with the adaptation of the 
HAZOP technique. SAFOP is a powerful tool for risk assessment of new (planned) 
or changed operations. It is applicable for all activities where a procedure will be 
used, such as process interventions, material handling, crane operations, 
maintenance, and marine activities [43]. 
2.2.1.11 Influence diagrams 
An influence diagram is a way of describing the dependencies among hazardous 
variables and decisions. It is a graphical representation of the probabilistic 
dependence between the various factors that could influence the outcome of an event. 
The technique has been used in human reliability assessment and decision-making on 
explosion protection offshore. 
Although they are not commonly used in hazard identification, influence diagrams 
have the potential to enhance the presentation of hazards identified using the 
techniques above, and may be an alternative to fault trees for this purpose. 
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Figure 2.4 : Sample influence diagram of an accident occurred in the research area. 
2.2.1.12 Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis is a qualitative method useful for mechanical 
and electrical hardware systems. In this technique: 
- It considers how the failure modes of each system component can result in system 
performance problems. 
- It ensures that appropriate safeguards against such problems are in place.  
The quantitative version of FMEA is known as failure modes, effects, and critically 
analysis (FMECA).The analysis uses a form that begins with a systematic list of all 
components in the system, and typically includes [40]: 
 Component name. 
 Function of component. 
 Possible failure modes. 
 Causes of failure. 
 How failures are detected. 
 Effects of failure on primary system function. 
 Effects of failure on other components. 
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 Necessary preventative/repair action. 
 Rating of frequency of failure. 
 Rating of severity (i.e. consequence) of failure. 
2.2.1.13 Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis technique focuses on the major hazard events which occur 
through the increasing of the smaller initiating events. This technique signs the whole 
range of "initiating events” placing "demands” on the system and how the safeguards 
act to prevent escalation of the hazards. Events and the safeguards can be external 
conditions (storm, violent wind, strong current), technical conditions (steering unit, 
propulsion, electricity), conditions onboard (Watchkeeping rules, violation of traffic 
rules, navigation failure) or human error related. In the semi-quantitative approach it 
is not necessary to evaluate likelihoods, the structure of the tree is sufficient to 
demonstrate the means by which major hazards arise. Full details on Fault Tree 
Analysis are provided in section 3. 
2.2.1.14 Event tree analysis (ETA) 
Event Tree Analysis is a technique that logically develops visual models of the 
possible outcomes of an initiating event. The logical diagram used in an Event Tree 
Analysis describes the relation between an initiating event and the events that 
describe the possible consequences. Initiating events (sometimes called top events) 
are defined and their frequency or probability of occurrence calculated. It uses 
decision trees to show the various possibilities that may arise at each step. Possible 
consequences from the initiating event are determined by using a list of questions 
where each question is answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
ETA is a quantitative method and the first task of this approach is the definition of 
the initiating event which is the beginning of events leading to a hazardous incident 
or accident. The terminology which is commonly used in an event tree analysis [40]: 
 Initiating event: The occurrence of some failure with the potential to produce a 
hazardous consequence. An initiating event is sometimes called an incident. 
Line of assurance (LOA): A protective system or human action that may respond to 
the initiating event. 
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  Branch point: Graphical illustration of two potential consequences. 
 Accident sequence or scenario: One specific pathway through the event tree from 
the initiating event to an undesired consequence. 
The event tree (Figure 2.5) illustrates the various consequences and probability of the 
accidents resulting from the blackout of a vessel while passing the Strait of Istanbul. 
The first branch depict if the vessel is close to the shore or not, while navigating in 
this narrow fairway. In the second step of that branch; is the maneuvering restricted 
or not? Other step includes the external conditions while the incident occurred. If the 
vessel started drifting, did the rescue service position to assist? And, the next step of 
this branch depicts; did the tugs prevent the accident? On the other branch, it starts 
with a no answer for the vessel´ s position to the shore. And, the same steps for this 
branch like the first branch.  
 
Figure 2.5 : Sample event tree analysis model applied to the research area.
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Quantification of an event tree is relatively simple, and it can be evaluated by hand, 
although spreadsheets or computer models are increasingly used to automate the 
multiplication task.  
                               Accident = LOA1*LOA2*LOA3*LOA4*LOA5                   (2.2) 
Accident: Accident Probability of a Vessel in the Strait of Istanbul in blackout 
conditions. 
LOA: Line of Assurance 
The probablity of an accident for the first branch is depicted as: 
Accident1= 0.8*0.7*0.6*0.3*0.4  
               = 0.04 per vessel in the conditions of close vessel to the shore, restricted 
maneuvering, violent wind and strong current, tugs ready to assist, tugs cannot 
prevent the accident.  
A probability is depicted with each branch, being the conditional probability of the 
branch (i.e. the answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the branch question) given the answers of all 
branches leading up to it. In each case, the sum of the probabilities of each branch 
must be unity (1). The probabilities of each consequence are the products of the 
probabilities at each branch leading to them. The sum of the probabilities for all 
consequences must be unity (1) as well. This provides a useful check on the analysis. 
Figure 2.5 shows an example of ETA applied to a marine hazard in the research area. 
2.2.1.15 Bow tie analysis 
The Bow-Tie approach has been popularized recently in the Netherlands (EU Safety 
Case Conference, 1999) as a structured approach for risk analysis within safety cases 
where quantification is not possible or desirable. It is a process which can be used to 
effectively demonstrate how a facility’s Safety Management System can be 
implemented. The application is simple, to combine the cause and consequence 
analyses into a single diagram with the fault tree plotted on the left and the event tree 
plotted on the right. The major accident and the origin of the analysis plotted as a 
large circle in the middle of the diagram. 
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Figure 2.6 : A typical display of a bow-tie diagram [39]. 
Bow-ties show the relationship between hazards, threats, barriers, escalation factors, 
controls, consequences, recovery preparedness measures and critical tasks. Bow-ties 
have become a preferred tool in many aspects. They describe the relationship 
between various factors. 
Although, Bow-Tie analysis method is known as a qualitative approach with a 
common application of Fault Tree Analysis and Event Tree Analysis, it can be used 
for numerical assessments of probability calculations as a quantitative analyzing 
approach such as Fault Tree Analysis and Event Tree Analysis.  
2.2.1.16 Preliminary risk analysis (PRA) 
Preliminary risk analysis technique is a streamlined accident-centered risk 
assessment approach. The objective of this technique is to classify the common risks 
from the significant accident scenarios. The technique also determines the risk of the 
accidents and identifies recommendations for reducing risk.  
2.2.1.17 Cause-consequence analysis (CCA) 
Cause - Consequence Analysis is a technique which is a blend of Fault Tree Analysis 
and Event Tree Analysis. FTA and ETA occurs the cause and consequence sides of 
this technique, and hence deductive and inductive analysis is used. The purpose of 
CCA is to identify chains of events that can result in undesirable 
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consequences. The aim of this technique is the calculation of the probabilities of the 
various events and the probabilities of the various consequences, thus establishing 
the risk level of the system. 
2.2.1.18 Operational risk analysis 
This method is a quantitative analysis model as far as possible. There are barriers 
which are in general characterized by reliability, functionality and robustness. The 
results from the studies should enable both industry and authorities to improve 
safety. 
The analysis is therefore performed such that, where relevant, common cause or 
mode failures and dependencies between barrier elements. There are two types of 
common techniques for this approach as briefly introduced followings; 
 Barrier and operational risk analysis (BORA) 
This method is generally used for offshore safety analysis. The BORA project has 
proposed a methodology in order to analyze failure of operational barriers. It is a 
research project conducted in the period 2003-2006. The aim of this project was to 
carry out a demonstration process with modeling and analysis of barriers on offshore 
production installations, including human, technical and organizational barrier 
elements [47]. 
Barriers before and after unplanned events were to be included, i.e. barriers to 
prevent events from occurring and barriers intended to eliminate/contain the 
consequences of an unplanned event. 
 Bayesian belief network (BBN) 
Bayesian belief networks are powerful tools for modeling causes and effects in a 
wide variety of domains. They are gaining popularity among risk analysts as they are 
flexible and well suited to taking the performance of human and organizational 
factors into consideration, and they provide a more precise quantitative link among 
performances of risk influencing factors. They are compact networks of probabilities 
that capture the probabilistic relationship between variables, as well as historical 
information about their relationships [48]. 
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Figure 2.7 : An example of BBN structure for marine accidents in the research area. 
Baye’s Theorem 
Bayesian belief networks are based on the work of the mathematician and theologian 
Thomas Bayes, who worked with conditional probability theory in the late 1700s to 
discover a basic law of probability, which was then called Bayes’ rule [49]. 
One of the most important concepts in probability theory is "conditional probability". 
                                                        P (X=x| Y=y)=r                                                (2.3)                                                                                                   
Conditional probability means that; If Y=y, the probability of X=x equals to r. 
Determining the conditional probabilities for the combinations of X and Y values is 
called the conditional probability distribution and depicts as p(X|Y). Conditional 
probability is important to determinate the multiplication rule. Multiplication rule 
defines the possibility of two events and depicts as p(A∩B). In this case [50]: 
                                           p(A∩B)= p(A|B) * p(B)= p(B|A) * p(A)                      (2.4) 
                                  Baye’s Theorem= P(A|B) = P(B) * P(B/ A) / P(A)              (2.5) 
A: Uncertainty of proposition 
B: Evidence 
P(A|B) : Probability of evidence of A after than B (POSTERIOR) 
P(A) : Probability of evidence of A before than B (PRIOR) 
P(B|A) : Probability of evidence B for the realization of A event (LIKELIHOOD) 
1/ P (B): Normalization 
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2.2.1.19 Pareto analysis 
Pareto analysis is a technique to identify the most significant items. This technique 
employs the 80-20 rule, which states about 80 percent of the problems or effects are 
produced by about 20 percent of cases.  
Pareto analysis is used as a risk assessment technique for the activity level to system 
level. It depends on the information analyzed, generally requires some form of data 
tracking. It is mostly used to rank activity or system accidents. It can be used to rank 
the cases that contribute to accidents. It is also used to evaluate the improvement of 
risk as a consequence of an activity or system modifications with before and after 
data [45]. The following graph is an example of the final results from a Pareto 
Analysis. 
2.2.1.20 Relative ranking /risk indexing 
This technique assesses the attributes of a vessel, shore facility or operation to 
calculate index numbers. These index numbers are useful for making relative 
comparisons of various alternatives and can, in some cases, be correlated to actual 
performance estimates. The following categories show the index values. The factors 
and scoring process are very different for various applications. 
This technique is used primarily to establish priorities for boarding and inspecting 
foreign flagged vessels. It is a systematic process built on the experience of the 
ranking system developers. It is generally performed by small groups who are not 
necessarily risk experts but who have been trained to understand the ranking system, 
and sometimes performed by an individual [45]. 
Some sample of ranking index factors are follows: 
- Vessel owner 
- Flag state 
- Class society 
- Vessel inspection and boarding history 
- Vessel type 
- Etc. 
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2.2.1.21 Determination of risk factors and risk estimation 
In most quantitative risk assessment methods, the probability of occurrence of the 
event - Ei, defined as the probability per unit time or the frequency of occurrence. On 
the results of the factor Ci, is a measurement of the effect of Ei. Ci defined as; market 
loss, injury, death, loss of time, and loss of expression.  After Ei, Pi and Ci have been 
identified; the calculations are performed for the variables of risk and failure / 
malfunction. The objective in this technique is to calculate the values of total risk – 
Ri and create the risk profiles.These two methods are commonly used in quantitative 
risk analysis [49]. 
                                                             Ri = Σ Pi * Ci                                            (2.6) 
The value of the expected risk calculated with the formula mentioned above. The 
total effect of risk calculated as the product of the probability of realization of these 
events with the events and the calculation formula based on qualitative risk 
assessment methods. 
Table 2.6 : Presentation of risk values. 
Event Probability Effects Risk Factor 
Ei Pi Ci Ri=Pi*Ci 
For example; there were 130 accidents occured in Haydarpaşa between 1991-2010 
years. The probability of the occurrence of an accident in Haydarpaşa yearly 130/20 
years = 6.5/year. Average time loss of each accident in 20 years is about 48 hours. 
The effect of the total risk calculated as: 
Ri=Pi*Ci 
Ri= 6.5/year *48 hours = 312 hours/year is likely 13 days/year. 
Determination of risk factors is a step by step process and an effective method for the 
determination of a functioning economic factor based on risk-based features. 
Analysts identify risks, calculate the weights of these risks, and finally find the total 
values of these risks by using this method. Total risk values found by the 
management level use for the review and design of the process. 
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Table 2.7 : Monitoring the risk factors and weights [51]. 
Weight Risk Factor 
20 % Change in the technology 
20 % Complexitry of the system 
25 % Adequency of resources 
25 % Adequency of personnel 
10 % Uncertainty of future 
100 %  
After determining the weights of each risk factor, and scored on a scale ranging 1-5, 
from values given in the example of Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8 :  Evaluation of risk factors 
Ranking Information 
1 Acceptable 
2 Acceptable but need to improve 
3 Inappreciable 
4 Unacceptable risk 
5 High risk 
Example: 
The weight in the complexity of the traffic volume in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone is 
20% and the ranking point is 5. The risk value calculated as: 0.2*5= 1 
Then, the risk values separately determined for each state in the research area is 
expected to gather on the total unit risk value. 
2.2.1.22 Statistical simulation (Monte Carlo) 
Monte Carlo simulation techniques are alternative or complementary tools for 
estimation of failure probabilities. This technique is a class of computational 
algorithms that rely on repeated random sampling to compute their results. The 
advantage of these methods are very simple,to understand as well as to execute, and 
give solutions which converge towards exact results when a sufficient number of 
simulations are carried out. A drawback is the amount of computation time required, 
especially if small failure probabilities are to be estimated. At least for basic Monte 
Carlo Simulation, the required number of simulations should be of an order of 
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magnitude 100/Pf in order to estimate failure probability Pf with a good confidence 
[57]. 
2.2.2 Selecting risk assessment approach 
In the literature, there are many different risk analysis techniques and tools. These 
tools discuss a number that are highly useful for assessing marine systems. To select 
an appropriate risk assessment tool, several factors must be considered [45]: 
- Reason for risk assessment 
- Type of results needed  
- Type of resource available 
- Complexity and size of the risk assessment 
- Type of activity or system 
- Type of incidents targeted 
The suggested categorization of the risk assessment approaches for different types, 
divide maritime decision making into several major sections. 
2.2.2.1 A High-level listing of field unit decision-making applications 
 Prevention-related decisions 
- Managing port and waterway operations: 
1- Main actions which should be taken to address port and waterway operations that 
causes the greatest risk to safety and environmental protection. 
Table 2.9 : Risk analysis options for managing port and waterway operations 1 [45]. 
Common  Analysis Options  
Categories Suggested Streamlined Advanced 
Simple ranking of 
issues 
Relative ranking/risk 
indexing 
Pareto analysis 
Preliminary hazard 
analysis 
More complicated 
risk profiles 
Preliminary hazard 
analysis 
Preliminary hazard 
analysis ( less detail) 
Preliminary hazard 
analysis (more detail) 
2- Actions that will minimize risk for specific operations or systems of special 
business. 
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Table 2.10 : Risk analysis options for managing port/ waterway operations 2 [45]. 
Common  Analysis Options  
Categories Suggested Streamlined Advanced 
Risk assessment of marine 
casualties 
( collisions, groundings, 
contacts ) 
Event tree analysis 
Checklist analysis 
What-if analysis 
Relative ranking/risk 
indexing 
 
Fault Tree Analysis 
Casualty response 
capability/dependability 
assessment 
Event tree analysis 
Checklist analysis 
What-if analysis 
Relative ranking/risk 
indexing 
 
Fault Tree Analysis 
Mechanical or electrical 
system analysis 
Failure modes and effect 
analysis 
Checklist analysis 
 
What-if analysis 
 
 
Fault Tree Analysis 
Fluid or thermal system 
analysis 
Hazard or operability 
analysis 
Checklist analysis 
 
What-if analysis 
 
 
Fault Tree Analysis 
Risk assessment of one type 
of loss in complex systems 
of any type 
Fault tree analysis 
Checklist analysis 
 
What-if analysis 
 
None suggested 
 
Risk assessment of human 
mistakes during critical 
work tasks 
Hazard and operability 
analysis 
Error-likely situation 
and human factors 
checklist 
 
 
What-if analysis 
 
 
Event Tree Analysis 
Risk assessment of new 
operations or systems early 
in development, definition, 
or design 
 
What-if analysis 
Checklist analysis 
 
 
None suggested 
 
Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis 
 
3- Management of the upcoming changes of the risk in port and waterway 
operations. 
Table 2.11 : Risk analysis options for managing port/ waterway operations 3 [45]. 
Common  Analysis Options  
Categories Suggested Streamlined Advanced 
Routine marine 
events and marine 
construction 
Checklist analysis 
Relative ranking/risk 
indexing 
Operational risk 
management 
Preliminary hazard 
analysis 
What-if analysis 
Unique marine events 
and marine 
construction 
 
Change analysis 
 
Checklist analysis 
 
Preliminary hazard 
analysis 
What-if analysis 
 
Changes in waterway 
usage 
Change analysis 
Preliminary risk 
analysis 
 
Checklist analysis 
Fault tree analysis 
Preliminary hazard 
analysis 
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4- A proposed alternative compliance strategy provide the same level of protect as 
the established requirements. 
Table 2.12 : Risk analysis options for managing port / waterway operations 4 [45]. 
Common  Analysis Options  
Categories Suggested Streamlined Advanced 
Decisions for many 
operators in similar 
operations 
 
Relative ranking/risk 
indexing 
 
Checklist analysis 
Various other tools to 
support relative 
ranking/risk indexing 
Decisions for 
individual operators 
in unique situations 
 
Change analysis 
 
Checklist analysis 
Fault tree analysis 
Preliminary hazard 
analysis 
2.2.2.2 Preparedness-related decisions 
- Managing accidents and locations: 
1- Accidents and locations which organizations emphasize in response planning. 
Table 2.13 : Risk analysis options for managing accidents and locations 1 [45]. 
Common  Analysis Options  
Categories Suggested Streamlined Advanced 
Simple prioritization 
of inspections 
Relative ranking/risk 
indexing 
Pareto analysis 
Preliminary hazard 
analysis 
More complicated 
risk profiles 
Preliminary hazard 
analysis 
Preliminary hazard 
analysis ( less detail) 
Preliminary hazard 
analysis (more detail) 
2- Strategies to minimize the risk associated with a specific accident scenario. 
Table 2.14 : Risk analysis options for managing accidents and locations 2 [45]. 
Common  Analysis Options  
Categories Suggested Streamlined Advanced 
 
All situations 
Relative ranking/risk 
indexing 
-Operational risk 
management 
-Checklist analysis 
 
-What-if analysis 
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2.2.2.3 Response-related decisions 
-Managing investigates actions: 
1- Required actions for minimizing operational risks during response actions. 
Table 2.15 : Risk analysis options for managing investigate actions 1 [45].  
Common  Analysis Options  
Categories Suggested Streamlined Advanced 
 
All situations 
-Operational risk 
management 
-Checklist analysis 
 
None suggested 
 
-What-if analysis 
-Pareto analysis 
2- Investigate actions which should be taken to prevent recurrence of accidents. 
Table 2.16 : Risk analysis options for managing investigate actions 2 [45]. 
Common  Analysis Options  
Categories Suggested Streamlined Advanced 
Single serious event 
(near miss): Complex 
sequence of events 
Event and causal 
factor charting 
Checklist analysis 
 
None suggested 
 
Change Analysis 
Single serious event  
(near 
miss):Straightforward 
sequence of events 
 
Fault tree analysis 
Checklist analysis 
 
None suggested 
 
Change Analysis 
Single less serious 
event 
Fault tree analysis 
Checklist analysis 
Fault tree analysis Change Analysis 
Series of repeated 
similar incidents 
Fault tree analysis 
Checklist analysis 
None suggested Change Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
3.   STUDY TECHNIQUES 
There has been a strong focus on the relationship between marine accidents and the 
congested area like the Strait of Istanbul. Traffic volume, restricted searoom, 
physical impacts, marginal conditions directly increase the risk levels of this region.  
The research area mainly is the Southern entrance of Strait due to its congested and 
risky marine traffic. Haydarpasa Port is just located at the Southern entrance of the 
Istanbul Strait and this area is known as the most risky region. This study analyzes 
the risks that affected the navigation safety. 
3.1 Models and Data Used in the Research 
In the first step of this research, ship accident reports were used as data sources of 
Turkish Republic Prime Ministry, Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs, department 
of the Directorate of Inspection Commission during the period 1991-2010 to evaluate  
probability of the risk levels of navigation safety in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone to 
determine the  strategies for preventing  these risks. Additionally, the data from 
internet news and Turkish State Meteorological Service were used. The qualitative 
and quantitative evaluation of these data and analyzes are based on the data source.  
In the second step, in order to determine the strategies for preventing the risks from 
past experiences, questionnaire survey application for the captains who sailed in that 
waterway were used as a data for evaluation. The most appropriate method to profit 
from the ideas and proposals of the captains is evaluated with Fuzzy-AHP method. It 
is made of two different applications in order to achieve the purpose intended. In the 
first application, Hazard Identification (HAZID) of the conditions that affect the 
navigation safety and   Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) method used for the 
evaluation of these hazards with the statistical data analysis
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in Section 2. Following these general considerations, the mechanisms for the reasons 
of occurrence of the hazard are determined with Fault Tree Analysis method. 
In the second application, questionnaire survey is applied to the experts (captains, 
VTS operators, academicians) statistically analyzed for carrying out extensively and 
and it reveals the current situation. The findings of the analysis performed by Fuzzy-
AHP model for evaluation of navigational risk levels have been revealed. 
In summary, the research process was adopted with PHA as the basis of risk 
assessment methods used for definition of risks based on the ship accidents occurred 
in the research area. It is identified that causal factors of risks in details for this zone 
and as consequences of these risks. The frequency of accidents and their  effects are 
determined and  they pointed out the importance levels. It is planned to investigate 
minimizing risks and to develop strategies due to ship accidents in the research area 
according to expert opinions. Research methods and data sources used within the 
scope of applications are presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 : Research-based methods and data sources. 
METHOD DATA SOURCE 
 
 
 
Statistical Analysis 
Reports of accidents occurred in period 1991-2010. 
Search and Rescue Coordination Center, 
accident/incident statistics on the official webpage of 
Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs, historical news 
on internet archive, Office of Navigation-Hydrographic 
and Oceanography historical data and Official Website 
of Turkish State Meteorological Service historical data. 
 
             Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
Reports of accidents occurred in period 1991-2010. 
Expert opinions face to face interviews. 
 
 
                        Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Reports of accidents occurred in period 1991-
2010.Historical news on internet archive, Office of 
Navigation-Hydrographic and Oceanography historical 
data and Official internet page of Turkish State 
Meteorological Service historical data. Statistical 
analysis results. 
 
Fuzzy-AHP Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis results. Questionnaire survey 
application to the 57 experts (captains, VTS operators 
etc), expert opinions, face to face interviews. 
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Especially the data base prepared by the Undersecretariat of Maritime is used for 
accuracy and suitability in the process of collecting the data sources used in this 
research. First-hand data sources used for qualitative and quantitative analysis, more 
particularly selected from among experts in the field, make a significant contribution 
as "content validity" in terms of providing the research. 
3.2 Limitations of the Research 
Problems have been experienced due to lack of data in the interpretation of statistical 
concepts. Availability and quality of the information affects the degree of uncertainty 
in the data. There can be drawbacks to obtain the second-hand data sources (pers. 
comm. Svein Kristiansen). 
Fault Tree Analysis and Fuzzy-AHP model application of complex systems used in 
the scope of the analysis for the first time is very costly and time consuming within 
this research. Accident reports and all the data obtained from these reports have not 
been tested for reliability. There is a restricted data in some accidents. For example, 
some accident data from the reports are unavailable. 
Mathematical models used as a quantitative analysis in the Fault Tree method do not 
give the final result but obtain derived information for a rational decision making 
with a systematic form. As a result of outputs from Fault Tree Analysis a 
questionnaire survey applied to the experts can be tested. Outputs of the survey are 
analyzed by a Fuzzy-AHP model for the comparison and testing of the FTA model in 
this research. Limiting the number of sufficient experts for the complicated 
questionnaire survey in this research is another limitation for the study.  
3.3 Methodology 
In order to achieve the purpose, the following applications carried out intended the 
scope of the research.  The layout of the research shown in Figure 3.1. The theory of 
FTA and Fuzzy-AHP methods is given in the following.  
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Figure 3.1 : Research layout. 
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3.3.1 Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a technique that visually models how logical 
relationships between technical failures, human errors, external conditions, and 
unsafe acts can combine to cause specific accidents/incidents [45]. The technique 
was developed to identify causes of failure and was used primarily as a tool in 
reliability and availability assessment with identifying the sub-systems that are most 
critical for the operation of a given system. The fault tree can result in the occurrence 
of the hazardous event, usually referred to as the top event. This analysis technique 
allows a realistic representation of the steps leading to a hazardous event. This allows 
a holistic approach to the identification of preventive and reducing measures, and 
will result in attention being focused on the basic causes of the hazardous event [44]. 
Fault Tree Analysis method is used to evaluate the probability of an accident 
resulting from sequences and combinations of faults and failure events. 
This methodology first developed in 1962 by H.S. Watson at the Bell Telephone 
Laboratories during the development of the ´ Minuteman ´ rocket´s combustion 
chamber. In later years, engineer’s working for Boeing Company Failure Modes and 
Effect Analysis method was developed and Fault Tree Analysis was applied. The 
method has become popular in 1980’s by United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. They have used this technique on an official way and prepared a guide 
for this method [43].  
The main principles of the Fault Tree Analysis method are illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 : Principles of establishing a fault tree [29].
70 
 
The logical diagram used in an FTA consists of a set of gate symbols that describe 
the relationship between causes, and event symbols that characterize the causes [29]. 
Symbols and their meanings used in Fault Tree Risk Assessments indicated in table 
3.2. 
Table 3.2 : Symbols and their meanings using for constructing a fault tree [45]. 
SYMBOL DEFINITION 
 
 
 
 
Top event and intermediate events: The rectangle is used to 
represent the TOP event and any intermediate fault events in a 
fault tree. The TOP event is the accident that is being analyzed. 
Intermediate events are system states or ccurrences that somehow 
contribute to the accident. 
 
 
 
 
AND gates: The event in the rectangle is the output event of the 
AND gate below the rectangle. The output event associated with 
this gate exists only if all of the input events exist simultaneously. 
 
 
 
 
OR gates: The event in the rectangle is the output event of the  
OR gate below the rectangle. The output event associated with 
this gate exists if at least one of th input events exists. 
 
 
 
 
Basic events: The circle is used to represent basic events in a 
fault tree. It is the lowest level of rsolution in the fault tree. 
 
 
 
Undeveloped events: The diamond is used to represent human 
errors and events that are not further developed in fault tree. 
 
 
 
 
Inhibit gates: The event in the rectangle is the output event of 
the INHIBIT gatebelow the rectangle. This gate is a special case 
of the AND gate. The output event associated with this gate exists 
only if the input eventexists and if the qualifying condition is 
satisfied. 
 
 
 
Transfer symbols: Transfer symbols are used to indicate that the 
fault tree continues on a different part. 
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The main objective of the fault-tree analysis method is to determine the combination 
of probabilities which caused the occurrence of the TOP event. Preventive measures 
are analyzed in details for realization or not realization of the TOP EVENT. And 
also, all the factors analyzed which may cause the TOP event.  
 
Figure 3.3 : Example of a fault tree [46]. 
The fault-tree given in Figure 3.3 is composed of different events connected to each 
other. These events associated in tandem with a logic sequence. Events described in 
the fault-tree are technical/equipment failures, human errors, external 
conditions…etc., may cause undesirable consequences. The TOP event identified as 
A.  Realization of event A occurs due to the realization of event B and the realization 
of event C. Realization of event E occurs only the consists of event D and E.  
Specially, it must be cared on the use of symbols in the following situations: 
 A simple notation should be adopted in terms of the tree for easily 
understood. 
 Two gates should not feed each other. There should be an event between two 
gates. 
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Figure 3.4 : Facts that need to be considered in building fault tree [53]. 
    A fault tree can be analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
    Fault Tree Analysis is a risk assessment technique that generates [45]; 
 Qualitative descriptions of potential problems and combinations of events 
causing specific problems of  interest 
 Quantitative estimates of failure frequencies and likelihoods, and relative 
importance of various failure sequences and contributing events 
 List of recommendations for reducing risks 
 Quantitative evaluations of recommendation effectiveness 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a logical presentation of many events and component 
failures that may combine to cause one critical event (e.g. navigation failure). Logic 
gates (mainly AND or OR gates) are used to show how basic events may combine to 
cause the TOP event. The top event normally be a major hazard such as “Collision ". 
The possible consequences would be estimated separately.  
Fault tree construction usually starts with the top event, and works down towards the 
basic events. It should be evaluated what conditions are necessary produce the event 
for each event. And also it should be represented these events at the next level down. 
If any one of several events may cause the higher event, they are joined with an OR 
gate. If two or more events must occur in combination, they are joined with an AND 
gate [54]. 
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The event symbols are rectangle, circle, diamond and triangle as described in the 
Table 3.2. Rectangle is used to depict of a failure output event, which results from 
combination of basic failure and intermediate events acting through the logic gates. 
The circle is used to assign a primary or basic fault event. The diamond represents 
failure inputs that are not a basic event but considered as a basic failure input since 
the cause of the failure has not been further developed due to lack of information. 
The triangle is used to indicate a transfer from one part of an FT to another [42]. 
   Following steps are necessary for performing a fault tree analysis: 
 
Figure 3.5 : Procedures for FTA [45]. 
Step 1 Definition of the system  and  boundary conditions:  Definition of physical 
borders and initial conditions of the system for which failure information is needed 
[29,45]. 
Step 2  Definition of  the TOP event for the Analysis: The description of the TOP 
event should give answers to " what the event is ? ", " where it occurs ? " and " when 
it occurs ? "  This may be a specific problem, distraction, safety issue, etc [29, 45]. 
Step 3 Definition of the treetop structure: The main task in the FTA approach is to 
systematically describe and structure the conditions and causes that directly lead to 
the top event. “What are the causes?” [29, 45]. 
Step 4 Exploration of each branch in successive levels of detail:  Description of 
failure events and assessment of failure events as primary failures, secondary failures 
and command failures. Determine the events and conditions that most directly lead to 
each intermediate event. Assessment the logical relation between the causes. Repeat 
the process at each successive level of the tree until the fault tree model is complete 
[29, 45]. 
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Step 5 Solution of the fault tree for the combinations of events contributing to 
the TOP event: Examine the fault tree model to identify all the possible 
combinations of events and conditions that can cause the TOP event of interest. 
Establishing the cut sets and path sets in that level is necessary. A cut set means that 
the set of basic events that secures that the TOP event will occur. A path set means 
that the set of basic events that by not occurring secures that the TOP event does not 
occur [7, 10].  For example, a minimal cut set for collision in the Port of Haydarpaşa 
Zone might have three events: 1) drunk captain violated the traffic rules 2) planning 
failure of the navigation 3) Strong current and strong wind weather conditions. 
Step 6 Identification of the important dependent failure potentials: Study the 
fault tree model and the list of minimal cut sets to identify potentially important 
dependencies among events. Like the number of  basic events in the minimal cut set 
and categorization/ ranking of basic events  ( human errors, technical failures, 
maneuvering failures) The step is qualitative common cause failure analysis [7, 10]. 
Step 7 Performing of the quantitative analysis:  The quantitative analysis of the 
fault tree uses the failure or reliability probability of the basic events and fault tree 
gates to calculate the probability of the TOP event. It is useful for the prediction 
future performance for the system [7, 10]. 
Step 8 Using the results for decision making: Use results of the analysis to identify 
the most significant vulnerabilities in the system and to make effective 
recommendations for reducing the risks associated with those vulnerabilities [45]. 
Fault Tree Analysis Model works with a completion qualitative and quantitative 
analysis applications. Step 1 to 5 accepted as a qualitative analysis and step 6 to 8 
accepted as quantitative analysis application. It will be followed and detailed these 
steps in the fault tree analysis of navigational safety in the research area. 
Likelihood of a TOP event calculation is given in a quantitative analysis of a Fault 
Tree given in Figure 3.6. 
If the probability of  the TOP event indicated with T, the calculation of probability of 
T is, 
                                                    T= X1 U A1 U A2                                                                         (3.1) 
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The probability of TOP event is compound set of the sub-component of X1, A1,  A2  as 
shown in formula. 
Figure 3.6 : A basic fault tree analysis process. 
The sub-component A1 and A2 are indicated as; 
                                                       A1 = X2 ∩ X3                                                                               (3.2) 
And 
                                                       A2 = X4 ∩ X5                                                                              (3.3) 
Generally, Pxi expressed as the probability of any xi event. The probability of the TOP 
event is calculated with the following formula. 
                                         PT = 1- (( 1- Px1 ) ( 1- PA1 )( 1- PA2 ))                            (3.4) 
Px1  is the probability of  X1, PA1 is the probability of  A1 and  PA2 is the probability of  
A2.  
And the probabilities of  PA1  and  PA2  are calculated as; 
                                                          PA1 = Px2 Px3                                                                          (3.5) 
and 
                                                  PA2= 1- (( 1- Px4 ) ( 1- Px5 ))                                  (3.6) 
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When calculating probabilities, probabilities of sub-components used in the gates OR 
and AND , are to be considered how to attend the calculations. If the gate AND is 
used, the output is completely dependent to the inputs. If the gate OR is used, the 
output is dependent at least one input. 
After calculating probabilities of each basic event, the probability of the TOP event 
is calculated easily. This calculations will be applicated for analyzing navigational 
safety of  Haydarpaşa Port Zone in the following sections. 
The strengths of Fault Tree Analysis are [40, 45]; 
 It is widely used and well accepted. 
 It is suitable for technical failures and human errors. 
 It is a clear and logical form of presentation. 
 It is often the only technique that can generate credible likelihoods for novel, 
comply systems. 
 It is suitable for many hazards in Quantitative Risk Analysis that arise from 
combination of adverse circumstances. 
 It is often the only technique that can generate credible likelihoods for 
complex systems. 
 It can be used as an effective root cause analysis tool to understand the causal 
factors of an incident/accident. 
 It can be used as an effective root cause analysis tool to determine the actual 
root causes of an incident/accident. 
    Its weaknesses are; 
 All events are assumed to be independent. 
 It soon becomes complicated, time-consuming and difficult to follow for 
large systems. 
 It loses its clarity when applied to systems that do not fall into simple failed 
or working states (e.g. human error, adverse weather etc). 
 The diagrammatic format discourages analysts from stating explicitly the 
assumptions and conditional probabilities for each gate. This can be 
overcome by careful back-up text documentation. 
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 Analysts may overlook failure modes and fail to recognize common cause 
failures (i.e. a single fault affecting two or more safeguards) unless they have 
a high level of expertise and work jointly with the operator. 
 It examines only one specific accident of interest. To analyze other types of 
incidents/accidents, other fault trees must be developed. 
3.3.2 Fuzzy-AHP model 
3.3.2.1 Fuzzy sets and triangular fuzzy numbers 
The term “fuzzy set” first appeared in 1965 when professor Lotfi A. Zadeh from the 
University of  Berkeley, USA, published a paper entitled “Fuzzy sets”. Since then he 
has achieved many major theoretical breakthroughs in this field and has been quickly 
joined by numerous research workers developing theoretical works . In  1970s, some 
researchers turned their interest to the resolution by fuzzy logic of problems 
considered to be difficult. In 1975 professor Mamdani from London developed a 
strategy for process control and published the encouraging results he had obtained 
for the control of a steam motor. In 1978, the Danish company, F.L. Smidth, 
achieved the control of a cement kiln. This was the first genuine industrial 
application of fuzzy logic [55]. 
In continuous and batch production processes, as well as in automation systems , 
applications have also increased. Fuzzy logic has developed in this area as it is an 
essentially pragmatic, effective and generic approach. It allows systematization of 
empirical knowledge and which is thus hard to control. The theory of fuzzy sets 
offers a suitable method that is easy to implement in real time applications, and 
enables knowledge of designers and operators to be transcribed into dynamic control 
systems [55]. 
The theory of fuzzy set is improved to cope with the extraction of the principal 
outcome from a variety of information distantly and roughly [56]. Fuzzy set theory 
treats vague data as possibility distributions in terms of set memberships. Once 
determined and defined, the sets of memberships in possibility distributions can be 
effectively used in logical reasoning [57]. It is an effective instrument for modeling 
in the lack of comprehensive and accurate information.  The fuzzy set theory has 
been become a significant application in complex finance, management and business 
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problems. A triangular fuzzy number is a particular fuzzy set Ã, and its membership 
function ( )
A
x is a continuous linear function. 
Description 1: In a universe of discourse  X , Ã is a fuzzy subset of X is defined  by a 
membership function 
A
  (x),  which maps each element x in X to a real number in 
the interval  [0, 1].  It is assigned to stand for the membership of x to Ã, and 
A
 (x) is 
called the membership function of fuzzy set Ã. 
Definition 2: A fuzzy number Ã is a convex and normalized fuzzy set of  X. 
Definition 3: A triangular fuzzy number is defined by its basic particulars which is 
          
0,                        ,
( ) / ( ),   ,
( ) 1,                         ,
( ) / ( ),   ,
0,                        .
A
x l
x l m l l x m
x x m
u x u m m x u
u x


    

 
    


              (3.7) 
where l and u correspond to the lower and upper bounds of the fuzzy number Ã, 
respectively, and m is the midpoint. The triangular fuzzy number is indicated as 
Ã=(l,m,u). Arithmetic operations between fuzzy numbers or a fuzzy number and 
crisp number are defined in Zadeh paper [56] by standard fuzzy arithmetic 
operations. 
3.3.2.2 Fuzzy-AHP (FAHP) 
FAHP method is a systematic process to the alternative selection and justification 
problem by using the concepts of fuzzy set theory and hierarchical structure analysis. 
Decision makers can specify preferences in the form of natural language or 
numerical value about the importance of each performance attribute. The system 
combines these preferences using FAHP with existing data. In the FAHP method, the 
pair-wise comparisons in the judgment matrix are fuzzy numbers and use fuzzy 
arithmetic and fuzzy aggregation operators, the procedure calculates a sequence of 
weight vectors that will be used to choose main attribute [58]. 
Laarhoven and Pedrycz have evolved AHP into the FAHP, adapting the triangular 
fuzzy number of the fuzzy set theory into the pairwise comparison matrix of the AHP 
[59]. Manyscholars proposed FAHP methods for various decision making problems.  
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Leung and Cao propose a fuzzy consistency definition with consideration of a 
tolerance deviation. The fuzzy ratios of relative importance are formulated as 
constraints on the membership values of the local priorities. The fuzzy local and 
global weights are determined via the extension principle. The alternatives are 
ranked on the basis of the global weights by application of max-min set ranking 
method [60]. Buckley determined trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to express the priorities 
of comparison ratios [61]. Chang used triangular fuzzy membership value for pair-
wise comparison and introduced a new approach for handling FAHP named “extent 
synthesis analysis” [62].  Lee et al.  review the basic ideas behind the AHP and 
introduce the concept of comparison interval and propose a methodology based on 
stochastic optimization to achieve global consistency and to accommodate the fuzzy 
nature of the comparison process [63]. Weck et al. presents a method for evaluating 
different production cycle alternatives adding the mathematics of fuzzy logic to the 
classical AHP [64]. 
In the present study, extent synthesis method of Chang is preferred as base method 
and the proposed design is developed by supporting consistency control, expert 
prioritization and ranking for direct numerical valuations. Chang introduces extent 
synthesis method as follows: 
Let X={x1, x2,…, xn} be an object set and U= {u1, u2,…, um} be a goal set. According 
to the method of extent analysis, each object is taken and extent analysis for each 
goal is performed, respectively [62]. Therefore, m extent analysis values for each 
object can be obtained, with the following signs: 
                               1 2, ,...,
i i i
m
g g gM M M , i=1, 2,…, n,             (3.8) 
Where all the jgM (j=1,2,…,m) are TFNs. 
The steps of Chang’s extent analysis can be given as in the following: 
Step 1: The value of fuzzy synthetic extent with respect to the ith object is defined as 
                                         
1
1 1 1
i i
m n m
j j
i g g
j i j
S M M

  
 
  
 
                          (3.9)
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To obtain
1
i
m
j
g
j
M

 , the fuzzy addition operation of m extent analysis values for a 
particular matrix is performed such as: 
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And to obtain
1
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values is performed such as: 
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and then the inverse of the vector in Eq. (3.9) is computed, such as: 
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Step 2: The degree of possibility of M2= (l2, m2, u2) ≥ M1=(l1, m1, u1) is defined as  
                              
1 22 1
( ) sup min( ( ), ( ))M M
y x
V M M x y 

                (3.13) 
and can be expressed as follows: 
V (M2≥ M1) =hgt (M1∩ M2)  
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Figure 3.7  illustrates Eq. 3.14 where d is the ordinate of the highest intersection 
point D between 
1M
  and
2M
 . To compare M1 and M2, we need both the values of V 
(M1≥M2) and V (M2≥ M1). 
 
Figure 3.7 :  The intersection between M1 and M2. 
Step 3: The degree possibility for a convex fuzzy number to be greater than k convex 
fuzzy Mi (i=1,2,…,k) numbers can be defined by 
V (M≥M1, M2,…, Mk) =V [(M≥M1) and (M≥M2) and … and (M≥Mk)] 
                                  =min V (M≥Mi), i=1,2,3,…,k.                       (3.15) 
Assume that d'(Ai)=minV(Si≥Sk) for k=1,2,…,n; k≠i..Then the weight vector     
is given by 
                                  W'= (d'(A1), d’(A2),…,d'(An))
T
           (3.16) 
Where Ai (i=1, 2,…, n) are n elements. 
Step 4: Via normalization, the normalized weight vectors are  
                           W= (d(A1), d(A2),…,d(An))                                  (3.17) 
where W is a non-fuzzy number. 
The non-numerical expressions as fuzzy linguistic variables, which help the decision 
maker to describe his/her pair-wise comparison of each criterion and alternatives, 
reflect the Saaty (1977)’s nine-point fundamental scale (Fig.3.8). Assign the 
linguistic comparison terms [65-68]  and their equivalent fuzzy numbers are shown 
in Table 3.3. 
0    l2       m2  l1    d  u2   m1 u1 
 
 
 
M2 M1 
V(M2 ≥ M1) 
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Figure 3.8 :  Fuzzy number of linguistic variable set. 
Table 3.3 :  Membership function of linguistic scale. 
Fuzzy number Linguistic scales   Membership function Inverse   
1A    Equally important  (1,1,1)   (1,1,1) 
2A    Slightly important  (1,1,3)   (1/3,1,1) 
3A    Moderately important  (1,3,5)   (1/5,1/3,1) 
4A    More important   (3,5,7)   (1/7,1/5,1/3) 
5A    Strongly important  (5,7,9)   (1/9,1/7,1/5) 
6A    Extremely important  (7,9,9)   (1/9,1/9,1/7) 
 Centric consistency index (CCI) 
The consistency control of the proposed method is based on the geometric 
consistency index (GCI) framework [69] and centric consistency index (CCI) is 
fuzzy extended version of the GCI . The procedure of the CCI is as follows: 
Let A = (aLij,aMij,aUij)n×n be a fuzzy judgment matrix,                                                                       
and let w = [(wL1,wM1,wU1),(wL2,wM2,wU2),…,(wLn,wMn,wUn)]
T
 be the priority vector 
derived from A using the RGMM. The centric consistency index (CCI) is computed 
by 
2
2
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1      3        5       7       9 
1A     2A      3A     4A     5A  
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When CCI(A)=0, we consider A fully consistent. Aguarón et al.  also provide the 
thresholds ( )GCI  as GCI =0.31 for n=3; GCI =0.35 for n=4 and GCI =0.37 for n>4 
[74]. When CCI (A) < GCI , it is considered that the matrix A is sufficiently 
consistent. Since the CCI is a fuzzy extended version of the GCI, thresholds remain 
identical. 
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4.  ANALYSIS OF MARINE ACCIDENTS OCCURRING IN THE PORT OF 
HAYDARPAŞA ZONE 
4.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis of Accidents in the Research Area 
The primary purpose of PHA identifies the critical issues relating to safety, 
preliminary assessment related the identification of hazards and definition of 
necessary accident/incident controls. 
Maritime Organization of data collection FSI Sub-Committee and the main topics in 
the forms of the Turkish Republic Prime Ministry, Undersecretariat of Maritime 
Affairs, department of the Directorate of Inspection Commission (DEKIK), are 
expressed as follows ( A sample form of DEKIK given in the Appendix B) . 
Potential hazards that the ships come across at sea are described in Section 1, 
classified under the topic headings in Figure 4.1. Insurance companies and class 
societies use this classification for ship accidents described under these headings. 
 
Figure 4.1 : Potential hazards in the research area  [70]. 
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Navigational hazards, which the vessels are likely to encounter, were evaluated 
according to their importance in the research area during the period 1991-2010,  as 
shown in Table 4.1.  The severity of the hazards likely to happen is divided into three 
main groups: 
 High level  
 Medium level  
 Low level 
This importance degree of hazards indicated from the obtained accident data and 
analyzed statistical data in Section 1. 
Table 4.1 :  Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) of navigation hazards in the research 
area. 
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Table 4.1 (continued) : Preliminary Hazard analysis (PHA) of navigation hazards in 
the research area. 
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Table 4.1 (continued) : Preliminary Hazard analysis (PHA) of navigation hazards in 
the research area. 
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Table 4.1 (continued) : Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) of navigation hazards 
in the research area. 
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Table 4.1  (continued) : Preliminary Hazard analysis (PHA) of navigation hazards 
in the research area. 
 
The data in the past is taken into account in order to determine the severity levels of 
the accidents in Table 4.1. 60 collisions, 24 groundings, 18 contacts, 11 fires, 8 
drifting, 4 capsizing, 3 man overboard and 1 rope stuck accidents are analyzed in this 
research.  Sub-systems and measures affecting the accidents in the past are identified 
by the Primary Hazard Analysis of the research area to prevent these hazards.  Sub-
systems affecting the hazards are also specified in detailed mechanisms of the Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) together in the next step of this research.  
4.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) of Accidents 
Marine accidents occurred during the period 1991-2010 are evaluated with a Fault 
Tree Analysis technique in this section of this research. 
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4.2.1 Approach 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods are used with a Fault Tree approach to 
analyze the risk of navigation safety in the research area.   
Construction of the fault tree and establishing the minimal cut sets are determined in 
the qualitative side of this research.  Calculation of the fault trees and assessment of 
the importance of the different basic causes for the accidents are related with the 
construction and minimal cuts sets are determined in the quantitative side. 
129 accidents during the period 1991-2010 are investigated with Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) to expose possible reasons of incidents by using existing statistics indicated in 
Section 1 . Number of accidents investigated as; 
 60 Collisions 
 24 Groundings 
 18 Contacts 
 11 Fires 
 8 Drifting 
 4 Capsizing 
 3 Man overboard (M.O.B.) 
 1 Rope stuck 
Collisions, groundings and contacts come out as the major incidents and these three 
types of accidents are investigated by using Fault Tree Analysis in this research. A 
number of accidents exist with their unexpected and large-scale impacts on safety of 
life and marine environment based on these accidents that occurred in the history. 
One of the important limitations of Fault Tree Analysis examines only one specific 
accident of interest. So, a separate fault tree for each accident type is developed in 
this research.  One fault tree has been analyzed for contacts and groundings each.  
Collisions are investigated in two fault tree models separately as; maneuvering 
related collisions and navigation related collisions in this research. Accidents 
occurred during the period 1991-2010, are represented with a fault tree in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 : FTA of the accidents occurred in the research area. 
4.2.2 Construction of fault trees for navigation safety in the research area 
The first step of a fault tree analysis is to describe the system and initial conditions 
(subsystems, components) of the system for which failure information is needed. The 
system is described in Section 1 in this research as navigational conditions.  
The next step is to construct the fault tree for a particular unwanted system failure by 
using this system description. In other words, definition of the TOP event for the 
analysis. The unwanted events are mentioned as the accidents occurred in the 
research area. The occurrence of the accidents (collisions, groundings and contacts) 
are dependent on two conditions known as technical failure of the vessels and ship 
control failures. Technical failures of the vessels while navigation in the Port of 
Haydarpaşa, are affected only by the external factors (marginal conditions, physical 
impacts and restricted searoom). So, technical failures are investigated independently 
from the ship control failures to analyze the navigational safety. Ship control failures 
are affected by human errors (incapacitation/violation of the traffic rules and less 
than adequate (L.T.A.) human performance .  
Explanatory variables are used for analyzing the causal factors of the accidents in 
this area.  Explanatory variables are considered as external conditions and conditions 
onboard. 
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a) External Conditions (EC) were evaluated into three groups as; 
 EC1 as Marginal Conditions for Visibility – Mist and Illumination 
 EC2 as Physical Impact on the Vessel – Wind, Wave and Current 
 EC3 as Restricted Searoom that Effects the Navigation of the Vessel – 
Narrow Fairway and Traffic Volume 
b) Conditions onboard (CO) were evaluated into two groups as; 
 CO1 as Navigation related failures - Lack of Visual Observation, Fixed 
Positioning, Lack of Vessel Control, and Planning Failures. 
 CO2 as Maneuvering related failures – Lack of Control, Handling Failures. 
4.2.3 Fault tree analysis of contacts   
Contacts are defined as cases where a vessel comes into impact with standing 
vessels, objects or the shore. This includes contacts on berths, bridges, buoys, 
platforms, breakwaters, and berthed vessels.  
18 contacts have been rated in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone during the 20 year period 
1991-2010. This is equivalent to an average of 0.9 contacts per calendar year. 
None of the contacts resulted in any fatalities, any injuries or total loss of the ship. 
Data in Section 1 for the contacts indicates minimal potential serious damage on 
vessel. 
The potential types of contacts may be categorized as follows in the research area : 
 Contact on berth (quay, pier, berthed vessel)  
 Contact on port structure (breakwater, navigation aid)  
 Contact on offshore installation (underwater work platform, buoy). 
 Contact on mooring area (anchored vessel). 
Experience with contacts during 1991-2010 may be classified as follows: 
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Types of Contact                             Number of Contacts                       Percentage 
Contact on berth                                   5 contacts                                 28 % 
Contact on port structure                      4 contacts                                22 % 
Contact on offshore inst.                      4 contacts                                 22% 
 Contact on mooring area                     5 contacts                                 28%   
The causes of contacts, classified as in the PHA of the contacts in the Port of 
Haydarpaşa Zone, in Table 4.1. are:  
External Conditions: 
 Visibility- Poor visibility (mist, snowstorm, heavy rain) significantly affects 
the navigation safety on the Strait of Istanbul. 
 Illumination- Risky navigation at night on the Strait of Istanbul.  
 Wind- Strong and violent wind conditions affect the safety of navigation. 
 Wave - Strong waves affect the safety of navigation (but this is less likely). 
 Current- Strong currents affect the safety of navigation. 
 Infrastructures - Breakwater of Haydarpaşa Port, underwater work area of 
Marmaray (buoys, platforms), berth (quay, pier), mooring area that effect the 
safety of navigation. 
 Traffic Volume - Transit and local traffic create high risk for contacts on the 
strait.  
Conditions Onboard: 
 Technical Failure - Steering failure, machinery failure and propulsion failure 
cause the drifting of the vessels and may also lead to contacts on the 
infrastructures. 
 Unsafe Acts – Maneuvering failure, navigation failure, lack of visual 
observation, fixed positioning, handling failure, planning failures are reported 
as the causal factors of contacts occurred in the research area. 
The basic events of accidents are analyzed from the reports of accidents, internet 
sources and Turkish State Meteorological Service historical data. Explanatory 
variables data of the contacts occurred in the research area are shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 : Number of explanatory variables of the contacts. 
 EC1 EC2 EC3 Total 
 
CO1 
 
0 Contact 
 
3 Contacts 
 
4 Contacts 
 
7 Contacts 
 
CO2 
 
0 Contact 
 
2 Contacts 
 
9 Contacts 
 
11 Contacts 
Total 0 Contacts 5 Contacts 13 Contacts 18 Contacts 
The numerical data on the Table 4.2 evaluated from the stastical data in Section 1.  
Representation of the formula for Table 4.2 is : 
((CO1 ∩ EC1) U  ( CO1 ∩ EC2 ) U ( CO1 ∩ EC3 ) ) U ((CO2 ∩ EC1) U (CO2 ∩ 
EC2) U ( CO2 ∩ EC3 ) ) = Explanatory Variables of 18 Contacts                   (4.1) 
CO1 ∩ EC1 = 0 Contact 
 There was not any contact occurred from navigation related failures due to 
marginal conditions (visibility, illumination). 
CO1 ∩ EC2 = 3 Contacts 
 3 of the contacts occurred from navigation related failures due to physical 
impacts on vessel (wind, wave, current). 
CO1 ∩ EC3 = 4 Contacts 
 4 of the contacts occurred from navigation related failures due to restricted 
searoom (narrow fairway, traffic volume). 
CO2 ∩ EC1 = 0 Contact 
 There was not any contact occurred from maneuvering related failures due to 
marginal conditions (visibility, illumination). 
CO2 ∩ EC2 = 2 Contacts 
 2 of the contacts occurred from maneuvering related failures due to physical 
impacts on vessel (wind, wave, current). 
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CO2 ∩ EC3 = 9 Contacts 
 9 of the contacts occurred from maneuvering related failures due to restricted 
searoom (narrow fairway, traffic volume). 
It can easily be understood from Table 4.2 that maneuvering failures due to restricted 
searoom are the risky events for contacts in the research area. 8 of the contacts 
occurred due to technical failures on the vessels. Most of them affect the 
maneuvering control of the vessel as a reason for the incident.  
 
Figure 4.3 : View of contacted vessel on Marmaray Buoy  and  rescue facilities [70]. 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
 
Figure 4.4 : FTA of contacts in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone during the period 1991-2010. 
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Figure 4.5 : FTA of external conditions which  affects the occurrence of  contacts. 
There were 18 contacts from 129 accidents occurred during the period 1991-2010. 
Technical failure on vessel directly increases the risk of contact in this narrow waterway with 
error on the other vessel, infrastructures, high volume traffic, strong currents and strong wind. 
The level of redundancy and reliability of the propulsion machinery, bow thrusters and 
steering gear affect the contact frequency. 44% of the contacts caused by technical failures 
and 4 of contacts caused by propulsion failure on vessels are shown in Figure 4.4. 
Ship control factor is evaluated with the basic events incapacitation/violation of the rules 
(human error) and less than adequate human performance in this research.  67% of contacts 
caused by human errors. There were 11 contacts caused by maneuvering operations. Contact 
causes are dominated by maneuvering errors when berthing. The navigation and maneuvering 
failures and their frequencies with the subcomponents are determined in Figure 4.4.  
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External conditions affect all the subcomponents of ship control and technical failure 
modes in this analysis.  Investigated data shows that marginal conditions had minor 
effects on the contact occurrence. None of the contacts caused by poor visibility. 4 of 
the contacts occurred at night. Strong winds and strong currents make berthing and 
navigation in narrow fairway more difficult. Also, they make the ship more 
vulnerable to the failure of key items of machinery. Currents have major effects on 
contacts in this area. There were strong currents in 14 of the contacts from 18. Waves 
have minor effects on the contacts. Contacts are most likely in difficult port 
approaches with restricted searoom to maneuver around infrastructures. 72% of the 
contacts occurred while passing through underwater work zone, breakwater and 
mooring area. Other ships might restrict the searoom for maneuvering or require 
avoiding action on the vessel, making contacts on other obstacles and vessels more 
likely in the research area. Traffic volume had a major effect on contacts in the 
research area. 78% of the contacts occurred in high volume traffic situations. 
  4.2.3.1 Determination of minimal cut sets 
A cut set in a fault tree is a set of basic events whose occurrence (at the same time) 
ensures that the TOP event occurs. For example, contacts can occur only if two basic 
conditions are satisfied. These two conditions are the ship control and technical 
failure as shown in Figure 4.4.   
As shown in the fault tree of contacts, a contact can occur if the following set of 
causes are occurring; propulsion, steering and machinery failures, complacency, 
incompetency, negligence, distraction, navigational planning failure, lack of visual 
observation, lack of navigation control, fixed positioning, handling error, lack of  
maneuvering control,  and external conditions .  
This is a cut set for this fault tree because the simultaneous occurrence of the thirteen 
cases with external conditions results in the occurrence of the TOP event        
(Contact). 
A cut set is said to be minimal if the set cannot be reduced without losing its status as 
a cut set. For example, the following two sets of causes are minimal cut sets; 
distraction, fixed positioning, and strong current or steering failure, and violent wind. 
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There is a method for obtaining cut sets called MOCUS (Method of Obtaining Cut 
Sets). MOCUS is a systemized algorithm that is used to establish the cut sets of a 
fault tree [29]. MOCUS is represented by four steps: 
1- Considering the TOP event. 
2- Replacement of the event with the events on the second level according to the 
following criteria: 
- If the events on the lower level are connected through an OR gate they are 
written in separate rows. 
- If the events on the lower level are connected through an AND gate they are 
written in separate columns. 
3- Performing of step 2 successively for all events that are not basic events. 
4- When all events are basic events the events in each row constitute a cut set. 
The failures and the events under the TOP events are identified in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 : Codification of events and failures on the fault tree of contacts. 
EVENT FAİLURE 
EV1: Technical Failure F1:Propulsion Failure 
EV2: Ship Control F2: Steering Failure 
EV3: Incapacitation/Violation of Rules F3: Machinery Failure 
EV4: L.T.A. Human Performance F4: Complacency 
EV5: Lack of Situation Awarness Navigation F5: Incompetency 
EV6: Task Errors Related to Maneuvering F6: Negligence 
E1 : Marginal Conditions F7:Distraction 
E2 : Physical Impact F8: Planning Failure 
E3: Restricted Searoom F9: Lack of Visual Observation 
E1.1: Visibility F10: Lack of Navigation Control 
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Table 4.3 (continued) : Codification of events and failures on the fault tree of 
contacts. 
EVENT FAILURE 
E1.2: Illumination F11: Fixed Positioning 
E2.1: Wind F12: Handling Error 
E2.2: Wave F13: Lack of Maneuvering Control 
E2.3: Current  
E3.1: Traffic Volume  
E3.2. Narrow Fairway  
External conditions are evaluated as external condition modes. E has been used as 
the transfer symbol of external conditions. There were three types of external 
conditions which affect the occurrence of contacts: marginal conditions, physical 
impacts and restricted searoom. Subcomponents of this classification will be used in 
the quantification of the minimal cut sets.  
4.2.3.2 Failure Data Calculated for Contacts 
Table 4.4 : Failure data calculated for contacts in 20 years. 
Failure Failure Description 
Failure  
Probability 
F1 Propulsion Failure 0,222 
F2 Steering Failure 0,111 
F3 Machinery Failure 0,111 
F4 Complacency 0,167 
F5 Incompetency 0,222 
F6 Negligence 0,167 
F7 Distraction 0,111 
F8 Planning Failure 0,111 
F9 L.O. Visual Observation 0,055 
F10 L.O. Navigation Control 0,055 
F11 Fixed Positioning 0,167 
F12 Handling Error 0,278 
     F13 L.O. Maneuvoring Control 0,333 
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Table 4.5 : External conditions data calculated for contacts in 20 years. 
External 
Conditions External Conditions Description        Probability 
E 1.1 Marginal Conditions, Visibility 0 
E 1.2 Marginal Conditions, Illumination 0,222 
E 2.1 Physical Impact, Wind 0,5 
E 2.2 Physical Impact, Wave 0,278 
E 2.3 Physical Impact, Current 0,778 
E 3.1 Restricted Searoom, Traffic Volume 0,778 
E 3.2 Restricted Searoom, Narrow Fairway 0,722 
The calculations of the probabilities based on the proportion of the number of the 
specific failures/events occurred  gives us the probability of TOP event contacts. 
For example: 
Calculation of F13; 
6 of the contacts caused by the event lack of maneuvering control and 18 contacts 
investigated in 20 years. 
The number of the Lack of Maneuvering Control events/ Total number of Contacts 
6/18= 0,333 as shown in the Table 4.4 
Same calculations have been made for all events and failures. 
4.2.3.3 Establishing Minimal Cut Sets 
The MOCUS algorithm is applied for establishing minimal cut sets in this research.  
MOCUS step 1:  
Probability of contact risk for each vessel sailing in the research area. 
MOCUS step 2: 
Occurrence of contacts based on two events in the research area. 
EV1: Technical Failures 
EV2: Ship Control 
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MOCUS step 3.1.  
OR gate has been used for the technical failure event (EV1 in the fault tree of 
contacts in Figure 4.4.). Technical failures of contacts were analyzed as propulsion 
failures OR steering failures OR machinery failures in the research area.  
F1 
F2 
F3 
EV2 
 
MOCUS step 3.2. 
AND gate has been used for the ship control event (EV2 in the fault tree of contacts 
in Figure 4.4.).  Ship control event due to incapacitation/violation of rules and less 
than adequate human performance conditions onboard. Either of these or both 
conditions might be the reason for contacts. 
F1  
F2  
F3  
EV3 EV4 
 
MOCUS step 3.3.  
For the Incapacitation/violation of rules (EV3) : 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 EV4 
F5 EV4 
F6 EV4 
F7 EV4 
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MOCUS step 3.4. For the LTA of human performance (EV4) : 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 EV5 
F4 EV6 
F5 EV5 
F5 EV6 
F6 EV5 
F6 EV6 
F7 EV5 
F7 EV6 
MOCUS step 3.5. For lack of situation awareness navigation (EV5) : 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 F8 
F4 F9 
F4 F10 
F4 F11 
F4 EV6 
F5 F8 
F5 F9 
F5 F10 
F5 F11 
F5 EV6 
F6 F8 
F6 F9 
F6 F10 
F6 F11 
F6 EV6 
F7 F8 
F7 F9 
F7 F10 
F7 F11 
F7 EV6 
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MOCUS step 3.5. For task errors related maneuvering (EV6) : 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 F8 
F4 F9 
F4 F10 
F4 F11 
F4 F12 
F4 F13 
F5 F8 
F5 F9 
F5 F10 
F5 F11 
F5 F12 
F5 F13 
F6 F8 
F6 F9 
F6 F10 
F6 F11 
F6 F12 
F6 F13 
F7 F8 
F7 F9 
F7 F10 
F7 F11 
F7 F12 
F7 F13 
 
MOCUS step 3.6 
Additionally, all failure modes are significantly affected by external conditions in the 
research area. Same process should be done for each basic event of the external 
conditions as below. 
 
 
               E   
 
 
 
E1.1 
E1.2 
E2.1 
E2.2 
E2.3 
E3.1 
E3.2 
E1 
E2 
E3 
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Table 4.6 : Establishing minimal cut sets of contacts. 
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Table 4.6 (continued) : Establishing minimal cut sets of contacts. 
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Table 4.6 (continued) : Establishing minimal cut sets of contacts. 
 
 
MOCUS step 4: 
There are 189 possible combinations of basic event failures for the contacts each 
row. There are at most three basic causes in each cut set. It is advantageous to have 
as many basic cut sets as possible for root analysis of the contact risk. Two and three 
basic causes in each cut set are enough. The cut sets K1 to K21 include only two 
basic causes. As it is mentioned before, external conditions affect all the other basic 
events.  
The probability of a cut set is calculated by the multiplication of the frequencies of 
all the basic events. For example; 
Example 1:  
F1: Propulsion Failure frequency in contacts between 1991-2010 years in the Port of 
Haydarpaşa Zone. 
E2.3:  Current probability frequency in the contacts between 1991- 2010 years in the 
Port of Haydarpaşa Zone.  
F1 = 0,222 , E2.3 = 0,778 
                                                       QK5 = F1 * E2.3                                             (4.2) 
QK5 = 0,173 is the failure probability of contacts caused by propulsion failure with 
current effects. 
Example 2: 
F5 = Incompetent crew ( captain, pilot…e.t.c.)  condition probability  in the contacts 
between 1991-2010 years in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone. 
F13 = Lack of maneuvering control probability in contacts. 
E3.2 = Narrow fairway condition probability in contacts between 1991-2010 years. 
F5 = 0,222 , F13 = 0,333 , E3.2 = 0,722 
                                                   QK104 = F5 * F13 * E3.2                                  (4.3) 
K187 F7 F13 E2.3 
K188 F7 F13 E3.1 
K189 F7 F13 E3.2 
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QK104 = 0,0534 is the failure probability of contacts caused by maneuvering failure, 
human error  (incompetency) and high volume traffic effects. 
The probability calculations of all cut sets related to contacts are represented in 
Appendix C. 
Analyzing the data of the failure probabilities of the contacts, external conditions and 
technical failures were the major factors for the occurrence of contacts. Especially, 
propulsion failures with narrow fairway or strong current conditions are the most 
risky events for contacts in the research area. In other words, K5 and K6 had the 
highest frequency of failure probability in contacts with 0,173 values in  20 years 
(see in Appendix C).  K3 represented as the propulsion failure with strong wind 
could be evaluated in the same risk level. The risk levels based on the failure 
probabilities of the minimal cut sets of the basic events are represented in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 : Importance ranking of the cut sets based on failure probabilities. 
Risk Level Failure Probability of Cut Sets 
 
                         HIGH RISK 
                ( QKi between 0,05-0,2 ) 
QK5       QK13 QK21 QK104 
QK6 QK19 QK175 QK10 
QK3 QK20 QK4 QK17 
QK12 QK14 QK103 QK105 
 
                           
 
 
 
                        MEDIUM RISK 
                  ( QKi between 0,01- 0,05 ) 
QK2 QK139 QK189 QK133 
QK96 QK7 QK9 QK68 
QK97 QK56 QK16 QK69 
QK98 QK140 QK180 QK87 
QK61 QK11 QK181  QK107 
QK62 QK18 QK52 QK185 
QK145 QK94 QK136 QK70 
QK146  QK89 QK47 QK95 
QK63 QK90 QK48 QK100 
QK147 QK187 QK182 QK60 
QK101 QK188 QK131 QK144 
QK54 QK59 QK132 QK178 
QK55 QK143 QK49 QK26 
QK138 QK91 QK102 QK27 
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Table 4.7 (continued) : Importance ranking of the cut sets based on failure 
probabilities. 
Risk Level  Failure Probability of Cut Sets 
                        
                        MEDIUM RISK 
              ( QKi between 0,01- 0,05 ) 
QK45 QK129 QK137 QK88 
QK110 QK93 QK58 QK186 
QK111 QK28 QK66 QK51 
QK173 QK112 QK142 QK135 
QK174  QK53 
 
                             
 
                           LOW RISK 
               ( QKi between 0,005 - 0,01 ) 
QK152 QK77 QK41 QK126 
QK153 QK84 QK117 QK128 
QK75 QK179 QK118 QK150  
QK76 QK86 QK124 QK44 
QK82 QK184 QK125 QK73 
QK83 QK46 QK67 QK80 
QK108 QK130 QK177  QK65 
QK171 QK33 QK35 QK109 
QK24 QK34 QK42 QK172 
QK154  QK40 QK119 QK25 
 
                    
 
 
 
 
                  NEGLIGIBLE RISK 
              ( QKi between 0,000 - 0,005 ) 
QK159 QK157 QK156 QK92 
QK160 QK164 QK163 QK99 
QK166  QK72 QK1 QK106 
QK167 QK79 QK8 QK113 
QK31 QK149 QK15 QK120 
QK38 QK116 QK22 QK127 
QK115 QK123 QK29 QK134 
QK122 QK32 QK36 QK141 
QK161 QK39 QK43 QK148 
QK168 QK30 QK50 QK155 
QK23 QK37 QK57 QK162  
QK170  QK114 QK64 QK169 
QK74 QK121 QK71 QK176 
QK81 QK158 QK78 QK183 
QK151 QK165 QK85 
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Failure probability of cut sets is represented as QKi in Table 4.7. There are four level 
of risks evaluated in the table.   High risk level indicates the failure probabilities of 
the cut sets between 0,05-0,2. Medium level risk indicates the failure probabilities of 
cut sets between 0,01-0,05. Low level risk indicates the failure probabilities of cut 
sets between 0,01-0,005. Negligible risk is assumed as the probabilities between 0-
0,005 .  
Risk levels were evaluated as in the preliminary hazard analysis of the contacts in the 
research area which was represented in Table 4.1. High level risks were illustrated, if 
there was a serious damage on vessel and/or loss of infrastructure           (underwater 
work buoy, other vessels). Medium level risks were illustrated, if there was a minor 
damage on vessel (need to take towage service) and/or serious damage on the 
infrastructure. Low level risks were illustrated, if there was a minor damage on 
vessel (no need to take towage service) and/or minor damage on the infrastructure. 
Negligible risks were illustrated, if there was no damage on vessel and/or no damage 
on the infrastructure situations. 
4.2.3.4 Calculation of contact probability in the research area 
In the quantitative calculations two basic elements of a system are considered. The 
series structure of the fault tree and the parallel structure of the fault tree. For basic 
events combined through an OR gate the series structure equation is used as [29]: 
P: probability 
PSF: Reliability probability of structure 
               (4.4) 
For basic events combined through an AND gate the parallel structure equation is 
used as : 
           (4.5) 
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P is defined as the survival probability of a component/system. Q is defined as the 
non-survival system. The failure probability Q is equal to the probability of non-
survival [29]. 
                                                             Q= 1-P                                                        (4.6) 
The quantitative analysis of the fault tree uses the failure probability qi of the basic 
events and the fault tree gates to calculate the probability of the top event Q0. 
Consequently it is easier to trigger events combined through an OR gate than events 
combined through an AND gate with the following equation. 
                                                              Pi =1- qi                                                                       (4.7) 
 It is used the fault tree analysis model represented in Figure 4.4 and 4.5, the 
codifications of events and failures represented in Table 4.3, the failure, event and 
external conditions probability values in  Table 4.4, 4.5 for the top event failure 
probability ( Q0 )  calculation of contacts.  
Q0: Top event failure probability 
QEV1: Ship control functions failure probability 
QEV2: Technical failure functions failure probability 
QEV3: Incapacitation/violation of rules functions failure probability 
QEV4: Less than adequate human performance functions failure probability 
QEV5: Lack of situation awareness navigation functions failure probability 
QEV6: Task errors related to maneuvering functions failure probability 
QE0 : Top external conditions failure probability 
QE1 : Marginal conditions failure probability 
QE2 : Physical impact failure probability 
QE3 : Restricted searoom failure probability 
First task is to calculate the external conditions failure probability by using equation 
4.6 and equation 4.7 which affects all the failure conditions except 
incapacitation/violation of rules in the fault tree.  
QE3 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE3.1 ) ( 1- QE3.2 ) ] =  [ 1- ((1-0,778) ( 1- 0,722)) ] = 0,938 
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QE2 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE2.1 ) ( 1- QE2.2 ) (1- QE2.3 )  ] = [ 1- (( 1- 0,5 ) ( 1- 0,278 ) ( 1- 0, 
778 )) ] = 0,920    
QE1  = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE1.1 ) ( 1- QE1.2 ) ] =  [ 1- ((1-0) ( 1- 0,222)) ] = 0,222 
QE0  = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE1 ) ( 1- QE2 ) (1- QE3 )  ]  
= [ 1- (( 1- 0,222) ( 1- 0,92 ) ( 1- 0,938 )) ] = QE0= QE = 0,996 
  Second task is to calculate the TOP event contact failure probability for 20 years 
period. 
QEV6 =  [ 1- ( ( 1- QF12* QE ) ( 1-QF13*QE) ) ] =  [ 1- ( ( 1- 0,277 ) ( 1- 0,332) ) ] = 
0,517 
QEV5 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QF8*QE ) ( 1- QF9*QE ) (1- QF10*QE ) (1- QF11*QE ) ] = 0,338 
QEV4 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QEV5 ) ( 1- QEV6) ) ] = 0,68 
QEV3 =  [ 1- ( ( 1- QF4 ) ( 1- QF5 ) (1- QF6 ) (1- QF7 ) ) ] =  0,52 
QEV2 = QEV3 * QEV4 =  0, 354 
QEV1 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QF1*QE  ) ( 1- QF2*QE ) (1- QF3*QE ) ) ] = 0,384 
Q0 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QEV1 ) ( 1- QEV2) ) ]  
= 0,602 is the probability for the top event of contact risk of navigation in the 
Port of Haydarpaşa Zone in 20 years period. 
If it is calculated for one year period; 
0,602/20 = 0,0301  
This means that there is a 3 % chance that this particular unwanted and potentially 
dangerous event (contact) will occur in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone for one year 
period.  
4.2.3.5 Assessment of basic cause importance of the contacts  
Each of the minimal cut sets includes one unique set of basic events which were 
established in the fault tree of contacts. Combination of the probabilities of these 
minimal cut sets are the reasons for the occurrence of the TOP event. It is important 
to prevent the occurrence of a basic event that is presented in several cut sets [29]. In 
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that case, calculation of the importance measures of the basic events is a significant 
process to reduce the likelihood of top event occurrence. 
The importance measures are those used for ranking the importance of different basic 
events. Vessley Fussel’s measure of importance, IVF  of a basic event i is the 
approximate conditional probability that at least one minimal cut set that contains 
component i  is  failed,  given that the system is failed.  A minimal cut set is failed 
when all the components in the minimal cut set are failed [71]. Thus, the VF 
importance identifies the components that have the largest probability of being the 
cause of the system failure [72]. This measure is also called the fractional 
contribution of basic event to risk [73]. It is a positive number between 0 and 1. The 
equation of Vessley  Fussel’s  importance for a system breakdown can be presented 
in the following way [72] : 
I
VF
 (i/t) = P(At least one of the cut sets containing the basic event is                  
                              failed at time t/The system failed at time t ) 
Hence:    
                                                  I
VF
 (i/t) = QKİ / Q0                                                                           (4.8)                     
where QKi = the probability that one minimal cut set containing the basic event i  is 
failed at time t, Q0 = probability of occurrence for the TOP event . 
The minimal cut sets in which the basic cause i  is present are not independent 
because the same basic events may be present in more than one cut set.  The 
assumption is implemented in the following equation where m = number of minimal 
cut sets where basic event i is presented [29] . 
                                  I
VF
 (i/t) ~ 1- п m j=1 (1-QKi (t)) / Q0 (t)                                     (4.9)           
The failure probability data was used in Table 4.4 ,  4.5  and Appendix C to assess 
the importance of the different events which triggered the TOP event contact. 
For example: 
Calculation of basic event F1 (Propulsion Failure) in contacts in the Port of 
Haydarpaşa Zone in 20 years period is implemented in the following process. 
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Relevant cut sets effect F1 are: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Q0 = 0,602  
  VF 
I     = 1- Π ( 1- QKi)/ Q0 = 1- [ (1-0) (1-0,049) (1-0,111) (1-0,0617) (1-0,173) (1-
0,173) (1-0,0356) ] / 0,602 
=  1- [  (1) (0,951) (0,889) ( 0,9383) (0,827) (0,827) (0,9644) ] / 0,602 
= 1- (0, 5232) / 0,602 
= 0, 4767 / 0,602  
= 0, 7918 is the weight of the propulsion failure (F1)  in contacts in the research area. 
Table 4.8 :  Importance ranking basic events of contacts based on the Vessley-
Fussell measure of importance. 
Failure 
Conditions 
 
1- Π ( 1- QKi) 
 
 
VF 
I 
 
 
Ranking 
            F1 0,5443 
0, 9057 
5 
F2 0,3145 
0,5233 
12 
F3 0,3145 
0,5233 
12 
F4 0,4254 
0,7066 
9 
F5 0,5227 
0,8683 
4 
F6 0,4254 
0,7066 
8 
F7 0,3070 
0,5100 
11 
K1 F1 E1.1 
K2 F1 E1.2 
K3 F1 E2.1 
K4 F1 E2.2 
K5 F1 E2.3 
K6 F1 E3.1 
K7 F1 E3.2 
QK1 0 
QK2 0,049 
QK3 0.111 
QK4 0,0617 
QK5 0,173 
QK6 0,173 
QK7 0,0356 
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Table 4.8  (continued) :  Importance ranking basic events of contacts based on the 
Vessley-Fussell measure of importance. 
Failure 
Conditions 
 
1- Π ( 1- QKi) 
 
 
        VF 
I 
 
 
   Ranking 
F8 0,2169 
0,3602 
15 
F9 0,1137 
0,1889 
16 
F10 0,1137 
0,1889 
16 
F11 0,3082 
0,5120 
10 
F12 0,4608 
0,7654 
6 
F13 0,5241 
0,8707 
3 
E1.1 0 
0 
17 
E1.2 0,2100 
0,3654 
14 
E2.1 0,4337 
0,7205 
7 
E2.2 0,2690 
0,4468 
13 
E2.3 0,5925 
0,9842 
1 
E3.1 0,5925 
0,9842 
1 
E3.2 0,5640 
0,9368 
2 
As it has been shown on the Table 4.8, high volume traffic and strong currents are 
the major factors for contacts. Underwater work area, mooring area, breakwater and 
Quay of Haydarpaşa Port which were identified as restricted searoom, significantly 
affect the realization of contact probability. Contact causes are dominated by 
maneuvering errors when berthing. Lack of maneuvering control is an important 
cause for contacts. Incompetency as the human error onboard is a serious factor 
which causes contacts. Propulsion failure from the technical failures also 
significantly affects the contact frequency in the research area of the strait.
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Table 4.9 : Importance ranking of the basic failure events and contact probability of 
a vessel for a specified failure. 
Code Basic Failure Event Ranking 
E3.1, E2.3 Traffic Volume, Current 1 
E3.2 Narrow Fairway 2 
F1 Propulsion Failure 3 
F13 Lack of Maneuvering Control 4 
F5 Incompetency 5 
F12 Handling Error 6 
E2.1 Wind 7 
F4, F6 Complacency, Negligence 8 
F2, F3 
Steering Failure, Machinery 
Failure 
9 
F11 Fixed Positioning 10 
F7 Distraction 11 
E2.2 Wave 12 
E1.2 Illumination 13 
F8 Planning Failure 14 
F9, F10 
Lack of Visual Observation, 
Lack of Navigation Control 
15 
E1.1 Visibility 16 
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4.2.4 Fault tree analysis of groundings  
Groundings are defined as cases where a vessel comes into contact with the sea bed 
or shore, including underwater wrecks. If the ship is stuck fast, this is known as 
“stranding ".  If the ship sinks, this is sometimes known as “wreck ". The category 
wreck/stranded is equivalent to the term grounding used here. 
There have been 24 groundings rated in the research area during the 20 year period 
1991-2010. This is equivalent to an average of 1.2 groundings per calendar year. 
None of the groundings resulted in any fatalities. One of the grounding resulted in 
injuries with 4 people. Three of the groundings resulted in loses of the ships.  Five of 
the groundings resulted in serious damages on ships. Statistics have been taken from 
the data in Section 1.  
The potential types of groundings may be categorized as follows in the research area: 
 Grounding on sea bed (shallow water). 
 Grounding on port structure (breakwater) is the part of port between the berth 
and open sea. . 
 Grounding on berth (quay, berthed vessel) is the normal point of berthing in 
the port. 
 Grounding on shore. 
Experience with groundings may be classified as in the Table 4.10 ; 
Table 4.10 : Infrastructure effects in the occurrence of groundings. 
Types of Contact                             Number of Contacts                       Percentage 
Grounding on sea bed                            10                                                42 % 
Grounding on port structure                   3                                                  13 % 
Grounding on berth                                6                                                  25 % 
Grounding on shore                                5                                                  20  % 
The causes of groundings, classified as in the PHA of the groundings in Table 4.1 
are:  
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External Conditions: 
 Visibility- Poor visibility (mist, snowstorm, heavy rain) significantly affects  
the navigation safety on the Strait of Istanbul. 
 Illumination- Risky navigation at night on the Strait of Istanbul.  
 Wind- Strong and violent wind conditions effect the safety of navigation. 
 Wave - Strong waves affect the safety of navigation ( but this is less likely). 
 Current- Strong currents effect the safety of navigation. 
 Infrastructures - Breakwater of Haydarpaşa Port, berth (quay, pier ) and 
shallow waters  affects  the safety of navigation. 
 Traffic Volume - Transit and local traffic create high risk for groundings on 
the Strait of Istanbul. 
Conditions Onboard: 
 Technical Failure - Steering failure and  machinery failure  cause the 
drifting of the vessels and may also lead to groundings on the infrastructures. 
 Unsafe Acts – Maneuvering failure, navigation failure,  fixed positioning, 
handling failure, planning failures are reported as the causal factors of 
groundings . 
As a result of these data, statistic data of the explanatory variables of groundings is 
shown in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11 : Number of explanatory variables of the groundings. 
 EC1 EC2 EC3 Total 
 
CO1 
 
0 Grounding 
 
5 Groundings 
 
5 Groundings 
 
10 Groundings 
 
CO2 
 
1 Grounding 
 
11 Groundings 
 
2 Groundings 
 
14 Groundings 
Total 1 Groundings 16  Groundings 7 Groundings 24 Groundings 
((CO1 ∩ EC1) U (CO1 ∩ EC2) U (CO1 ∩ EC3)) U ((CO2 ∩ EC1) U (CO2 ∩ 
EC2) U (CO2 ∩ EC3) ) = Explanatory Variables of 24 Groundings   
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as in Equation 4.1. 
CO1 ∩ EC1 = 0 Grounding 
 There is not any grounding occurred from navigation related failures due to 
marginal conditions (visibility, illumination). 
CO1 ∩ EC2 = 5 Groundings 
 5 of the groundings occurred from navigation related failures due to physical 
impacts on vessel (wind, wave, current). 
CO1 ∩ EC3 = 5 Groundings 
 4 of the groundings occurred from navigation related failures due to restricted 
searoom (narrow fairway, traffic volume). 
CO2 ∩ EC1 = 1 Grounding 
 One of the groundings occurred from maneuvering related failures due to 
marginal conditions (visibility, illumination). 
CO2 ∩ EC2 = 11 Groundings 
 11 of the groundings occurred from maneuvering related failures due to 
physical impacts on vessel (wind, wave, current). 
CO2 ∩ EC3 = 2 Groundings  
 2 of the groundings occurred from maneuvering related failures due to 
restricted searoom (narrow fairway, traffic volume). 
Maneuvering failures due to physical impacts are the risky events for groundings in 
the research area. 8 of the groundings related with the technical failures on the 
vessels. Most of them affected the maneuvering control of the vessel.  
 
Figure 4.6 : View of a grounded vessel on the Shore of Harem [70]. 
121 
 
 
Figure 4.7 : FTA of groundings in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone during the period 1991-2010. 
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Figure 4.8 : FTA of external conditions which  affect the occurring of  groundings. 
There were 24 groundings from 129 accidents occurred in the research area. Basic 
events are identified as a causal factor for groundings in the Figure 4.7. Technical 
failure on vessel directly increases the risk of grounding in the research area. 
Infrastructures, high volume traffic, strong wind, strong currents and illumination 
significantly increase the potential risk of groundings beside technical failures. 33% 
of groundings are caused by technical failures. 
Ship control evaluated with the basic events incapacitation/violation of the rules 
(human error) and less than adequate human performance in this research.  54% of 
groundings are caused by human errors. There were 14 groundings caused by 
maneuvering operations. 
The navigation and maneuvering failures and their frequencies with the 
subcomponents  are determined in Figure 4.7.  
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External conditions affect all the subcomponents of ship control and technical failure 
modes in this analysis. Figure 4.7. shows 8% of groundings due to reduced visibility. 
50% of groundings occurred at night which does not indicate a significantly 
increased risk, assuming uniform exposure patterns. Strong winds increase the drift 
speed for a disabled ship, which reduces the time available and increases the 
anchoring force required to prevent grounding. Investigated data show that wind is a 
factor in 12 groundings from all 24 groundings in the research area. Currents have 
major effects on groundings in this area. 88% of the groundings are affected by 
strong currents. Waves have minor effects on the groundings. Losing control of the 
vessel by any reason as steering failure or maneuvering failure , increases the 
potential risk of groundings in this narrow fairway. 75% of the vessels grounded on 
shallow area, breakwater and quay in the Port of Haydarpaşa. Traffic situation is not 
a major effect as on contact. 58 % of the groundings occurred in high volume traffic 
situations. 
4.2.4.1 Determination of minimal cut sets 
As shown in the fault tree of groundings, a grounding can occur if the following set 
of causes are occurring; propulsion failure, steering failure, machinery failure, 
complacency, incompetency, negligence, distraction, navigational planning failure, 
lack of navigation control, fixed positioning, handling error, lack of maneuvering 
control,  and external conditions. In Figure 4.7, the failures and the events are 
identified under the TOP events in Table 4.12. The detailed information of 
determination of minimal cut sets was given in Section 4.2.2.1.1. 
Table 4.12 : Codification of events and failures on the fault tree of groundings. 
EVENT FAİLURE 
EV1: Technical Failure F1:Propulsion Failure 
EV2: Ship Control F2: Steering Failure 
EV3: Incapacitation/Violation of Rules F3: Machinery Failure 
EV4: L.T.A. Human Performance F4: Complacency 
EV5: Lack of Situation Awareness Navigation F5: Incompetency 
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Table 4.12 (continued): Codification of events and failures on the fault tree of groundings. 
EV6: Task Errors Related to Maneuvering F6: Negligence 
E1 : Marginal Conditions F7:Distraction 
E2 : Physical Impact F8: Planning Failure 
E3: Restricted Searoom F9: Lack of Navigation Control 
E1.1: Visibility F10: Fixed Positioning 
E1.2: Illumination F11: Handling Error 
E2.1: Wind F12: Lack of Maneuvering Control 
E2.2: Wave  
E2.3: Current  
E3.1: Traffic Volume  
E3.2. Narrow Fairway  
 
 
Figure 4.9 :  View of a grounded vessel on the shore in the research area [70].
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4.2.4.2 Failure data calculated for groundings 
Table 4.13 : Failure data calculated for groundings in 20 years. 
Failure Failure Description 
Failure  
Probability 
F1 Propulsion Failure 0 
F2 Steering Failure 0,125 
F3 Machinery Failure 0,208 
F4 Complacency 0,083 
F5 Incompetency 0,208 
F6 Negligence 0,208 
F7 Distraction 0,042 
F8 Planning Failure 0,083 
F9 L.O. Navigation Control 0,25 
F10 Fixed Positioning 0,083 
F11 Handling Error 0,375 
     F12 L.O. Maneuvoring Control 0,208 
Table 4.14 External Conditions Data Calculated for groundings  in 20 years. 
External 
Conditions External Conditions Description        Probability 
E 1.1 Marginal Conditions, Visibility 0,083 
E 1.2 Marginal Conditions, Illumination 0,5 
E 2.1 Physical Impact, Wind 0,5 
E 2.2 Physical Impact, Wave 0,25 
E 2.3 Physical Impact, Current 0,875 
E 3.1 Restricted Searoom, Traffic Volume 0,583 
E 3.2 Restricted Searoom, Narrow Fairway 0,75 
 
Detailed calculation is given in Section 4.2.3.2. 
4.2.4.3 Establishing minimal cut sets 
The MOCUS algorithm is applied for establishing minimal cut sets in this research.  
MOCUS step 1:  
Probability of grounding risk for each vessel sailing in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone. 
 
126 
 
MOCUS step 2: 
Occurrence of groundings based on two events in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone. 
EV1: Technical Failures 
EV2: Ship Control 
MOCUS step 3.1.  
OR gate has been used for the technical failure event (EV1 in the fault tree of 
groundings in Figure 4.7.). Technical failures of groundings were analyzed as 
propulsion failures OR steering failures OR machinery failures in the research area.  
F1 
F2 
F3 
EV2 
MOCUS step 3.2. 
AND gate has been used for the ship control event (EV2 in the fault tree of 
groundings in Figure 4.7).  Ship control event due to incapacitation/violation of rules 
and less than adequate human performance conditions onboard. Either of these or 
both conditions might be the reason for groundings. 
F1  
F2  
F3  
EV3 EV4 
MOCUS step 3.3. For the Incapacitation/violation of rules (EV3): 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 EV4 
F5 EV4 
F6 EV4 
F7 EV4 
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MOCUS step 3.4. For the LTA of human performance (EV4): 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 EV5 
F4 EV6 
F5 EV5 
F5 EV6 
F6 EV5 
F6 EV6 
F7 EV5 
F7 EV6 
MOCUS step 3.5. For lack of situation awareness navigation (EV5) : 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 F8 
F4 F9 
F4 F10 
F4 EV6 
F5 F8 
F5 F9 
F5 F10 
F5 EV6 
F6 F8 
F6 F9 
F6 F10 
F6 EV6 
F7 F8 
F7 F9 
F7 F10 
F7 EV6 
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MOCUS step 3.5. For task errors related maneuvering (EV6) : 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 F8 
F4 F9 
F4 F10 
F4 F11 
F4 F12 
F5 F8 
F5 F9 
F5 F10 
F5 F11 
F5 F12 
F6 F8 
F6 F9 
F6 F10 
F6 F11 
F6 F12 
F7 F8 
F7 F9 
F7 F10 
F7 F11 
F7 F12 
MOCUS step 3.6 
Additionally, all failure modes are significantly affected by external conditions in the 
research area. Same process should be done for each basic event of the external 
conditions as below. 
 
 
               E   
 
 
 
 
 
E1.1 
E1.2 
E2.1 
E2.2 
E2.3 
E3.1 
E3.2 
E1 
E2 
E3 
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Table 4.15 : Establishing minimal cut sets of groundings. 
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Table 4.15 (continued) : Establishing minimal cut sets of groundings. 
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MOCUS step 4: 
There are 161 possible combinations of basic event failures for the groundings each 
row. There are at most three basic causes in each cut set. It is advantageous to have 
as many basic cut sets as possible for root analysis of the grounding risk. Two and 
three basic causes in each cut set are enough. The cut sets K1 to K21 include only 
two basic causes. As it is mentioned before, external conditions in this area affect all 
the other basic events. The detailed calculation of a cut set is given in Section 
4.2.3.3. 
The probability calculations of   all cut sets related to groundings are represented in 
Appendix C. 
Analyzing the data of the failure probabilities of the groundings, external conditions 
and the technical failures are the major factors for the occurrence of accidents. 
Especially, machinery failure with strong current conditions is the most risky event 
for groundings. In other words, K22 had the highest frequency of failure probability 
in contacts with 0,182 values in 20 years (see in Appendix C). K24 represented as the 
machinery failure in high traffic volume could be evaluated in the same risk level. 
The risk levels based on the failure probabilities of the minimal cut sets of the basic 
events in the research area represented in Table 4.16. 
Table 4.16 :  Importance ranking of the  cut sets based on failure probabilities in 20 
years. 
Risk Level Failure Probability of Cut Sets 
                               
HIGH RISK 
( QKi between 0,05-0,2 ) 
 QK19            QK21               QK 20            QK12    
       QK16            QK17               QK14             QK13 
       QK82            QK117             QK9               QK10 
       QK84            QK119             QK18         
 
MEDIUM RISK 
( QKi between 0,01- 0,05 ) 
QK68 QK115 QK65 QK121 
QK83 QK89 QK66 QK122 
QK103 QK124 QK100 QK81 
QK118 QK91 QK101 QK116 
QK70 QK126 QK90 QK33 
QK79 QK11 QK125 QK48 
QK80 QK69 QK49 QK15 
QK105 QK104 QK86 QK35 
QK114 QK47 QK87 QK44 
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Table 4.16 (continued):  Importance ranking of the  cut sets based on failure 
probabilities in 20 years. 
Risk Level  Failure Probability of Cut Sets 
 
MEDIUM RISK 
( QKi between 0,01- 0,05 ) 
QK45 QK67 QK34 QK31 
QK54 QK102 QK154 QK55 
QK61 QK56 QK88 QK62 
QK75 QK63 QK123 QK76 
QK96 QK77 QK8 QK97 
QK110 QK98 QK30 QK111 
QK152 QK112 
  
 
LOW RISK 
( QKi between 0,005 - 0,01 ) 
QK138 QK93 QK46 QK40 
QK153 QK94 QK159 QK135 
QK51 QK107 QK161 QK136 
QK52 QK108 QK78 QK28 
QK58 QK140 QK113 QK32 
QK59 QK149 QK139 QK42 
QK72 QK150 QK26 QK160 
QK73 
   
 
 
 
 
NEGLIGIBLE RISK 
( QKi between 0,000 - 0,005 ) 
QK156 QK37 QK129 QK7 
QK157 QK38 QK142 QK22 
QK53 QK131 QK143 QK29 
QK60 QK145 QK50 QK36 
QK74 QK43 QK148 QK57 
QK95 QK133 QK130 QK64 
QK109 QK137 QK144 QK71 
QK27 QK147 QK155 QK92 
QK41 QK158 QK1 QK99 
QK151 QK132 QK2 QK106 
QK85 QK146 QK3 QK127 
QK120 QK25 QK4 QK134 
QK23 QK39 QK5 QK141 
QK24 QK128 QK6 
 
 
Failure probability of cut sets is represented as QKi in Table 4.16. There are four 
level of risks evaluated in the table. High risk level indicates the failure probabilities 
of the cut set between 0, 05-0, 2. Medium level risk indicates the failure probabilities 
of cut set between 0, 01-0, 05. Low level risk indicates the failure probabilities of cut 
set between 0, 01-0,005. Negligible risk is assumed as the probabilities between 0-
0,005.  
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Risk levels were evaluated as in the preliminary hazard analysis of the groundings in 
the research area which was represented in Table 4.1. High level risks were 
illustrated, if there were injuries, oil spill and/or loss of the vessel.  Medium level 
risks were illustrated, if there was a serious damage on vessel. Low level risks were 
illustrated, if there was a minor damage on vessel (need to take towage service). 
Negligible risks were illustrated, if there was no damage or minor damage on vessel 
(not need to take towage service). 
4.2.4.4 Calculation of grounding probability in the research area 
General information about the calculation of the TOP event was defined in Section 
4.2.3.4. 
It is used the fault tree analysis model represented in Figure 4.7 and 4.8 , the 
codifications of events and failures represented in Table 4.12, the failure, event and 
external conditions probability values in  Table 4.13, 4.14 for the top event failure 
probability ( Q0 )  calculation of groundings in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone.  
Q0: Top event failure probability 
QEV1: Ship control functions failure probability 
QEV2: Technical failure functions failure probability 
QEV3: Incapacitation/violation of rules functions failure probability 
QEV4: Less than adequate human performance functions failure probability 
QEV5: Lack of situation awareness navigation functions failure probability 
QEV6: Task errors related to maneuvering functions failure probability 
QE0 : Top external conditions failure probability 
QE1 : Marginal conditions failure probability  
QE2 : Physical impact failure probability 
QE3 : Restricted searoom failure probability 
First task is to calculate the external conditions failure probability which affects all 
the failure conditions except incapacitation/violation of rules in the fault tree.  
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QE3 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE3.1 ) ( 1- QE3.2 ) ] =    [ 1- ((1-0,583) ( 1- 0,75)) ] = 0,896 
QE2 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE2.1 ) ( 1- QE2.2 ) (1- QE2.3 )  ] = [ 1- (( 1- 0,5 ) ( 1- 0,25 ) ( 1- 0, 
875 )) ] = 0,953  
QE1  = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE1.1 ) ( 1- QE1.2 ) ] =  [ 1- ((1-0,083 ) ( 1- 0,5) ] = 0,542 
QE0  = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE1 ) ( 1- QE2 ) (1- QE3 )  ] = [ 1- (( 1- 0,542) ( 1- 0,953 ) ( 1- 
0,896 )) ] = 
QE0= QE = 0,998  
Second task is to calculate the TOP event contact failure probability for 20 years 
period. 
QEV6 =  [ 1- ( ( 1- QF11* QE ) ( 1-QF12*QE) ) ] =  [ 1- ( ( 1- 0,374 ) ( 1- 0,208) ) ] 
 = 0,504 
QEV5 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QF8*QE ) ( 1- QF9*QE ) (1- QF10*QE ) ] = 0,369 
QEV4 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QEV5 ) ( 1- QEV6) ) ] = 0,687 
QEV3 =  [ 1- ( ( 1- QF4 ) ( 1- QF5 ) (1- QF6 ) (1- QF7 ) ) ] = 0,449  
QEV2 = QEV3 * QEV4 =  0,308 
QEV1 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QF1*QE  ) ( 1- QF2*QE ) (1- QF3*QE ) ) ] = 0,307  
Q0 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QEV1 ) ( 1- QEV2) ) ]  
= 0,52 is the probability for the top event of  grounding risk of navigation  in 20 
years period. 
If it is calculated for one year period; 
0,52/20 = 0,026 
This means that there is a 2,6 % chance that this particular unwanted, and potentially 
dangerous event ( grounding ) will occur in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone for one year 
period. 
4.2.4.5 Assessment of basic cause importance of the groundings 
General information was given about assessment of basic cause importance in 
Section 4.2.3.5. 
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It was used the failure probability data in Table 4.13, 4.14 and Appendix C to assess 
the importance of the different events which triggered the TOP event grounding. 
For example: 
Calculation of basic event F2 (Steering Failure) in groundings in the Port of 
Haydarpaşa Zone in 20 years period is implemented in the following process. 
Relevant cut sets effect F1 are: 
                                         
 
 
 
 
Q0 = 0,52 
  VF 
I     = 1- Π ( 1- QKi)/ Q0 = 1- [ (1-0,0104) (1-0,0625) (1-0,0625) (1-0,0313) (1-
0,1094) (1-0,0729) (1-0,0938) ] / 0,52 
= 0, 7107 is the weight of the steering failure (F2)  in groundings. 
Table 4.17 :  Importance ranking basic events of  groundings  based on the Vessley-
Fussell measure of importance. 
Failure 
Conditions 
 
1- Π ( 1- QKi) 
 
 
        VF 
I 
 
 
   Ranking 
F1 0 
0 
16 
F2 0,3696 
0,7107 
8 
F3 0,5463 
1,0506 
2 
F4 0,0665 
0,1280 
14 
F5 0,5235 
1,0068 
3 
F6 0,5235 
1,0068 
3 
QK8 0,0104 
QK9 0,0625 
QK10 0.0625 
QK11 0,0313 
QK12 0,1094 
QK13 0,0729 
QK14 0,0938 
K8 F2 E1.1 
K9 F2 E1.2 
K10 F2 E2.1 
K11 F2 E2.2 
K12 F2 E2.3 
K13 F2 E3.1 
K14 F2 E3.2 
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Table 4.17 (continued) :  Importance ranking basic events of  groundings  based on 
the Vessley-Fussell measure of importance. 
Failure 
Conditions 
 
1- Π ( 1- QKi) 
 
 
        VF 
I 
 
 
   Ranking 
F7 0,1373 
0,2641 
13 
F8 0,1441 
0,2772 
12 
F9 0,3779 
0,7268 
7 
F10 0,1441 
0,2772 
12 
F11 0,5200 
1,0001 
4 
F12 0,3316 
0,6377 
10 
E1.1 0,0527 
0,1014 
15 
E1.2 0,3608 
0,6938 
9 
E2.1 0,3608 
0,6938 
9 
E2.2 0,1983 
0,3813 
11 
E2.3 0,5505 
1,0587 
1 
E3.1 0,4081 
0,7848 
6 
E3.2 0,4936 
0,9492 
5 
As it has been shown on the Table 4.17, strong currents and machinery failure        
(blackout, generator failure…etc. ) are the major factors for groundings in the Port of 
Haydarpaşa Zone. Incompetency and negligence of the captain which was identified 
as incapacitation subcomponent, significantly affect the realization of grounding 
probability. Grounding causes are dominated by handling errors. Shallow waters, 
breakwater of Haydarpaşa and the quays in Haydarpaşa Port  are   important causes  
of groundings in the research area. Traffic volume is a serious factor which causes 
groundings. Steering failure which is one of the reason of lack of control 
significantly affects the  grounding frequency in the research area.
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Table 4.18 : Importance ranking of the basic  failure events and grounding 
probability of a vessel for a specified failure . 
Code Basic Failure Event Ranking 
 E2.3                   Current 1 
F3 Machinery Failure 2 
F5,F6 Incompetency, Negligence 3 
F11 Handling Error 4 
E3.2 Narrow Fairway 5 
E3.1 Traffic Volume 6 
F9 L.O Navigation Control 7 
F2 Steering Failure 8 
E1.2,E2.1 Illumination,Wind 9 
F12 L.O. Maneuvering Control 10 
E2.2 Wave 11 
F8 Planning Failure 12 
F7 Distraction 13 
F4 Complacency 14 
E1.1 Visibility 15 
F1 Propulsion Failure 16 
4.2.5 Fault tree analysis of collisions 
Collisions are defined as events where two vessels accidentally come into contact 
with each other. This may lead to sinking, grounding or to a fire on the vessel but 
these are counted as collisions if this was the cause.  
There have been totally 60 collisions from 129 accidents in the 20 year period 1991-
2010.  This is equivalent to an average of 3 collisions involvements per calendar 
year. 
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Collisions are evaluated into two categories in this research. First one is the 
collisions related with the navigating vessels. Second one is the collisions related 
with the maneuvering vessels. 
31 collisions related with navigating and 29 collisions related with maneuvering 
position caused serious casualties. This is equivalent to an average of 1,55 collisions 
related with the navigation and  1,45 collisions related with the maneuvering 
operation  involvements per calendar year. 
Only 6 of the collision involvements resulted in a total loss of the vessels. Two of the 
collisions resulted in totally 2 fatalities. Twelve of the collisions resulted in totally 
118 injuries in the research area. Statistics has been taken from the data table. 
The importance of poor visibility in collisions is demonstrated by the fact that 16 of 
the 60 collisions occurred in mist. 30 of the collisions from 60 collisions occurred 
during the night. 15 from 60 collisions were affected by strong winds. Waves   had 
less importance on collisions in the research area. 41 collisions from 60 occurred in 
strong currents. In other words, 68% of the collisions were affected by currents. 
Traffic volume significantly affect on collisions in the research area. 58% of the 
collisions occurred in high volume traffic situations.    
The causes of collisions, classified as in the PHA of the collisions represented in 
Table 4.1 are :  
External Conditions: 
Visibility- Poor visibility (mist, snowstorm, heavy rain) significantly affects the 
navigation safety on the Strait of Istanbul. 
Illumination- Risky navigation at night on the Strait of Istanbul.  
Wind- Strong and violent wind conditions affect the safety of navigation. 
Wave - Strong waves affect the safety of navigation (but this is less likely). 
Current- Strong currents affect the safety of navigation. 
Infrastructures - Breakwater of Haydarpaşa Port, berth (quay, pier), underwater 
work area   ( Marmaray) and mooring area  affects  the safety of navigation. 
Traffic Volume - Transit and local traffic create high risk for collisions on the Strait 
of Istanbul. 
139 
 
Conditions Onboard: 
Technical Failure- Steering failure and machinery failure were causal factors for 
collisions in the research area. 
Unsafe Acts- Lack of radar observation fixed positioning, lack of visual observation, 
high speed, and navigation planning failure were the unsafe acts related to navigation 
for collisions. Handling failure, high speed, lack of maneuvering control, lack of 
radar observation, planning failure in maneuvering operations and lack of visual 
observation were the unsafe acts related to maneuvering operations for collisions.  
The components as the causal factors of accidents above were analyzed from the 
reports of accidents, internet sources and Turkish State Meteorological Service 
historical data. As a result of these data, statistic data of the explanatory variables of 
the collisions which occurred in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone is shown in Table 5.20. 
Table 4.19 : Number of explanatory variables of the collisions in the Port of  
Haydarpaşa Zone  during the period  1991-2010. 
 EC1 EC2 EC3 Total 
 
CO1 
 
18 Collisions 
 
11 Collisions 
 
2 Collisions 
 
31 Collisions 
 
CO2 
 
4 Collisions 
 
10 Collisions 
 
15 Collisions 
 
29 Collisions 
Total 22 Collisions 21 Collisions 17 Collisions 60 Collisions 
Using the Equation 4.1; 
( (CO1 ∩ EC1) U  ( CO1 ∩ EC2 ) U ( CO1 ∩ EC3 ) ) U ((CO2 ∩ EC1) U  ( CO2 
∩ EC2 ) U  ( CO2 ∩ EC3 ) ) = Explanatory Variables of 60 Collisions 
CO1 ∩ EC1 = 18 Collisions 
 18 of the collisions occurred from navigation related failures due to marginal 
conditions (visibility, illumination). 
CO1 ∩ EC2 = 11 Collisions 
 11 of the collisions occurred from navigation related failures due to physical 
impacts on vessel (wind, wave, current). 
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CO1 ∩ EC3 = 2 Collisions 
 2 of the collisions occurred from navigation related failures due to restricted 
searoom (narrow fairway, traffic volume). 
CO2 ∩ EC1 = 4 Collisions 
 4 of the collisions occurred from maneuvering related failures due to 
marginal conditions (visibility, illumination). 
CO2 ∩ EC2 = 10 Collisions 
 10 of the collisions occurred from maneuvering related failures due to 
physical impacts on vessel (wind,wave, current). 
CO2 ∩ EC3 = 15 Collisions  
 15 of the collisions occurred from maneuvering related failures due to 
restricted searoom (narrow fairway, traffic volume). 
Navigational failures due to marginal conditions are the risky events for collisions in 
the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone. Maneuvering failures due to restricted searoom 
significantly create a high risk for collisions nearly as navigational failures. As a 
result of this, 
Collision fault tree risk analysis was evaluated in two categories in this research: 
- Navigation failures related collisions 
- Maneuvering failures related collisions 
Categorization should be done for a clear fault tree analysis of the collisions. 
Otherwise, it might be very complex and incomprehensible for making evaluation. 
Same type unsafe acts are identified for maneuvering and navigation related failures. 
This identification enlarges the structure of fault tree and its subcomponents like 5 
subcomponents for lack of situation awareness navigation and 6 subcomponents for 
task errors related to maneuvering. 
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4.2.5.1 Fault tree analysis of navigation related collisions   
There have been 31 collisions occurred in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone related with 
the navigation during the 20 year period 1991-2010. This is equivalent to an average 
of 1,55 collision involvements per calendar year. 
Table 4.20 : Number of explanatory variables of navigation related collisions.  
 EC1 EC2 EC3 Total 
 
CO1 
 
18 Collisions 
 
11 Collisions 
 
2 Collisions 
 
31 Collisions 
The importance of poor visibility in navigation related collisions is demonstrated by 
the fact that 18 of the 31 collisions occurred in mist or night. Visibility is the major 
factor with navigation failures for navigation related collisions. 35% of the 
navigation related collisions occurred in high level physical impact conditions 
(strong winds, strong waves or strong currents). Narrow fairway and traffic volume 
did not have a significant effect on the collisions related to navigation. 
 
Figure 4.10 :  View  of a vessel after collision in the research area [74]. 
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Figure 4.11 : FTA of navigation related collisions in the Haydarpaşa Port Zone during the Period 1991-2010. 
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Figure 4.12 : FTA of external conditions which affect the occurrence of  navigation 
related collisions. 
There were 31 navigation related collisions from 129 accidents occurred during the 
period 1991-2010. 
None of the collisions occurred due to technical failure in 20 years. 81% of collisions 
were caused by human error related failures. Navigation related collisions are 
dominated by lack of situation awareness navigation failures when passing the Strait 
of Istanbul. 81% of the collisions were caused by navigation situation. Control errors 
do not significantly affect the occurrence of collisions.  
Investigated data shows that marginal conditions are the major factor for navigation 
related collisions. 12 of the collisions occurred in mist and 18 of the collisions 
occurred in darkness. Strong winds and strong currents make the vessel difficult to 
navigate in the research area and increase the risk of collisions in this narrow 
fairway. Currents are the major factor for collisions from external conditions with 
74% proportion. Crossing local traffic and passing transit traffic constitute a high risk 
of collisions. 8 of the collisions from 31 occurred due to high traffic 
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volume. Mooring area, breakwater, quays of Haydarpaşa Port and underwater work 
area do not constitute a high risk for a navigation related collision. 
 Determination of minimal cut sets:  
As shown in the fault tree of navigation related collisions in the research area, a 
collision can occur if the following set of causes are occurring; complacency, 
incompetency, negligence, distraction, drunk captain, navigational planning failure, 
lack of visual observation, lack of radar observation,  fixed positioning, high speed,  
and external conditions. In Figure 4.11 and 4.12, it is identified the failures and the 
events under the TOP events in Table 4.21. The detailed information of 
determination of minimal cut sets was given in Section 4.2.3.1. 
Table 4.21: Codification of events and failures on the fault tree of navigation related 
collisions. 
EVENT FAİLURE 
EV1: Technical Failure F1:Propulsion Failure 
EV2: Ship Control F2: Steering Failure 
EV3: Incapacitation/Violation of Rules F3: Machinery Failure 
EV4: L.T.A. Human Performance F4: Complacency 
EV5: Lack of Situation Awarness Navigation F5: Incompetency 
EV6: Task Errors Related to Control F6: Negligence 
E1 : Marginal Conditions F7:Distraction 
E2 : Physical Impact F8: Drunk 
E3: Restricted Searoom F9: Planning Failure 
E1.1: Visibility F10: Lack of  Visual Observation 
E1.2: Illumination F11: Lack of  Radar Observation 
E2.1: Wind F12: Fixed Positioning 
E2.2: Wave F13: High Speed 
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Table 4.21  (continued) : Codification of events and failures on the fault tree of 
navigation related collisions. 
EVENT FAİLURE 
E2.3: Current  
E3.1: Traffic Volume  
E3.2: Narrow Fairway  
 Failure data calculated for navigation related collisions 
Table 4.22 : Failure data calculated for navigation related collisions in 20 years. 
Failure Failure Description 
Failure  
Probability 
F1 Propulsion Failure 0 
F2 Steering Failure 0 
F3 Machinery Failure 0 
F4 Complacency 0,290 
F5 Incompetency 0,161 
F6 Negligence 0,226 
F7 Distraction 0,097 
F8 Drunk 0,032 
F9 Planning Failure 0,258 
F10 L.O. Visual Observation 0,226 
F11 L.O. Radar Observation 0,323 
F12 Fixed Positioning 0,161 
     F13 High Speed 0,032 
Table 4.23 : External conditions data calculated for navigation related collisions. 
External 
Conditions External Conditions Description        Probability 
E 1.1 Marginal Conditions, Visibility 0,387 
E 1.2 Marginal Conditions, Illumination 0,581 
E 2.1 Physical Impact, Wind 0,323 
E 2.2 Physical Impact, Wave 0,065 
E 2.3 Physical Impact, Current 0,742 
E 3.1 Restricted Searoom, Traffic Volume 0,581 
E 3.2 Restricted Searoom, Narrow Fairway 0,258 
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The detailed description about the calculation of failure data for navigation related 
collisions is in Section 4.2.3.2. 
 Establishing minimal cut sets 
The MOCUS algorithm is applied for establishing minimal cut sets in this research.  
MOCUS step 1:  
Probability of navigation related collisions risk for each vessel sailing in the Port of 
Haydarpaşa Zone. 
MOCUS step 2: 
Occurrence of navigation related collisions based on two events in the Port of 
Haydarpaşa Zone. 
EV1: Technical Failures 
EV2: Ship Control 
 
MOCUS step 3.1.  
OR gate has been used for the technical failure event ( EV1 in the fault tree of 
navigation related collisions in Figure 4.11). Technical failures of navigation related 
collisions were analyzed as propulsion failures OR steering failures OR machinery 
failures.  
F1 
F2 
F3 
EV2 
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MOCUS step 3.2. 
AND gate has been used for the ship control event (EV2 in the fault tree of 
navigation related collisions in Figure 4.11).  Ship control event due to 
incapacitation/violation of rules and less than adequate human performance 
conditions onboard. Either of these or both conditions might be the reason for 
navigation related collisions. 
 
 
MOCUS step 3.3. For the Incapacitation/violation of rules (EV3) : 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 EV4 
F5 EV4 
F6 EV4 
F7 EV4 
F8 EV4 
MOCUS step 3.4. For the LTA of human performance (EV4) : 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 EV5 
F4 EV6 
F5 EV5 
F5 EV6 
F6 EV5 
F6 EV6 
F7 EV5 
F7 EV6 
F8 EV5 
F8 EV6 
 
 
 
 
F1  
F2  
F3  
EV3 EV4 
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MOCUS step 3.5. For lack of situation awareness navigation (EV5) : 
 
 
MOCUS step 3.5. For task errors related control (EV6) : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 F9 
F4 F10 
F4 F11 
F4 EV6 
F5 F9 
F5 F10 
F5 F11 
F5 EV6 
F6 F9 
F6 F10 
F6 F11 
F6 EV6 
F7 F9 
F7 F10 
F7 F11 
F7 EV6 
F8 F9 
F8 F10 
F8 F11 
F8 EV6 
F6 F13 
F7 F9 
F7 F10 
F7 F11 
F7 F12 
F7 F13 
F8 F9 
F8 F10 
F8 F11 
F8 F12 
F8 F13 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 F9 
F4 F10 
F4 F11 
F4 F12 
F4 F13 
F5 F9 
F5 F10 
F5 F11 
F5 F12 
F5 F13 
F6 F9 
F6 F10 
F6 F11 
F6 F12 
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MOCUS step 3.6  
Additionally, all failure modes significantly affected by external conditions in the 
research area. Same process should be done for each basic event of the external 
conditions as below. 
 
 
               E   
 
 
 
Figure 4.13 : View of a navigation related collision [75]. 
E1.1 
E1.2 
E2.1 
E2.2 
E2.3 
E3.1 
E3.2 
E1 
E2 
E3 
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Table 4.24 :  Establishing minimal cut sets of navigation related collisions. 
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Table 4.24 (continued) :  Establishing minimal cut sets of navigation related 
collisions. 
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Table 4.24 (continued) :  Establishing minimal cut sets of navigation related 
collisions. 
 
MOCUS step 4: 
There are 196 possible combinations of basic event failures for the navigation related 
collisions each row. There are at most three basic causes in each cut set. It is 
advantageous to have as many basic cut sets as possible for root analysis of the 
navigation related collision risk. Two and three basic causes in each cut set are 
enough. The cut sets K1 to K21 include only two basic causes. As it is mentioned 
before, external conditions in this area affect all the other basic events.  
The detailed calculation of a cut set was shown in Section 4.2.3.3. 
The probability calculations of   all cut sets related to collisions due to navigation are 
represented in Appendix C. 
Analyzing the data of the failure probabilities of navigational related collisions, 
human errors and lack of situation awareness navigation are the major factors for 
occurrence of collisions. Especially, lack of radar observation and complacency with 
strong current conditions are the most risky event for navigation related collisions in 
the research area of the Strait of Istanbul. In other words, K40 had the highest 
frequency of failure probability in navigation related collisions with 0,0695 value in 
20 years (see in Appendix C). K26 represented as the planning failure and 
complacency with strong current could be evaluated in the same risk level. The risk 
levels based on the failure probabilities of the minimal cut sets of the basic events in 
the research area are represented in Table 4.25. 
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Table 4.25 :  Importance ranking of the  cut sets based on failure probabilities in 20 
years. 
Risk Level Failure Probability of Cut Sets 
HIGH RISK 
( QKi between 0,05-0,2 ) 
        QK40            QK26               QK 37            QK41  
                                           QK110       
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEDIUM RISK 
( QKi between 0,01- 0,05 ) 
QK33 QK104 QK118 QK98 
QK23 QK22 QK71 QK128 
QK27 QK106 QK99 QK132 
QK96 QK44 QK28 QK64 
QK107 QK48 QK82 QK113 
QK111 QK68 QK94 QK59 
QK75 QK117 QK112 QK77 
QK30 QK29 QK131 QK105 
QK34 QK24 QK142 QK135 
QK103 QK42 QK146 QK139 
QK36 QK58 QK43 QK141 
QK47 QK62 QK35 QK49 
QK93 QK108 QK73 QK66 
QK97 QK145 QK101 QK115 
QK61 QK92 QK138 QK152 
QK38 QK31 QK57 QK63 
QK72 QK65 QK45 QK143 
QK76 QK69 QK79 QK78 
QK100 QK114 QK83 
 
 
 
LOW RISK 
( QKi between 0,005 - 0,01 ) 
QK127 QK129 QK133 QK140 
QK70 QK147 QK39 QK51 
QK119 QK180 QK166 QK55 
QK149 QK136 QK148 QK124 
QK153 QK54 QK177 QK173 
QK134 QK84 QK181 QK150 
QK80 
   
 
 
 
                NEGLIGIBLE RISK 
( QKi between 0,000 - 0,005 ) 
QK25 QK174 QK102 QK188 
QK163 QK154 QK178 QK120 
QK167 QK176 QK162 QK169 
QK109 QK89 QK46 QK60 
QK32 QK95 QK52 QK164 
QK121 QK187 QK86 QK182 
QK125 QK50 QK90 QK56 
QK170 QK74 QK184 QK67 
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Table 4.25 (continued) :  Importance ranking of the  cut sets based on failure 
probabilities. 
Risk Level Failure Probability of Cut Sets 
                 
 
 
               NEGLIGIBLE RISK 
( QKi between 0,000 - 0,005 ) 
QK116 QK130 QK172 QK8 
QK122 QK137 QK190 QK9 
QK159 QK91 QK88 QK10 
QK171 QK189 QK186 QK11 
QK168 QK155 QK192 QK12 
QK85 QK151 QK196 QK13 
QK144 QK157 QK158 QK14 
QK183 QK161 QK193 QK15 
QK126 QK194 QK1 QK16 
QK175 QK179 QK2 QK17 
QK156 QK53 QK3 QK18 
QK160 QK191 QK4 QK19 
QK81 QK195 QK5 QK20 
QK87 QK123 QK6 QK21 
QK185 QK165 QK7 
 
 
Failure probability of cut sets is represented as QKi in Table 4.25. There are four 
level of risks evaluated in the table. High risk level indicates the failure probabilities 
of the cut sets between 0,05-0,2. Medium level risk indicates the failure probabilities 
of cut sets between 0,01-0,05. Low level risk indicates the failure probabilities of cut 
sets between 0,01-0,005. Negligible risk is assumed as the probabilities between 0-
0,005 .  
Risk levels were evaluated as in the preliminary hazard analysis of the navigation 
related collisions in the research area which was represented in Table 4.1. High level 
risks are illustrated, if there are fatalities, injuries, oil spill, air pollution and/or loss 
of the vessel.  Medium level risks were illustrated, if there were injuries, oil spillage 
serious damage on vessel and/or serious damage on infrastructure. Low level risks 
were illustrated, if there was a minor damage on vessel (need to take towage service) 
and/or minor damage on infrastructure. Negligible risks were illustrated, if there was 
no damage or minor damage on vessel (not need to take towage service). 
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 Calculation of navigation related collision probability 
General information about the calculation of the TOP event was defined in Section 
4.2.3.4. 
Q0: Top event failure probability 
QEV1: Ship control functions failure probability 
QEV2: Technical failure functions failure probability 
QEV3: Incapacitation/violation of rules functions failure probability 
QEV4: Less than adequate human performance functions failure probability 
QEV5: Lack of situation awareness navigation functions failure probability 
QEV6: Task errors related to control functions failure probability 
QE0 : Top external conditions failure probability 
QE1 : Marginal conditions failure probability  
QE2 : Physical impact failure probability 
QE3 : Restricted searoom failure probability 
First task is to calculate the external conditions failure probability which affects all 
the failure conditions except incapacitation/violation of rules in the fault tree.  
QE3 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE3.1 ) ( 1- QE3.2 ) ] =   [ 1- ((1-0,581) ( 1- 0,258)) ] = 0,689 
QE2 = [ 1- (( 1- QE2.1 ) ( 1- QE2.2 ) (1- QE2.3 )] = [ 1- (( 1- 0,323 ) ( 1- 0,065 ) ( 1- 
0,742 ))] 
= 0,837  
QE1  = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE1.1 ) ( 1- QE1.2 ) ] =  [ 1- ((1-0,387 ) ( 1- 0,581) ] = 0,743  
QE0  = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE1 ) ( 1- QE2 ) (1- QE3 )  ] = [ 1- (( 1- 0,743) ( 1- 0,837 ) ( 1- 
0,689 )) ] = 
QE0= QE = 0,987  
Second task is to calculate the TOP event navigation related collision failure 
probability for 20 years period. 
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QEV6 =  [ 1- ( ( 1- QF12* QE ) ( 1-QF13*QE) ) ] =  [ 1- ( ( 1- 0,161 ) ( 1- 0,032) ) ] = 
0,186 
QEV5 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QF9*QE ) ( 1- QF10*QE ) (1- QF11*QE ) ] = 0,606 
QEV4 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QEV5 ) ( 1- QEV6) ) ] = 0,679 
QEV3 =  [ 1- ( ( 1- QF4 ) ( 1- QF5 ) (1- QF6 ) (1- QF7 ) (1- QF8 ) ] = 0,597 
QEV2 = QEV3 * QEV4 =  0,405 
QEV1 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QF1*QE  ) ( 1- QF2*QE ) (1- QF3*QE ) ) ] = 0 
Q0 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QEV1 ) ( 1- QEV2) ) ] 
= 0,405 the probability for the top event of  navigation related collision risk  in 
the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone in 20 years period. 
If it is calculated for one year  period; 
0,405/20 = 0,020  
This means that there is a 2 % chance that this particular unwanted, and potentially 
dangerous event (navigation related collision ) will occur in the Port of Haydarpaşa 
Zone for one year period. 
 Assessment of basic cause importance of  navigation related collisions  
General information about assessment of basic cause importance and detailed 
calculation are given in Section 4.2.3.5.  
Failure probability data was used in Table 4.22. , 4.23.  and Appendix C to assess the 
importance of the different events which triggered the TOP event navigation related 
collision. 
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Table 4.26 :  Importance ranking basic events of  navigation related collisions  based 
on the Vessley-Fussell measure of importance. 
Failure 
Conditions 
 
1- Π ( 1- QKi) 
 
 
        VF 
I 
 
 
   Ranking 
F1 0 
0 
17 
F2 0 
0 
17 
F3 0 
0 
17 
F4 0,5805 
1,4334 
1 
F5 0,3799 
0,9380 
7 
F6 0,4904 
1,2108 
3 
F7 0,2491 
0,6152 
11 
F8 0,0900 
0,2222 
14 
F9 0,4620 
1,1407 
4 
F10 0,4186 
1,0335 
6 
F11 0,5411 
1,3360 
2 
F12 0,3192 
0,7882 
9 
F13 0,0732 
0,1808 
15 
E1.1 0,2705 
0,6680 
10 
E1.2 0,3785 
0,9345 
8 
E2.1 0,2311 
0,5706 
12 
E2.2 0,0511 
0,1263 
16 
E2.3 0,4568 
1,1279 
5 
E3.1 0,3785 
0,9345 
8 
E3.2 0,1890 
0,4666 
13 
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As it has been shown on the Table 4.26., human errors (complacency, negligence) 
and lack of situation awareness (lack of radar observation, planning failure) are the 
major factors for navigation related collisions in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone. Strong 
currents from external conditions significantly affect the realization of navigation 
related collision probability. 
Analyzed data show that there was not any technical failure event like propulsion, 
steering and machinery in the occurrence of navigation related collisions.  
Table 4.27 : Importance ranking of the basic failure events and navigation related 
collision probability of a vessel for a specified failure. 
Code Basic Failure Event Ranking 
 F4                   Complacency 1 
F11 Lack of Radar Observation 2 
F6 Negligence 3 
F9 Planning Failure 4 
E2.3 Current 5 
F10 Lack of Visual Observation 6 
F5 Incompetency 7 
E1.2, E3.1 Illumination, Traffic 8 
F12 Fixed Positioning 9 
E1.1 Visibility 10 
F7 Distraction 11 
E2.1 Wind 12 
E3.2 Infrastructure 13 
F8 Drunk 14 
F13 High Speed 15 
              E2.2 Wave 16 
F1,F2,F3 
Propulsion, Steering, Machinery 
Failure 
17  
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4.2.5.2 Fault tree analysis of maneuvering related collisions   
There have been 29 collisions occurred in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone related with 
the maneuvering. This is equivalent to an average of 1, 45 collision involvements per 
calendar year. 
Table 4.28 : Number of explanatory variables of maneuvering related collisions. 
 EC1 EC2 EC3 Total 
 
CO2 
 
4 Collisions 
 
10 Collisions 
 
15 Collisions 
 
29 Collisions 
The events caused restricted searoom like traffic volume and narrow fairway are the 
major factors for occurrence of maneuvering related collisions with 15 collisions 
from 29. 35% of the collisions due to maneuvering are caused by physical impact 
conditions (strong winds, strong waves or strong currents). Visibility and 
illumination identified as marginal conditions did not have a significant effect on 
maneuvering related collisions. 
 
Figure 4.14 : View  of a vessel after collision in the research area [76]. 
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Figure 4.15 : FTA of maneuvering related collisions in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone during the period 1991-2010. 
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Figure 4.16 : FTA of external conditions which affect the occurrence of 
maneuvering related collisions. 
There were 29 maneuvering related collisions from 129 accidents occurred during 
the period 1991-2010. 
Technical failures are dominated by steering failures in the maneuvering related 
collisions with 5 collisions from 7.  Approximately 50% of the collisions occurred 
based on human errors. 83% of the collisions occurred by task errors related to 
maneuvering in this category. Handling errors related to maneuvering are the major 
failures from the task errors related to maneuvering situations. 
Investigated data shows that restricted searoom conditions are the major factor for 
maneuvering related collisions from the external conditions category. 23 of the 
collisions were affected by the infrastructures on the fairway and high traffic volume. 
Breakwater of Haydarpaşa significantly increases the risk of collisions due to 
maneuvering especially for local traffic.  59% of the collisions related to 
maneuvering occurred in the high traffic volume. Strong winds and strong currents 
make the vessel difficult to maneuver in the research area and increase the risk of 
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collisions in this narrow fairway. Marginal conditions do not have  a large effect on 
the collisions related to maneuvering. Only 12 of the collisions occurred in the night.  
 Determination of minimal cut sets:  
As it is shown in the fault tree of maneuvering  related collisions in the research area, 
a collision can occur if the following sets of causes are; complacency, incompetency, 
negligence, distraction, navigational planning failure, lack of visual observation, lack 
of radar observation,  handling error, high speed, lack of control while maneuvering,  
and external conditions.  
Using the data in Figure 4.20 and 4.21, it is identified the failures and the events 
under the TOP events in Table 4.29. The detailed information of determination of 
minimal cut sets was given in Section 4.2.3.1. 
Table 4.29 : Codification of events and failures on the fault tree of maneuvering  
related collisions. 
EVENT FAİLURE 
EV1: Technical Failure F1:Propulsion Failure 
EV2: Ship Control F2: Steering Failure 
EV3: Incapacitation/Violation of Rules F3: Machinery Failure 
EV4: L.T.A. Human Performance F4: Complacency 
EV5: Lack of Situation Awarness Navigation F5: Incompetency 
EV6: Task Errors Related to Control F6: Negligence 
E1 : Marginal Conditions F7:Distraction 
E2 : Physical Impact F8: Planning Failure 
E3: Restricted Searoom F9: Lack of  Visual Observation 
E1.1: Visibility F10: Lack of  Radar Observation 
E1.2: Illumination F11: Handling Error 
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Table 4.29 (continued) : Codification of events and failures on the fault tree of 
maneuvering  related collisions. 
EVENT FAİLURE 
E2.1: Wind F12: High Speed 
E2.2: Wave F13: Lack of Control 
E2.3: Current  
E3.1: Traffic Volume  
E3.2: Narrow Fairway  
 Failure data calculated for maneuvering  related collisions 
Table 4.30 : Failure data calculated for maneuvering related collisions in 20 years. 
Failure Failure Description 
Failure  
Probability 
F1 Propulsion Failure 0,034 
F2 Steering Failure 0,172 
F3 Machinery Failure 0,034 
F4 Complacency 0,069 
F5 Incompetency 0,103 
F6 Negligence 0,138 
F7 Distraction 0,172 
F8 Planning Failure 0,034 
F9 L.O. Visual Observation 0,069 
F10 L.O. Radar Observation 0,069 
F11 Handling Error 0,517 
F12 High Speed 0,069 
     F13 Lack of Control 0,241 
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Table 4.31: External conditions data calculated for maneuvering related collisions. 
External 
Conditions External Conditions Description        Probability 
E 1.1 Marginal Conditions, Visibility 0,138 
E 1.2 Marginal Conditions, Illumination 0,414 
E 2.1 Physical Impact, Wind 0,172 
E 2.2 Physical Impact, Wave 0,034 
E 2.3 Physical Impact, Current 0,621 
E 3.1 Restricted Searoom, Traffic Volume 0,586 
E 3.2 Restricted Searoom, Narrow Fairway 0,793 
The detailed description of the calculation of failure data for maneuvering  related 
collisions  is in Section  4.2.3.2. 
 Establishing minimal cut sets 
The MOCUS algorithm is applied for establishing minimal cut sets in this research. 
MOCUS step 1:  
Probability of maneuvering related collisions risk  for each vessel  sailing in the Port 
of Haydarpaşa Zone. 
MOCUS step 2: 
Occurrence of maneuvering related collisions based on two event in the Port of 
Haydarpaşa Zone. 
EV1: Technical Failures 
EV2: Ship Control 
 
MOCUS step 3.1.  
OR gate has been used for the technical failure event  ( EV1 in the fault tree of 
maneuvering  related collisions in Figure 4.15). Technical failures of navigation 
related collisions were analyzed as propulsion failures OR steering failures OR 
machinery failures.  
F1 
F2 
F3 
EV2 
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MOCUS step 3.2. 
AND gate has been used for the ship control event (EV2 in the fault tree of 
maneuvering related collisions in Figure 4.15).  Ship control event based on 
incapacitation/violation of rules and less than adequate human performance 
conditions onboard. Either of these or both conditions might be the reason for 
maneuvering related collisions. 
 
 
MOCUS step 3.3. For the Incapacitation/violation of rules (EV3): 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 EV4 
F5 EV4 
F6 EV4 
F7 EV4 
 
MOCUS step 3.4. For the LTA of human performance (EV4): 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 EV5 
F4 EV6 
F5 EV5 
F5 EV6 
F6 EV5 
F6 EV6 
F7 EV5 
F7 EV6 
 
 
 
 
F1  
F2  
F3  
EV3 EV4 
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MOCUS step 3.5. For lack of situation awareness navigation (EV5) : 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 F8 
F4 F9 
F4 F10 
F4 EV6 
F5 F8 
F5 F9 
F5 F10 
F5 EV6 
F6 F8 
F6 F9 
F6 F10 
F6 EV6 
F7 F8 
F7 F9 
F7 F10 
F7 EV6 
MOCUS step 3.5. For task errors related maneuvering (EV6) : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F6 F10 
F6 F11 
F6 F12 
F6 F13 
F7 F8 
F7 F9 
F7 F10 
F7 F11 
F7 F12 
F7 F13 
F1  
F2  
F3  
F4 F8 
F4 F9 
F4 F10 
F4 F11 
F4 F12 
F4 F13 
F5 F8 
F5 F9 
F5 F10 
F5 F11 
F5 F12 
F5 F13 
F6 F8 
F6 F9 
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MOCUS step 3.6  
Additionally, all failure modes are significantly affected by external conditions in the 
research area. Same process should be done for each basic event of the external 
conditions as below. 
 
 
               E   
 
 
 
Figure 4.17 : Sinking of a vessel after  maneuvering related collision [77]. 
 
E1.1 
E1.2 
E2.1 
E2.2 
E2.3 
E3.1 
E3.2 
E1 
E2 
E3 
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Table 4.32 : Establishing minimal cut sets of maneuvering  related collisions. 
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Table 4.32 (continued) : Establishing minimal cut sets of maneuvering  related 
collisions. 
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Table 4.32 (continued) : Establishing minimal cut sets of maneuvering  related 
collisions. 
 
MOCUS step 4: 
There are 189 possible combinations of basic event failures for the maneuvering 
related collisions each row. There are at most three basic causes in each cut set. It is 
advantageous to have as many basic cut sets as possible for root analysis of the 
maneuvering related collision risk. Two and three basic causes in each cut set are 
enough. The cut sets K1 to K21 include only two basic causes. As it is mentioned 
before, external conditions in this area affect all the other basic events.  
The detailed calculation of a cut set was shown in Section 4.2.3.3. 
The probability calculations of   all cut sets related to collisions due to maneuvering 
are represented in Appendix C. 
Analyzing the data of the failure probabilities of navigational related collisions, 
steering failures from technical failures are the major factors for occurrence of 
collisions. Especially, handling failure and distraction in narrow fairway conditions 
are the most risky event for maneuvering related collisions in the research area. In 
other words, K14 had the highest frequency of failure probability in maneuvering 
related collisions with 0,1364 value in 20 years (see in Appendix C). K175 
represented as the handling failure while maneuvering and   distraction in narrow 
fairway could be evaluated in the same risk level. The risk levels based on the failure 
probabilities of the minimal cut sets of the basic events in the research area 
represented in Table 4.33. 
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Table 4.33 :  Importance ranking of the  cut sets based on failure probabilities.  
Risk Level Failure Probability of Cut Sets 
HIGH RISK 
( QKi between 0,05-0,2 ) 
QK14 QK13 QK175 QK173 
QK12 QK9 QK133 QK174 
 
 
 
MEDIUM RISK 
( QKi between 0,01- 0,05 ) 
QK131 QK7 QK48 QK104 
QK91 QK21 QK145 QK2 
QK132 QK147 QK6 QK16 
QK170 QK187 QK20 QK142 
QK89 QK188 QK105 QK63 
QK189 QK8 QK146 QK129 
QK90 QK47 QK184 QK169 
QK10 QK86 QK103 QK61 
QK128 QK5 QK171 QK100 
QK49 QK19 QK44 
  
 
LOW RISK 
( QKi between 0,005 - 0,01 ) 
QK127 QK159 QK58 QK143 
QK62 QK166 QK45 QK183 
QK161 QK180 QK117 QK77 
QK168 QK85 QK124 QK84 
QK182 QK185 QK138 QK98 
QK87 QK160 QK3 QK118 
QK119 QK167 QK11 QK125 
QK126 QK181 QK17 QK139 
QK140 
    
                    
 
 
 
 
               NEGLIGIBLE RISK 
( QKi between 0,000 - 0,005 ) 
QK43 QK110 QK136 QK108      
QK156 QK172 QK155 QK148 
QK163 QK59 QK162 QK29 
QK177 QK72 QK176 QK36 
QK1 QK79 QK26 QK50 
QK15 QK93 QK65 QK60 
QK141 QK34 QK27 QK66 
QK154 QK41 QK186 QK106 
QK75 QK55 QK113 QK64 
QK82 QK70 QK120 QK24 
QK96 QK111 QK134 QK158 
QK101 QK130 QK4 QK165 
QK76 QK149 QK18 QK179 
QK83 QK57 QK46 QK22 
QK97 QK68 QK73 QK116 
QK114 QK69 QK80 QK123 
QK121 QK30 QK94 QK137 
QK135 QK37 QK144 QK32 
QK35 QK51 QK23 QK39 
QK42 QK157 QK71 QK53 
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Table 4.33 (continued) :  Importance ranking of the  cut sets based on failure 
probabilities. 
Risk Level Failure Probability of Cut Sets 
                  
                NEGLIGIBLE RISK 
( QKi between 0,000 - 0,005 ) 
QK152 QK28 QK150 QK95 
QK99 QK107 QK31 QK109 
QK153 QK88 QK38 QK151 
QK33 QK115 QK52 QK25 
QK40 QK122 QK102 QK67 
QK54 QK56 QK164 QK78 
QK74 QK112 QK178 QK92          
QK81 
   
 
Failure probability of cut sets is represented as QKi  in Table 4.33. There are four 
level of risks evaluated in the table. High risk level indicates the failure probabilities 
of the cut sets between 0,05-0,2. Medium level risk indicates the failure probabilities 
of cut sets between 0,01-0,05. Low level risk indicates the failure probabilities of cut 
sets between 0,01-0,005. Negligible risk is assumed as the probabilities between 0-
0,005 .  
Risk levels were evaluated as in the preliminary hazard analysis of the maneuvering 
related collisions in the research area which was represented in Table 4.1. High level 
risks are illustrated, if there are fatalities, injuries, oil spillage, air pollution and/or 
loss of the vessel.  Medium level risks are illustrated, if there are injuries, oil spill 
serious damage on vessel and/or serious damage on infrastructure. Low level risks 
are illustrated, if there is a minor damage on vessel (need to take towage service ) 
and/or minor damage on infrastructure. Negligible risks are illustrated, if there is no 
damage or minor damage on vessel (not need to take towage service). 
 Calculation of maneuvering related collision probability 
General information about the calculation of the TOP event was defined in Section 
4.2.3.4. 
The fault tree analysis model represented in Figure 4.15 and 4.16 , the codifications 
of events and failures represented in Table 4.29, the failure, event and external 
conditions probability values in  Table 4.30, 4.31 are used for the top event failure 
probability ( Q0 )  calculation of maneuvering related collisions.  
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Q0: Top event failure probability 
QEV1: Ship control functions failure probability 
QEV2: Technical failure functions failure probability 
QEV3: Incapacitation/violation of rules functions failure probability 
QEV4: Less than adequate human performance functions failure probability 
QEV5: Lack of situation awareness navigation functions failure probability 
QEV6: Task errors related to maneuvering functions failure probability 
QE0 : Top external conditions failure probability 
QE1 : Marginal conditions failure probability  
QE2 : Physical impact failure probability 
QE3 : Restricted searoom failure probability 
First task is to calculate the external conditions failure probability which effects all 
the failure conditions except incapacitation/violation of rules in the fault tree.  
QE3 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE3.1 ) ( 1- QE3.2 ) ] =   [ 1- ((1-0,586) ( 1- 0,793)) ] = 0,914 
QE2 = [ 1- (( 1- QE2.1 ) ( 1- QE2.2 ) (1- QE2.3 )] = [ 1- (( 1- 0,172 ) ( 1- 0,034 ) ( 1- 
0,621 ))] = 0,697 
QE1  = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE1.1 ) ( 1- QE1.2 ) ] =  [ 1- ((1-0,138 ) ( 1- 0,414) ] = 0,495  
QE0  = [ 1- ( ( 1- QE1 ) ( 1- QE2 ) (1- QE3 )  ] = [ 1- (( 1- 0,495) ( 1- 0,697 ) ( 1- 
0,914 )) ] = 
QE0= QE = 0,987  
Second task is to calculate the TOP event maneuvering related collision failure 
probability for 20 years period. 
QEV6 =  [ 1- ( ( 1- QF11* QE ) ( 1-QF12*QE) (1- QF13*QE ) ) ] = 0,652 
QEV5 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QF8*QE ) ( 1- QF9*QE ) (1- QF10*QE ) ] = 0,161 
QEV4 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QEV5 ) ( 1- QEV6) ) ] = 0,708 
QEV3 =  [ 1- ( ( 1- QF4 ) ( 1- QF5 ) (1- QF6 ) (1- QF7 ) ] = 0,404 
QEV2 = QEV3 * QEV4 =  0,286 
174 
 
QEV1 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QF1*QE  ) ( 1- QF2*QE ) (1- QF3*QE ) ) ] = 0,227 
Q0 = [ 1- ( ( 1- QEV1 ) ( 1- QEV2) ) ] 
= 0,448 the probability for the top event of  maneuvering related collision risk  
in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone in 20 years period. 
If it is calculated for one year  period; 
0,448/20 = 0,022  
This means that there is a 2,2 % chance that this particular unwanted, and potentially 
dangerous event ( maneuvering related collision ) will occur in the Port of 
Haydarpaşa Zone for one year period. 
 Assessment of basic cause importance of maneuvering related collisions 
General information about assessment of basic cause importance and detailed 
calculation are  given  in Section 4.2.3.5.  
The failure probability data in Table 4.30 ,  4.31  and Appendix C  is used to assess 
the importance of the different events which triggered the TOP event navigation 
related collision. 
Table 4.34 : Importance ranking basic events of maneuvering related collisions 
based on the Vessley-Fussell measure of importance. 
Failure 
Conditions 
 
1- Π ( 1- QKi) 
 
 
VF 
I 
 
 
Ranking 
F1 0,0904 
0,2017 
14 
F2 0,3932 
0,8777 
3 
F3 0,0904 
0,2017 
14 
F4 0,1748 
0,3901 
11 
F5 0,2490 
0,5559 
10 
F6 0,3198 
0,7138 
7 
F7 0,3824 
0,8534 
4 
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Table 4.34 (continued) : Importance ranking basic events of maneuvering related 
collisions based on the Vessley-Fussell measure of importance. 
Failure 
Conditions 
 
1- Π ( 1- QKi) 
 
 
        VF 
I 
 
 
   Ranking 
F8 0,0444 
0,0992 
16 
F9 0,0878 
0,1961 
15 
F10 0,0878 
0,1961 
15 
F11 0,5039 
1,1249 
1 
F12 0,0878 
0,1961 
15 
F13 0,2763 
0,6167 
8 
E1.1 0,09591 
0,2122 
13 
E1.2 0,2617 
0,5841 
9 
E2.1 0,1171 
0,2613 
12 
E2.2 0,0241 
0,0539 
17 
E2.3 0,3682 
0,8219 
5 
E3.1 0,3513 
0,7842 
6 
E3.2 0,4459 
0,9954 
2 
As it has been shown on the Table 4.34, distraction and handling error while 
maneuvering operation in the narrow fairway conditions are the major factors for 
maneuvering related collisions. Additionally, steering failure from the technical 
failures could be identified as another major factor in the occurrence of maneuvering 
related collisions. Strong currents and traffic volume from external conditions 
significantly affect the realization of maneuvering related collision probability. 
Propulsion and machinery failures did not have a big effect on the maneuvering 
related collisions.  
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Table 4.35 : Importance ranking of the basic failure events and maneuvering related 
collisions probability of a vessel for a specified failure. 
Code Basic Failure Event Ranking 
 F11 Handling Error 1 
E3.2 Narrow Fairway 2 
F2 Steering Failure 3 
F7 Distraction 4 
E2.3 Current 5 
E3.1 Traffic Volume 6 
F6 Negligence 7 
F13 Lack of Maneuvering Control 8 
E1.2 Illumination 9 
F5 Incompetency 10 
F4 Complacency 11 
E2.1 Wind 12 
E1.1 Visibility 13 
F1,F3 Propulsion, Machinery Failure 14 
F9,F10,F12 
L.O. Visual Observation, L.O. 
Radar Observation, High Speed 
15 
              F8 Planning Failure 16 
E2.2 Wave 17  
4.2.4 Calculation of annual accident probability for each vessel navigating in the 
research area    
By using calculated top event probabilities of contacts, groundings, navigation 
related collisions and maneuvering related collisions for one year period, possibility 
of an accident for a vessel can be calculated by dividing the number of passing 
vessels.  
It has been calculated that 3% probability of contact, 2,6% probability of grounding, 
2% probability of navigation related collision and 2,2% probability of maneuvering 
related collisions in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone for one year period.   
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Probability calculations have been done for all navigating vessels in the research 
area. As given in equation below , possibility of an accident ( collision, contact and 
grounding ) can be calculated by dividing probability of  an accident type in a certain 
time interval by amount of ship movement in a certain area for each vessel. 
                                              P (x) = Pr (x) / AOSM                                             (4.10)                                           
P(x) : Possibility of a type x accident for each vessel. 
Pr (x) : Probability of a type x accident in a year period. 
AOSM: Amount of Other Ship Movement 
Table 4.36 : Amount of other traffic movement during the period  1995-2010 years 
in the research area [78]. 
YEAR AMOUNT of SHIP MOVEMENT 
1995 46954 
1996 49952 
1997 50942 
1998 49304 
1999 47906 
2000 48079 
2001 42637 
2002 47283 
2003 46939 
2004 54564 
2005 54794 
2006 54880 
2007 56606 
2008 54396 
2009 51422 
2010 50871 
Transit vessels passing the strait in longitudinal direction, arriving and departing 
vessels in the Port of Haydarpaşa are mentioned as other traffic. Table 4.36 
represents the transit and berthing vessel movements in the research area.  Ship 
movements of the City Lines Ferries, Istanbul Sea Buses, and Local Passenger Boats 
crossing the strait are mentioned as local traffic in this research. 
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Average amount of other ship movements based on last 15 years calculated 
approximately 54.000 vessel movement per year. Determined main traffic flow and 
calculated probability of accidents in the research area are used to compute the 
possibility of an accident between vessels belonging to other traffic. Table 4.37 
shows the probabilities. 
Table 4.37: Possibility of an accident of ships  belong to other traffic  in one year 
period in the research area. 
Type of Accident 
Probability of the Accident 
in one Year Period (%) 
Probability of the Accident 
for each Vessel (%) 
Contact 3 5.5 X 10 
-4 
Grounding 2.6 4.8 X 10 
-4 
Navigation Related Collision 2 3.7 X 10 
-4 
Maneuvering Related 
Collision 
2.2 4.1 X 10 
-4 
Local traffic in the Strait of Istanbul is examined in three regions according to the 
guidelines prepared by Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs. These regions are  
named as C1, C2 and C3 in the guidelines of local traffic [1]. The accident risk  of  
the local traffic in C1 region has been investigated 
Figure 4.18 : Boundaries of  C1 region in the Strait of Istanbul [1]. 
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There are 1765 scheduled daily voyages from the local traffic in this region [1]. It the 
annual ship movements of local traffic have been calculated as; 
                                              ALSM = #V * 365 days                                          (4.11) 
ALSM= Amount of Local Ship Movement 
#V = Daily Number of Voyages 
ALSM= 1765*365 
= 644.225 local ship movement in a year. 
Average amount of local ship movements are calculated   644.225  movement per 
year. Determined main traffic flow and calculated probability of accidents in the 
research area are used to compute possibility of an accident between vessels 
belonging to local traffic. Table 4.38 shows the probabilities. 
Table 4.38 : Possibility of an accident of ships belong to local traffic in one year 
period. 
Type of Accident 
Probability of the Accident 
in one Year Period (%) 
Probability of the Accident 
for each Vessel (%) 
Contact 3 4.7 X 10 
-5 
Grounding 2.6 4 X 10 
-5 
Navigation Related Collision 2 3.1 X 10 
-5 
Maneuvering Related 
Collision 
2.2 3.4 X 10 
-5 
 
Total Ship movement calculated as;  
                                                TSM= AOSM + ALSM                                        (4.12) 
AOSM: Amount of Other Ship Movement 
ALSM= Amount of Local Ship Movement 
= 698.225 ship movements in a year in the research area. 
Total amount of ship movements are calculated   698.225 movements per year. 
Determined main traffic flow and calculated probability of accidents in the research 
area are used to compute possibility of an accident between vessels belonging to 
local traffic and other traffic. Table 4.39 shows the probabilities. 
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Table 4.39 : Possibility of an accident between ships belong to local and other traffic 
in one year period. 
Type of Accident 
Probability of the Accident 
in one Year Period (%) 
Probability of the Accident 
for each Vessel (%) 
Contact 3 4.2 X 10 
-5 
Grounding 2.6 3.7 X 10 
-5 
Navigation Related Collision 2 2.8  X 10 
-5 
Maneuvering Related 
Collision 
2.2 3.2 X 10 
-5 
4.3 Analysis of the Factors Affecting Navigation Safety with Fuzzy-AHP 
(Analytic Hierarchy Process) Method in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone 
The marine accidents in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone have been investigated by 
using Fuzzy-AHP Method to find out the nature of accidents by consulting regional 
experts in this application. According to the expert opinions, strategies are 
investigated by analyzing the causal factors of the accidents for the prevention 
measures.   
The purpose of this application is to analyze the results of expert findings in 
accordance with their views, to contribute to the development of strategies, and to 
provide solutions for preventing marine accidents.  
4.3.1 Analysis of risk perception by expert survey 
In Fault Tree Analysis,  several parameters such as; technical failures, failures related 
to the ship control, human factors and external conditions in addition possibility of 
accidents based on historical data were investigated in order to determine the degree 
of danger in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone. On the basis of the results from the 
previous studies, a questionnaire survey has been conducted to Pilots, Vessel Traffic 
Services Operators (VTS-O), Local Traffic Vessel Captains and Master Marines who 
had much experience of passing through the Istanbul Strait in order to assess their 
perceptions of danger, and to propose a basis for further studies. 
The aim of this study is to determine most dangerous parameters such as; influence 
the level of environmental conditions, traffic volume , pilotage/towage service, 
VTS/Port Authority, human factors and technical failures and effectiveness level of 
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potential counter measures gathered from the survey. It is also aimed to investigate 
perception differences among afore mentioned major stakeholders. 
4.3.2 Design of the questionnaire survey 
Totally 57 questionnaires were distributed to the experts for the survey. 14 pilots 
(average 16.7 years sea experience), 16 Ocean going captains and Istanbul Sea Buses 
(IDO) captains who have much experience of passing through the Istanbul Strait 
(average 9.7 years sea experience), 5 local traffic vessel captains (various 
competency- license and average 22 years sea experience), 11 VTS-O’s (average 
14.2  years sea and VTS experience), 11 Academician captains (average 4.1 years 
sea experience) participated in this survey as given in Table 4.40. 
Table 4.40 :  Number of participants with their experiences. 
 Number of 
Participant 
Average Experience ( year) 
Pilot 14 16.7  (Sea+Pilot) 
VTS-O 11 14.2 ( Sea+VTS-O) 
Captain Ocean Going and 
IDO 
16 9.7 ( Sea + IDO) 
Captain Local Traffic 5 22 ( Sea + Local ) 
Captain Academician 11 4.1 ( Sea) 
A sample of questionnaire survey is presented in Appendix-D. 
4.3.3 Method and calculations 
The criteria, sub-criteria and alternatives of the questionnaire survey were chosen 
based on the components and subcomponents of the Fault Tree Analysis of the 
accidents. The survey consists of two parts. The aim of the first part is to evaluate the 
four main criteria and sub criteria by the experts. Evaluation should be done by 
ranking of the criteria and scoring these criteria between 0-100 points. In the second 
part, it is also aimed to rank the six alternative situations with the designated sub 
criteria and to score these alternatives   between 0-100 points. The survey was 
analyzed by using Fuzzy-AHP model with the evaluation of scores and rankings.  
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The aim of this survey is to test the reliability of the results of Fault Tree Analysis or 
to find out the differences of the results between to analysis methods. The detailed 
information about the Fuzzy-AHP model was given in the Section 3.3.2. 
This survey was applied to the 57 experts who sailed in the research area.  In the first 
step, all the scores and rankings of the experts were transferred on the excel table. 57 
experts were divided into 3 groups according to their sea experience. Groups 
organized as follows; 
Group 1 : Sea experience between 0-10 years 
Group 2 : Sea experience between 10-20 years 
Group 3 : Sea experience between  20-34 years 
The average sea experience of group 1 is calculated as 4.8 years, the average sea 
experience of group 2 is calculated as 13.7 years and the average sea experience of 
group 3 is calculated as 26.7 years. Then, the normalized values of the sea 
experiences are calculated.  
In the next step, the average scores of the answers of the experts have been 
calculated according to their groups.   
The aim of the Fuzzy-AHP calculations is to find the final weights of the alternatives 
which assumed as the effective factors of the accidents. The weights of main criteria 
have been calculated in the following as an example. 
First, it has been assigned the membership functions of the average scores for the 
main criteria group by group. 
Table 4.41 : Membership functions of linguistic scales for group 1. 
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Table 4.42 : Membership functions of linguistic scales for group 2. 
 
Table 4.43 : Membership functions of linguistic scales for group 3. 
 
It has been taken geometric mean the values of pair wise comparison and the values 
has been normalized as in the following. 
For Group 1; 
The membership function of C1 with C1, C1 with C2, C1 with C3 and C1 with C4 
are (1.00, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 ) 
Geometric Mean of C1 is = ( 1*1*1*1 ) 
¼
 = 1.00 
The membership function of C2 with C1, C2 with C2, C2 with C3 and C2 with C4 
are (0.33, 1.00, 0.33, 1.00 ) 
Geometric Mean of C2 is = ( .33*1*.33*1 ) 
¼
 = 0.58 
The membership function of C3 with C1, C3 with C2, C3 with C3 and C3 with C4 
are (0.33, 1.00, 1.00, 1.00 ) 
Geometric Mean of C3 is = ( .33*1*1*1 ) 
¼
 = 0.76 
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The membership function of C4 with C1, C4 with C2, C4 with C3 and C4 with C4 
are (0.20, 0.33, 0.33, 1.00 ) 
Geometric Mean of C4 is = ( .2*.33*.33*1 ) 
¼
 = 0.39 
 Normalized Fuzzy Values for Group 1.1= ( 0.37, 0.21, 0.28, 0.14 )      
 Normalized values are calculated for  Group 1  as; 
 Normalized Fuzzy Values of  Group 1.2 = ( 0.32, 0.25, 0.25, 0.19 ) 
 Normalized Fuzzy Values of  Group 1.3 = ( 0.39, 0.20, 0.26, 0.15 ) 
 Same calculations have been done for Group 2 and Group 3. 
Table 4.44 : Membership functions of  linguistic scales for group cumulative. 
 
For the calculation membership functions of  group cumulative , weight of each 
group experts has been taken as the exponent of  each membership function. 
Exponent value of each membership function as a result of pair wise comparison, is 
multiplied by each other to find their cumulative values. Group cumulative matrix is 
shown in Table 4.44.  
Same calculations have been done for the membership functions of group cumulative 
as in the calculation of normalized values of membership functions of group 1.  
Normalized fuzzy values are calculated as; 
Group Cumulative 1 =  (0.30, 0.20, 0.37, 0.13) 
Group Cumulative 2 =  ( 0.29, 0.24, 0.31, 0.16) 
Group Cumulative 3 =   ( 0.32, 0.20, 0.35, 0.13) 
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Table 4.45 : Median of membership functions for group cumulative. 
 
It has been taken the average of normalized values of Group Cumulative 1, 2 and 3 
as follows; 
Average Normalized Values of Group Cumulative =  (0.30, 0.22, 0.34, 0.14 ) 
Next step is the calculation of the CCI (Centric Consistency Index).  Equation 3.17  
is applied for the values in Table 4.45 for calculation of the CCI value. Table 4.46 
shows the CCI value of the group cumulative matrix. 
Table 4.46 : CCI value of  four main criteria. 
 
As it is mentioned in Section 3.3.2.2.1, if CCI value is calculated less than 0.35 for 4 
criteria, the questionnaire survey is sufficiently consistent.  
The last step is to find MAN (Mean Aggregated Weights) of 4 main criteria in the 
occurrence of the accidents in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone. Sum of the membership 
function values for each criteria which is shown in Table 4.44, is calculated as 
follows; 
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Table 4.47 : Sum of the membership function values in the matrix of group 
cumulative. 
∑ C1 3.52 5.16 9.86 
∑ C2 2.66 4.00 6.00 
∑ C3 4.55 5.58 10.89 
∑  C4 1.77 2.85 3.52 
Sum 12.50 17.59 30.27 
Pairwise comparison between sum of the membership functions in group cumulative 
calculated as;  
 
Example as pairwise comparison of ∑ C1 with ∑ C3 is calculated as follows; 
If      ( ∑C1 med > ∑ C3 med  ) ; 1 
If      ((∑C1 med  - ∑C1 max ) – ( ∑ C3 med - ∑ C3 min )) = 0 ; 0 ;  
        (∑C3min - ∑C1max) / ((∑C1med - ∑C1max) - (∑C3med - ∑C3min))                      (4.13) 
 = 0,96 
Pairwise comparison between sum of the membership functions as follows; 
∑ C1 ∑ C1 1,00 
 
Norm. 
∑ C1 ∑ C2 1,00 
  ∑ C1 ∑ C3 0,96 0,96 0,30 
∑ C1 ∑ C4 1,00 
  
     
     ∑ C2 ∑ C2 1,00 
  ∑ C2 ∑ C1 0,85 
  ∑ C2 ∑ C3 0,79 0,79 0,24 
∑ C2 ∑ C4 1,00 
  
     
     ∑ C3 ∑ C3 1,00 
  ∑ C3 ∑ C1 1,00 
  ∑ C3 ∑ C2 1,00 1,00 0,31 
∑ C3 ∑ C4 1,00 
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∑ C4 ∑ C4 1,00 
  ∑ C4 ∑ C1 0,56 
  ∑ C4 ∑ C2 0,75 0,46 0,14 
∑ C4 ∑ C3 0,46 
 
1,00 
     
     
The normalized values of the results give the mean aggregated weights (MAN) of 4 
main criteria. 
Table 4.48 : Weights of main criteria which affect the occurrence of accidents. 
Mean aggregated weights and pair wise comparisons between criteria, sub-criteria 
and alternatives are shown in Appendix E.  
4.3.4 Factors affecting safety of navigation in the research area 
Factors affecting the navigation safety are determined by the calculation of the final 
weights of the alternatives. There are 4 main criteria, 14 sub-criteria and 6 
alternatives are identified in the questionnaire survey. The calculations of the weights 
are shown in Appendix E. The calculation of the final weight for A1 (Alternative 1) 
is shown as an example in the following; ( WGB = Weight Global ) 
                                         WGB = Cn * Cnxm * Ak                                                  (4.14)       
  
  Global Weight of A1 with C1 and C_1-1 : WGB1 = Wc1 *Wc_1-1 * WA1 = 0.05  
  Global Weight of A1 with C1 and C_1-2 : WGB2 = Wc1 *Wc_1-2 * WA1 = 0.05 
  Global Weight of A1 with C2 and C_2-1 : WGB3 = Wc2 *Wc_2-1 * WA1 = 0.02 
  Global Weight of A1 with C2 and C_2-2 : WGB4  = Wc2 *Wc_2-2 * WA1 = 0.02 
  Global Weight of A1 with C2 and C_2-3 : WGB5  = Wc2 *Wc_2-3 * WA1 = 0.01 
  Global Weight of A1 with C2 and C_2-4 : WGB6  = Wc2 *Wc_2-4 * WA1 = 0.01 
  Global Weight of A1 with C3 and C_3-1 : WGB7   = Wc3 *Wc_3-1 * WA1 = 0.02 
MAIN CRITERIA (C ) 
MEAN AGGREGATED WEIGHT 
(MAN) 
Accident Criteria Sourced by Vessel   (C1) 0.30 
Accident Criteria Based on Port Structure (C2) 0.24 
Accident Criteria Caused  by Environmental Conditions (C3) 0.31 
Accident Criteria Based on VTS/ Regulations (C4) 0.14 
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  Global Weight of A1 with C3 and C_3-2 : WGB8   = Wc3 *Wc_3-2 * WA1 = 0.02 
  Global Weight of A1 with C3 and C_3-3 : WGB9  = Wc3 *Wc_3-3 * WA1 = 0.01 
  Global Weight of A1 with C3 and C_3-4 : WGB10 = Wc3 *Wc_3-4 * WA1 = 0.02 
  Global Weight of A1 with C3 and C_3-5 : WGB11 = Wc3 *Wc_3-5 * WA1 = 0.02 
  Global Weight of A1 with C4 and C_4-1 : WGB12 = Wc3 *Wc_4-1 * WA1 = 0.01 
  Global Weight of A1 with C4 and C_4-2 : WGB13 = Wc3 *Wc_4-2 * WA1 = 0.01 
  Global Weight of A1 with C4 and C_4-3 : WGB14 =  Wc3 *Wc_4-3 * WA1 = 0.01 
∑ WGB(A1)  = WGB1 +  WGB2 + WGB3 + WGB4 + WGB5 + WGB6 + WGB7 + WGB8 + WGB9 
+ WGB10 WGB11 + WGB12 + WGB13 + WGB14 
∑ WGB (A1)  = 0.270 is the final weight of Alternative 1. 
Table 4.49 represents the final weights of six alternatives which influence the safety 
of navigation in the research area. 
Table 4.49 :  Importance ranking and final weights of the alternatives. 
Alternative Description Weight Ranking 
A2 High Volume Traffic ( Local Traffic, Other Traffic,  Fishing Boats) 0.271 1 
A1 Environmental Conditions  ( Wave, Wind, Current, Mist, Night) 0.270 2 
A6 Technical Failures ( Propulsion, Steering, Machinery Failures) 0.134 3 
A5 Human Factors (Complacency, Distraction, Negligence…e.t.c) 0.134 3 
A3 Inadequate Ship Control,  Pilotage and Towage Service 0.106 4 
A4 Inadequate VTS/ Port Authority 0.084 5 
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 5.    CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMENDATIONS 
Strait of Istanbul in terms of safety navigation is one of the world’s most dangerous 
and narrowest waterways with its specific hydrographical, meteorological, and 
topographical conditions.  Traffic in Istanbul Strait, considering the extensive local 
traffic, exceeds the limits of a safe transition and it is expected to become even more 
complex. In parallel with the contemporary technological developments and the 
growing trade volume in recent years, sizes of vessels passing through the strait have 
grown.  Increasing the number of vessels carrying hazardous cargo, especially 
petroleum, reveals a serious threat on safety of navigation, human and environment. 
Occurrence of an accident between vessels carrying dangerous cargo might  result in 
catastrophic levels in that narrow waterway.  
In this dissertation, the risk level of all accidents which occurred in the Port of 
Haydarpaşa Zone, located in the Southern entrance of the Istanbul Strait,  is found 
based on the historical accident data during the period 1991-2010. In addition, a 
questionnaire survey application is implemented to the experts (captains) who have 
sailed in this region.  
First, the type and characteristics of accidents which occurred in the research area are 
determined based on historical accident reports database. The most common 
accidents are selected for the analysis to find out causal factors as risk parameters 
related to these unwanted incidents. Evaluation of the risk parameters would be 
useful and necessary to prevent the fatalities, injuries, sea and air pollution, loss of 
vessel and cargo, damage to the infrastructures, loss of time and money.  
Several risk analysis methods such as Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) and Fuzzy-AHP models have been used.  
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A data table has been generated for 129 accidents which occurred in the research 
area, and analyzed in PHA to find out the causal factors. Collisions with 60 
accidents, groundings with 24 accidents, and contacts with 18 accidents come out as 
the major incidents and these three types of accidents are investigated by using FTA.  
A questionnaire survey has been applied to 57 expert captains who have sailed in this 
region for establishing Fuzzy-AHP model.  
As a result of FTA, high volume traffic and strong currents are the major factors in 
the occurrence of contacts. Underwater work structures, mooring area close to the 
research area, breakwater and Quays of Haydarpaşa Port significantly affect the 
realization of contact probability. Propulsion failures and lack of maneuvering 
control with the incompetency of the deck crew have a big role in the occurrence of 
the contacts. Visibility and lack of visual observation do not have effects on contacts.  
Strong current condition in the strait is the main factor for the occurrence of 
groundings as in the occurrence of contacts. Blackout of the main engine or any 
reason for stopping the engine power increases the risk of groundings. Incompetency 
and negligence as evaluated human factors onboard operations significantly increase 
the probability of groundings. Grounding causes are dominated by handling errors 
from ship control failures.  None of the propulsion failure event resulted in 
grounding during the period 1991-2010. There is a little effect of visibility as 
evaluated in marginal conditions for grounding of a vessel. 
Analysis of collisions with fault tree approach is evaluated into two categories as; 
navigation related collisions, and maneuvering related collisions. 31 collisions 
related with navigating and 29 collisions related with maneuvering situation from 60 
collisions causing serious casualties. This is equivalent to an average of 1,55 
collisions related with the navigation and  1,45 collisions related with the 
maneuvering operation  involvements per calendar year.  
The main reason for navigation related collisions is found as complacency and 
negligence of deck crew from human factors as the result of the analysis. Lack of 
radar observation is common and significant failures in the occurrence of navigation 
related collisions. Planning failure of the transition with strong current effect on the 
vessel determined a high risk level for these category accidents. None of the 
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technical failure events  affected the occurrence of navigation related collisions in 20 
year periods. 
The primary cause of maneuvering related collisions is analyzed as distraction of the 
captain and handling errors in the narrow fairway. Additionally, steering failure has 
been determined as another significant factor in the occurrence of maneuvering 
related collisions. Strong currents and traffic volume major external conditions affect 
the realization of this type accidents. Propulsion and machinery failures do not have 
big effects on the maneuvering related collisions due to the analysis. 
In Fuzzy-AHP model, the nature of accidents is found out by consulting regional 
experts in this application. According to the expert opinions, strategies were 
investigated by analyzing the causal factors of the accidents for the prevention 
measures. The purpose of this application is to analyze the result of experts findings 
in accordance with their views and to contribute to the development of strategies 
which can provide solutions in order to prevent marine accidents.  
The questionnaire survey has been conducted to 57 experts including pilots, Vessel 
Traffic Services Operators, Local Traffic Vessel Captains and Master Marines who 
had a lot of experience in  passing through the Istanbul Strait. 
In Fault Tree Analysis,  the  parameters such as; technical failures, failures related to 
the ship control, human factors and external conditions in addition possibility of 
accidents based on historical data are  investigated in order to determine the degree 
of danger. On the basis of the results from the Fault Tree Analysis parameters, a 
questionnaire survey has been prepared to be applied to the experts so as to make a 
clear comparison between these two models. 
4 main criteria, 14 sub-criteria under main criteria, and 6 alternatives form the 
questionnaire for the evaluation of the experts opinions about the causal factors for 
the occurrence of the accidents.  
According to Fuzzy-AHP model, high traffic volume  identified as Alternative 1 and 
environmental conditions   identified as Alternative 2 are found out as the major 
factors affecting the occurrence of the accidents with the approximately in the same 
weights . Effects of technical failures and human factors are determined in the same 
degree with the same weights after traffic and environmental conditions. Alternative 
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3 has significant effects but not as many as human errors and technical failures. It has 
been determined that inadequate VTS and Port Authority mentioned as Alternative  
4, do not have  an important effect for the accidents in the research area. 
For the comparison of two model results, the parameters of FTA on  Fuzzy-AHP 
alternatives has been integrated as follows; 
 Visibility, illumination, wind, wave and current  are determined  in the same 
category  and identified under A1( Environmental Conditions) 
 Traffic volume and narrow fairway are determined in the same category  and 
identified under  A2 ( High volume traffic) 
 Lack of navigation control, handling failure, lack of maneuvering control and 
high speed are determined in the same category  and  identified under  A3 
(Inadequate ship control, pilotage and towage service ) 
 Planning failure and fixed positioning  are determined in the same category 
and  identified under A4 (  Inadequate VTS /Port Authority ) 
 Complacency, distraction, drunkenness, incompetency, negligence lack of 
visual observation and lack of radar observation are determined in the same 
category and identified under A5 (Human Factors) 
 Propulsion failure, steering failure and machinery failure are determined in 
same category and identified under A6 (Technical Failure). 
Importance ranking of alternatives which cause the accidents has been evaluated as 
the result of FTA and Fuzzy-AHP models and given in the following tables.  
Table 5.1 : Importance ranking of alternatives analyzed by FTA. 
Ranking Contacts Groundings Collisions (Navigation)  Collisions (Maneuvering) 
1 A2 A2 A4 A2 
2 A6 A3 A5 A5 
3 A5 A6 A2 A3 
4 A1 A1 A1 A6 
5 A3 A5 A3 A1 
6 A4 A4 A6 A4 
It is indicated that contact, grounding and maneuvering related collision causes are 
dominated by A2 mentioned as traffic volume and narrow fairway conditions. 
Moreover, A2 has the most significant effect in the occurrence of accidents in 
navigation related collisions as shown in Table 5.1. It could be determined that the 
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major factor of accidents which are analyzed with FTA is the traffic volume with the 
narrow fairway conditions. 
Human factor (complacency, distraction, drunkenness, negligence, incompetency, 
lack of visual observation, lack of radar observation) mentioned as A5 is evaluated as 
a secondary factor affecting the navigation safety in the navigation related and 
maneuvering related collisions as shown in Table 5.1.  Human errors significantly 
affect the occurrence of contacts in the research area. Especially lack of experience 
of the captain for navigating in this fairway increases the risk of contact. Human 
factor does not have effects on contacts as much as the other analyzed accident types. 
It is very hard situation for a vessel which has a technical failure while passing or 
crossing the strait in strong current and high traffic volume. A6 mentioned as 
technical failures significantly affect the occurrence of contacts in high volume 
traffic situations. Technical failure on the vessel increases the risk of grounding after 
drifting in this narrow fairway.  In maneuvering operations, failure on the propulsion 
system or steering system might result in the grounding of the vessel if the vessel has 
high speed. Technical failures do not have any effects on navigation related 
collisions in the research area. 
Ship control, pilotage and towage service mentioned as A3 have significant effects in 
the occurrence of groundings and maneuvering related collisions as shown in Table 
5.1. If there are failures due to ship control, pilotage and towage service, A3 does not 
have a big effect in the occurrence of contacts and navigation related collisions.  
External conditions (A1), especially strong current is a very dangerous situation for 
the vessels navigating in the research area. However, the results of fault tree analysis 
show that A1 is a moderate factor for the accidents occurred. Visibility, illumination, 
wind, wave and current parameters are analyzed for the calculations. Taking all 
parameters mentioned above into account, the calculations might give such results. 
VTS and Port Authority category mentioned as A4, have minimum effects in the 
occurrence of accidents except the navigation related collisions.  Surprisingly, A4 is 
the major causal factor for this type of accidents. 
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The results represented in Table 5.1 are designed for establishing the alternative sets 
to make a comparison with the Fuzzy-AHP model. Fuzzy-AHP model is applied for 
all types of accidents with general expressions. Table 5.2 represents the importance 
rankings of FTA and Fuzzy-AHP alternatives results for all type of accidents. 
Table 5.2 : Importance ranking of alternatives determined from FTA and Fuzzy-
AHP results. 
Ranking FTA ( for all Accidents) FAHP 
1 A2 A2 
2 A5 A1 
3 A1 A5 
4 A6 A6 
5 A3 A3 
6 A4 A4 
Table 5.2 gives the comparison of final rankings of alternatives determined for both 
FTA and FAHP models. The normalized weight values of alternatives calculated   
for each accident (contact, grounding, navigation related collision, maneuvering 
related collision) are combined and normalized for the determination of all accidents 
which are analyzed in FTA model. The calculations and normalizations have been 
done to enable the two models to be compared.  
In table 5.2, traffic volume and narrow fairway expressed as A2 is evaluated as the 
primary major causal factor in the occurrence of accidents in two models. Especially 
FTA results show that, contacts are most likely in difficult port approaches with 
restricted searoom to maneuver around infrastructures. 72% of the contacts occurred 
while passing through underwater work zone, breakwater and mooring area. Other 
ships might restrict the searoom for maneuvering or require avoiding action on the 
vessel, making contacts on other obstacles and vessels more likely in the research 
area. Traffic volume had a major effect on contacts in the research area. 78% of the 
contacts occurred in high volume traffic situations. 75% of the vessels grounded on 
shallow area, breakwater and quay in the Port of Haydarpaşa. Traffic situation is not 
a major effect as on contacts. 58 % of the groundings occurred in high volume traffic 
situations. Crossing local traffic and passing transit traffic constitute a high risk of 
navigation related collisions. 8 of the collisions from 31 occurred due to high traffic 
volume during the period 1991-2010. Mooring area, breakwater, quays of 
Haydarpaşa Port and underwater work area do not constitute a high risk for the 
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collisions due to navigation. Investigated data shows that restricted searoom 
conditions are the major for maneuvering related collisions from the external 
conditions category. 23 of the collisions were affected by   the infrastructures on the 
fairway and high traffic volume. Breakwater of Haydarpaşa significantly increases 
the risk of collisions due to maneuvering especially for local traffic.  59% of the 
collisions related to maneuvering occurred in the high traffic volume during the 20 
years. 
It has been determined that external conditions and human factors are the secondary 
main causal factors for the occurrence of the accidents in two models. It is found that 
effects of the human behaviors and errors onboard operations are more significant 
than the effects of external conditions as the result of FTA. However, the results of 
FAHP show that external conditions are more important than the human factor.  The 
reason for differentiation in the FTA and FAHP comparison is that the experts 
answered this questionnaire taking into account all types of accidents while forming 
FAHP model. Another reason for the differentiation is that the effects of human 
factor on the accidents were ignored. 
As a result of these two analyses A3, A4, and A6 alternatives are shown to have the 
same degree of effect on the accidents in two models in the research area. 
Finally, some distinctions have been identified between two methods. It has been 
found that FAHP is the most suitable method for analyzing the causal factors for 
accidents only under general conditions. On the other hand, the details of the causal 
factors of accidents have been evaluated mainly by using FTA method.  
 Findings of the research are listed below: 
1. The southern entrance of the Istanbul Strait is a highly risky waterway, 
and local marine traffic is the main reason for those risks. One-way traffic 
and local traffic separation scheme implementations promote navigation 
safety in this area. 
2. When probability of contact in the Port of Haydarpaşa Zone is compared 
with the accidents analyzed, it is found to be higher than grounding and 
collision. 
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3. The number of vessels running in the research area during the period 
08:00-00:00 hours increases the risk of accidents. Results show that the 
local traffic departure times could be re-arranged in the Southern entrance 
of the strait in order to decrease potential encounters and ship handling 
difficulties. Also, necessary safety precautions should be taken such as 
more intensive VTS surveillance for both local and transit vessels in order 
to minimize existing encounter risks. 
4. On the basis of the results of statistical studies, the most risky part of the 
research area is the region between Port of Haydarpaşa- Harem Fairway 
and Sarayburnu. On the other hand, this area is on the border of two 
Vessel Traffic System (VTS) sectors. The Istanbul region is divided into 
four VTS sectors. Each sector is controlled by different operators. The 
VTS system allows operators to see other sectors, but the operators must 
only consider their own sectors. Thus, the VTS sector borders cause 
confusion and reduce the effectiveness of the VTS. Since the most risky 
area of the strait is on the border, the research findings strongly 
recommend that the VTS sector line should be shifted to another location. 
The results also indicate that there is a necessity for improvement of 
navigation safety. 
5. Continuity of one-way traffic, which has been implemented since 2003 
due to an underwater project (Marmaray), is an ongoing discussion. One-
way traffic implementation is determined by expert surveys as the most 
effective counter measure. One-way traffic implementation improves 
navigation safety. As stated before, the research area is determined as a 
highly risky fairway. Hence, continuity of one-way traffic implementation 
is strongly recommended. The VTS in Istanbul could continue to regulate 
transit ship passage especially during high volume traffic times. With one 
way transit, the hazards arising  from third party vessel actions are largely 
removed, and risk management is therefore much more within the control 
of the VTS operators.  
6. According to COLREG Rule 10, in a TSS crossing vessels should cross 
"as nearly as practicable at right angles to the general direction of traffic 
flow", and this is taken in to consideration when the LTSSs are proposed. 
Thus, confusion for transit ships due to crossing vessel's intentions and 
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courses would be reduced and at the same time would enable crossing 
vessels to cross the lane as quickly as possible. Navigators on transit ships 
would know in which location local traffic should go east bound and west 
bound. Thus, it could be helpful for the improvement of the situational 
awareness of navigators on transit ships. In the present situation, local 
traffic vessels cross from one side to the other on irregular routes which 
cause enormous stress to transit vessel navigators despite the fact that 
local traffic vessels must give the way. 
7. Fishing boats concentrated in this region are another factor that adversely 
affects traffic. In accordance with this data, the navigators must recognize 
the region to minimize the risks, in terms of safety of navigation.  
Therefore, the requirement of obtaining a pilot should be implemented to 
all vessels passing the strait. According to the captains navigating in the 
research area, fishing should be prohibited for safety of navigation. 
8. Vessels passing the strait change their routes at least 12 times with 
increasing rate of current. Currents in the strait generally engage the 
likelihood of an accident for the north-south passage vessels in the 
research area. 
9. Illumination of  roads, streets, buildings, restaurants on the shore, which 
cause light pollution, prevent the vessels from distinguishing navigation 
lights of the other ships, lights of buoys and lights of lighthouses in the 
strait. In that case, the number, sight distances and power of lightings of 
the navigation aids should be increased and the authority should continue 
the improvement of navigation aids for safety of navigation. 
10. Technical capacity of the tugs which give services to the vessels should be 
improved.  Such services should be compatible with international norms. 
11.  In order to reduce the human errors, captains who navigate in the research 
area should take necessary trainings under the ISM code and STCW 
regulations of IMO. 
12. Ship inspections due to traffic rules should be increased under COLREG 
10 for the safety of navigation. 
13. Contact is a high risk in the Port Area of Haydarpaşa as in the research 
area. Analyzed reports and survey to the experts show that breakwater, 
quay and berthed vessels are the main factor for the contacts in the port. 
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14. The inner side of the breakwater is a safety region against bad weather and 
sea conditions. However, it seriously restricts the maneuvering area for the 
local traffic and increase the risk of collision as the secondary factor. In 
addition, the currents which come from the strait and turn into complex 
currents create another risk for the collisions. According to data obtained 
from reports, vessels continuously show a tendency to fall over the 
breakwater. In this case, the tugs try to keep the vessels safely in the water 
side of the breakwater.  It is very hard situation to keep the vessel in a safe 
area while in maneuvering operation in the breakwater. The appropriate 
situation is anchoring while departing from the port area.  The entrance of 
the port area can be made slightly wider for arriving/departing facilities 
and safety of navigation. Breakwater should be redesigned for using the 
south region. 
15. The local traffic and the other traffic which arrives/departs from the port 
are another reason for collisions in the breakwater and port area. Vessels 
should maneuver in safe distance from the other vessels. 
16. Increasing the maneuvering time creates risk of contacts to the quays of 
Haydarpaşa Port. The local traffic and restricted maneuvering area 
increase these risks. 
17. Under strong southwester and borealis wind, number of the ropes should 
be increased. 
In the literature, FTA and Fuzzy-AHP models are not used for analyzing of the 
accidents in the research area before. This study is the first FTA and Fuzzy-AHP 
approach together in the Strait of Istanbul. The causal factors are found out and 
analyzed based on the historical accidents and a questionnaire survey is applied for 
current and future analysis.  
Some limitations were experienced during the research. Problems have been 
experienced due to lack of data in the interpretation of statistical concepts. 
Availability and quality of the information affect on the degree of uncertainty in the 
data. There are drawbacks to obtaining the second-hand data sources. FTA and 
Fuzzy-AHP models application of complex systems used in the scope of the analysis 
is very costly for the first time and time consuming within this research. The 
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reliability of the data obtained from the accident reports has not been tested. 
Restricted data is published in the reports of some accidents.   
Finally, contemporary systems and equipments should be used to reduce the risk of 
navigation in maritime transportation. Risk management comes over as an 
appropriate solution for reducing navigation risk in the research area.  Risk 
assessment, risk control options, cost benefit analysis are necessary processes for 
decision makers. Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) should be implemented as 
recommended by IMO for the research area to find out the dark points of accidents.  
FTA and Fuzzy-AHP models will be applied for another complex port zone under 
the determined parameters of this study. Especially, based on artificial intelligence 
logic, FTA could be used as a system which updates the risk levels whenever an 
accident occurs.  
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